Even if times change drastically, the rules of US diplomacy may not. Take the rules guiding the US relationship with Taiwan. Once again, the US Congress is attempting to make changes in US-Taiwan diplomatic ties. The executive branch opposes such efforts, because foreign policy is supposed to be its turf. Congress rarely succeeds because it tries to do too much at once. As for China, all it needs to do is grumble. This process has repeated itself over the years, like a broken record.
That may be an exaggeration, but not by much. At least not for someone who has pushed for changing the rules for 15 years. Following my first visit to Taiwan in 1990 after becoming chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, I gave a speech to the Sino-American Cultural Society in Washington. I gave a talk about how Taiwan was democratizing, which was news to many members, who were strong supporters of the "Free China" (the government of Chiang Kai-shek [
Over the years my speeches and reports continued to include this subject, but the US government did not seem to make any effort to help strengthen Taiwan's democratization, aside from paying occasional lip service to democracy in general. China disapproved of any change in Taiwan that strengthened its democratic government. That attitude continues now and goes unchallenged, even by the democratic world.
Support in helping Taiwan make needed changes to its democratic system has been very rare. In 1992 some effort was made to review the rules, but that process was thwarted by senior experts in the State Department and dropped completely after the next elections. In 1994 a Taiwan Policy Review was completed, as had been promised to Congress. It produced very minimal changes, enough to pass Congress. Most of the review's efforts were actually spent assuring China that US policy on Taiwan would remain unchanged.
Now the US finds itself with a Taiwan that has fully established a people's democracy, and increasingly insists on governing itself under that system. It also finds itself dealing with a far different and far stronger China, which wields worldwide influence on many matters -- including its goal to absorb the now genuinely "Free China."
Within the US executive branch, there have always been different priorities in different agencies regarding the US-Taiwan relationship. Even within these agencies, there are conflicting interests on matters of economics and trade, regional security priorities, the potential for spreading democracy and the importance of geopolitical interests.
Congress has now, again, put on the table rather substantial changes to the rules regarding the US-Taiwan relationship. The House has put into the State Department's annual budget bill changes on a wide number of rules dealing with visits and meetings between US officials and their Taiwanese counterparts at the highest level.
In the past, the House has used what is known as expressing the "sense of the Congress" on most Taiwan-related manners. That means that Congress informs the executive branch of its opinions but does not require any action. An amendment to a budget bill several years ago that included similar measures on Taiwan as the present effort became law, but the wording seems to have made it possible for the executive branch to ignore it. This time the House's measure includes budget requirements that cannot be so easily avoided. The House provision, however, has yet to pass the Senate.
On the Senate side, senators George Allen and Tim Johnson have raised a "sense of the Congress" on similar Taiwan-related matters. How this will impact on the House version when the latter comes to the Senate is unclear. Whether the House version will be accepted by the Senate and signed by the president remains to be seen.
One of the difficulties will be the position of the executive branch. The State Department has already stated its opposition to the changes in relations with Taiwan proposed by the House. This inevitably includes the usual statement that the Executive Branch has the final say over matters of foreign policy. Also, as usual, it was stated that the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) is the foundation of US policy on Taiwan. Ironically, the TRA was largely formulated by Congress, not the executive branch.
The problem with keeping the rules effective is the difficulty of maintaining Congressional oversight and the inclination by the executive branch to avoid the trouble that would come with changing the rules, which would include Beijing's objections and Taiwan's pressure for rules that were even more to its liking. Requests by Congress for changes in the rules are too often too broad and well publicized, causing tensions with China.
The changes now being sought by Congress are reasonable and long overdue. There is a pressing need for better communication between the US and Taiwan in a rapidly changing atmosphere. Even China must be aware that better US-Taiwan communication would be a good thing for it, too.
Beijing today may still want to absorb Taiwan, but it is clearly well aware that it has far bigger problems within China than with Taiwan. It is also aware that the US (and Taiwan) do not want war over the issue any more than it does. It is time that the US, in its own interest, underlines the point that visits and meetings with senior Taiwanese officials in the US or Taiwan are in everyone's interest, including China's.
It's in no one's interest to have misunderstandings and tension while dealing with such sensitive issues.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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