If former American Institute in Taiwan chairman Nat Bellocchi is to be believed, the push to oust President Chen Shui-bian (
If this is the case, the charade is not working. If anything, forces in the KMT are now using the maverick campaign to undermine Ma, accusing him of being a pushover. Presumably, these KMT hardliners would prefer Ma lead an armed assault on the Presidential Office with a few thousand stormtroopers in tow, or at least join the sit-in and pout for a few hours like former KMT chairman Lien Chan (
Yesterday's developments offer Ma and his supporters a reminder that all is not well within their party, and that Ma's increasingly vocal enemies in the pan-blue camp are looking for opportunities to undermine his authority -- and eventually prevent him from being the KMT's presidential candidate.
When Ma was elected KMT chairman -- against the expectations of most media commentators and despite fervent opposition from the party's inner circle -- there was a sense among grassroots supporters that the party could be energized and taken in a new direction, if not one entirely free of thuggery and contempt for democratic principles.
This was based on Ma's history of cultivating a reasonably clean persona -- and exercising authority in this manner -- despite being surrounded by the filthiest of the filthy.
The problem is, the forces that would prefer the KMT return to its roots have decided that Ma is not their man, and they are regrouping. If he is to withstand these attacks from within, Ma is going to have to demonstrate that he can stand up for himself in ways other than weakly parroting the language of blue-camp firebrands.
Ma claims that he has "hardened up." Unfortunately, this is not reflected in Ma taking his own line and sticking to it, but in taking a harder line to disarm blue-camp extremists. This is not political strength, nor is it pragmatism; it is flat-footed, wishy-washy and manipulable behavior.
The average blue-camp voter does not endorse public disorder. It would therefore benefit Ma and the nation's morale if he spoke more for the broad majority of people that gave him his chance to be president and less for the rabble rousers within his party and without.
Ma's defense of his role as keeper of the peace in Taipei against the bleatings of KMT city councilors -- who would have anti-Chen protesters break the law and not be accountable -- is proof that Ma has the ability to stare down miscreants in his party. Unfortunately, he so often seems unable to stare down miscreants with any power. That is why he capitulated so readily when People First Party Chairman James Soong (
Reforming the KMT was always going to involve some bloodletting, but now it seems that Ma will have a serious struggle on his hands to achieve this. If Ma cannot control his troops, the DPP will be able to ask: "Who will really have power in a KMT government and can they be trusted?"
The skeletons in the KMT's closet are too many and too odious for the pan-green camp not to be able to exploit this angle, despite its complacency and ham-fisted politicking of late, and despite growing alienation among voters. If things continue in this direction, the DPP will be thrown a lifeline for an election that it should never have been able to win.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
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