The pan-green camp's current view of the anti-corruption campaign against President Chen Shui-bian (
I believe that the ethnic issue is part of the campaign, but Mainlanders are not the only ethnic group driving the protests. A group deserving of greater attention is the growing and increasingly complex amalgam of "fake Taiwanese." Ignoring this trend will cause the pan-green camp's ethnic policy to gradually depart from reality.
We need to clarify that even if the anti-Chen campaign also includes pan-blue supporters, this does not diminish the possibility that the campaign might have a positive effect on political integrity in Taiwan. The values represented by the campaign may also affect ethnic politics, adding more "red" into the "blue."
If the color red represents nationality, then the pan-green camp had also been red in the past, since it made its ethnic identification part of Taiwan's democracy movement, accomplishing its democratic goals under the slogan "the Taiwanese stand up." After the process of democratization was near completion, however, the pan-green camp continued to rely on ethnic identification, leading to the confrontation between the pan-blue and pan-green camps.
Because the pan-green's nationalism fed on the energy arising from ethnic conflict, the attempt to resolve this conflict by establishing a pan-Taiwanese nationalism based on "a shared community of the main four ethnic groups" or the "new Taiwanese" concept failed.
Some pro-green academics then considered the possibility that civic democracy -- the practice of democracy at the municipal level where an active and engaged citizenry is the primary source of political power -- could be used to consolidate national identification.
However, a civic identity grows out of unselfish participation in public affairs, whereas Taiwan is still in the initial stages of developing a public culture and a civil society. A civic identity based solely on the universal value of democracy lacks the passion and energy that stems from national identification. Relying on democracy is not enough to build nationalism.
Similarly, I believe that civic values and identification solely based on the call for anti-corruption is insufficient to provide the passion and energy the red camp needs to sustain long-term opposition.
The red camp also has its own brand of ethnic identification, but the question of whether the red and pan-blue camps are the same does not matter anymore, since the pan-blue camp no longer consists of only Mainlanders, and since cities and counties in northern Taiwan have started leaning toward the pan-blues. These changes show that ethnicity has taken on a new meaning.
On the surface, the blue-green confrontation over the past few years has been a conflict between identification with a Republic of Taiwan and the Republic of China. But the formation of the pan-blue camp and its recent transformation, as well as the reds' intense efforts to transcend the green and blue camps, are an attempt to resist the exclusiveness of pan-green ethnic nationalism rather than a push for ROC nationalism.
In other words, the changing pan-blue camp and the red camp are made up of groups excluded by the pan-green camp's ethnic nationalism.
Pan-green supporters may think that Taiwanese nationalism has only made some Mainlanders feel excluded. Aren't "new Taiwanese," "cultural diversity" and the "Chinese Taiwanese" concept proposed by Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairman Yu Shyi-kun last month sufficiently tolerant discourses?
This kind of thinking, however, is indicative of the pan-green camp's blind spot. The pan-greens still basically divide Taiwan on language and blood lines into four groups -- Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders and Aboriginals. Some may add in foreign brides and other new immigrants.
What the green camp fails to see is that in addition to some people feeling excluded on the basis of language and blood line, globalization has created many more identities, aspirations and choices which supersede ethnic and language divisions and often also override state borders.
Taiwanese ethnic nationalism often becomes a stumbling block to those pursuing these new oppor-tunities and choices or cause these new ethnic groups to feel a lack of tolerance toward the mainstream identity. The most obvious problem of Taiwanese nationalism is seen in the Taiwan/China polarization, which creates an atmosphere where the groups that see the future in closer ties with China feel thwarted or excluded.
But there are many more new identities and ethnic groups in Tai-wan than the Taiwanese/Chinese labels that most concern the pan-greens. For example, some people who are physically in Taiwan may have a Korean identity thanks to the Internet -- they could be called "Koreans of Taiwanese descent," just as other people who live in the international sphere could be labeled based on their location. These people exist everywhere, although they normally act as if they are Taiwanese citizens like everybody else.
These "fake Taiwanese" accept a Taiwanese nationality but no longer focus their identification on blood and language line or nationality. They may primarily identify with their sexual orientation, a subculture, certain ideals, a religion, a lifestyle, an industry, or a hobby and so on. The Taiwanese nationalism promoted by the pan-green camp is not a nationalism that these people identify with, and it will cause these groups to feel insecure and angry.
Globalization has brought more resources and opportunities to the north of the country, perhaps because people in this area are more integrated into global commercial networks and are unwilling to be defined along blood and language lines.
The exclusionary nature of Taiwanese ethnic nationalism affects gender as well as politics. After the end of martial law, gender equality became more possible, and women as a group climbed the social ladder and improved themselves. As a result, they may be the most likely to protest the inevitable exclusion caused by ethnic nationalism. That increasing numbers of women are joining the red-clad protesters should not be surprising.
In the past, young people embraced the DPP because the party was closer to the younger generation, but today's young have grown up in a globalizing world and threaten to become an army of potential "fake Taiwanese" and subscribers to new identities. When they become employed and push for a state that doesn't limit their individual global opportunities and choices, the DPP's policies based on ethnic nationalism will face even greater dangers.
However, since globalization also has brought with it a quest to recognize local cultures, conditions for exclusive ethnic policies and nationalism still exist. Although part of the need for recognition of local culture will be commercialized, this need can be integrated with ethnic politics in areas where globalization has not made itself fully felt.
In addition, because nationalism remains an important tool when nation states adopt defensive attitudes and strategies toward globalization, it will remain even under a pan-blue govern-ment, although not in the form of ethnic Taiwanese nationalism.
Without any major changes with-in the pan-green camp, however, it will probably continue to pursue ethnic nationalism, which implies that the blue-green confrontation will continue. But will it intensify? Will the market for ethnic nationalism shrink? This will depend on Taiwan's future development in a globalizing world.
Ning Yin-bin is a professor in the Graduate Institute of Philosophy at National Central University.
Translated by Eddy Chang, Jason Cox and Perry Svensson
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