In the early hours of July 5, North Korea tested seven missiles. Six short-and intermediate-range missiles were successfully launched but the nuclear-capable Taepodong-2 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) failed 42 seconds after lift-off. A working three-stage Taepodong-2 ICBM with a range of 15,000km could reach the western US.
However, the country most threatened by missiles from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is Japan. While US forces deployed in Japan are also at risk, it will be some time before North Korea can perfect the Taepodong-2 and develop a nuclear warhead for it. However, it is prudent to assume that in time, Pyongyang could develop the capability to threaten the US with nuclear attack.
So the race is on for the US to speed up its nascent missile defense system now located in Alaska and California, in cooperation with Japan. The US has just stationed a destroyer with the AEGIS anti-missile system at Yokosuka.
Another AEGIS destroyer will be sent to Japan in this month. How effective the AEGIS destroyers would be against the hundreds of missiles that North Korea could launch is unknown.
South Korea's position is ambivalent. President Roh Moo-hyun's government wants to continue the Sunshine Policy of engagement and reconciliation with the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.
China isn't overly excited by North Korea's missile brinkmanship. Its main concern is the diplomatic tactic of how not to be perceived as part of the problem while refusing to rein in the Pyongyang's truculence. For China, a nuclear-armed North Korea is useful in driving a wedge between the already strained US-South Korea relations, in pressuring the pro-China wing of Japan's policy establishment to further lean toward China, in diminishing US influence in East Asia and ultimately in compelling US disengagement from the region.
In response to the North Korean missile tests, Japan proposed on July 7 a binding UN Security Council resolution with the support of the US and its European allies to ban the transfer of missile and nuclear materials or technology to and from North Korea. This draft was based on the UN Charter's Chapter VII, which enables the Security Council to use force and impose sanctions.
On July 12 China's UN ambassador threatened to veto the proposed resolution on the grounds that it might serve as a pretext for military action against North Korea. China and Russia then proposed a non-binding resolution on July 15 which required all nations to prevent Pyongyang from receiving or transferring missile-related items and strongly urged North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and return to the six-party talks on that program. This watered-down resolution was passed, only to be rejected by North Korea's ambassador within the hour.
The fact is the US has few options in dealing with North Korea. Some observers in the US and Japan have advocated preemption, that is, strikes against North Korea's nuclear and missile facilities. This option is not realistic for many reasons. North Korea has thousands of underground tunnels and caves where it can conceal military assets.
Seoul is vulnerable to a massive attack by North Korea's long-range artillery. In a conflict it is estimated that civilian casualties could reach 1 million. South Korea would be most reluctant to fight for the US' security to the last Korean. In Iraq, the insurgency is looking more like the beginning of a civil war. In Afghanistan, the Taliban is enjoying a resurgence. US forces are already stretched thin in the Middle East. A ground war in Korea is unthinkable.
Another option is to look toward China for help. Since China reportedly supplies more than 40 percent of North Korea's food supplies and nearly 90 percent of its oil imports, in theory Beijing could apply leverage to moderate North Korea's errant behavior. To date, however, China has chosen to not cooperate. Instead, China concentrates on hosting the six-party talks in Beijing, which merely serve to showcase its growing importance, and Washington's seeming impotence, in managing regional problems.
In October 2002, then US assistant secretary of state James Kelly confronted the North Koreans with evidence of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment program, which the North Koreans affirmed and then denied. The dispute led to the abrogation of the 1994 Agreed Framework whereby North Korea was to freeze its nuclear program and allow monitoring by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency.
In return, the US was to supply heavy fuel oil and provide North Korea with two modern light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs). The collapse of the framework in turn enabled North Korea to reprocess 8,000 spent fuel rods, yielding enough plutonium for six nuclear weapons.
On Feb. 10 last year, Pyongyang announced that it had manufactured nuclear bombs and that it was suspending participation in the six-party talks as a result of US hostility.
The six-party talks (also including South Korea, China, Russia and Japan) began in August 2003. The five rounds of talks have largely been unproductive. At the conclusion of the fourth round, a joint statement was issued on Sept. 19 last year wherein North Korea promised to abandon all of its nuclear weapons and programs "at an early date" and the other parties recognized Pyongyang's right to a peaceful nuclear energy program. The parties also agreed to discuss at an appropriate time, North Korea's request for LWRs, to which the US was and is strongly opposed.
This agreement was devoid of substance not only because of the ambiguous language but also because Pyongyang's foreign ministry immediately asserted that the essential part of the agreement was "for the US to provide LWRs to the DPRK as early as possible." The ministry then warned "the US should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs."
The six-party talks were bound to be unfruitful because the participating nations have different interests and objectives which could be exploited by North Korea.
For Pyongyang, nuclear weapons and missiles are intended to deter a military attack by the US, are a means to extract economic aid from the US, Japan and South Korea, and function like a cash export crop to help sustain an impoverished economy where the per capita gross national income is US$800. For these reasons, North Korea is not likely to ever give up its nuclear program no matter what commitment it makes in the future.
In South Korea, the younger generation and the current government are more concerned about perceived US rigidity and hostility toward Pyongyang rather than any threat from the North. Their main objectives are peace and economic engagement leading eventually to unification.
For China, the main objective is a stable and viable North Korea, since a regime collapse could trigger a massive influx of refugees into northeast China. China is cultivating close political and economic relationships with South Korea, with the eventual aim of a unified Korean peninsula which is outside the loop of democratic states. The last thing China wants to see are the military forces of a democratic nation on its border.
Among the nations at the six-party talks, Japan reacted most strongly to Pyongyang's missile tests, since it is the nation most directly threatened by them. The whole of Japan is within range of the DPRK's short and medium-range missiles. Japan's tasks in enhancing its national security against a potential threat from North Korea, however, are not easy to implement.
First, Japan must modify Article 9 of its Peace Constitution so it can take more active steps in defending itself. In addition to collaborating with the US missile defense system against ICBMs, Japan needs to develop offensive missile capabilities, including cruise missiles which can degrade North Korea's nuclear infrastructure and other military assets.
For the US, any hope of resolving the North Korean impasse must be based on former US president Theodore Roosevelt's adage: speak softly and carry a big stick.
Aside from homeland security, the US is concerned with the proliferation of nuclear materials and technology. The best the US can hope for is probably the freezing, not abandonment, of North Korea's nuclear program. Promise of nonproliferation can be relied on only if the DPRK's economy improves to such an extent that it no longer needs to peddle nuclear and missile materials to survive.
Imposing sanctions and isolating Pyongyang will merely push North Korea closer to China and South Korea and will be counterproductive. Regime change would be a difficult goal to achieve.
The best course would be for the US to be more flexible and proactive. Washington should not be afraid to engage the North Koreans in bilateral negotiations within the framework of the six-party talks on issues such as a nonaggression pact and eventual recognition of the regime in Pyongyang.
Regional economic engagement with North Korea should be encouraged, since this is the only feasible way to foster a more stable and responsible regime.
For Taiwan, there is a silver lining in the recent Korean crisis.
First, the US may decide to expand and increase funding for its missile defense system. As this system becomes more effective, it will be easier for the US to help defend Taiwan if China attacks since a Chinese nuclear threat will be less credible.
Second, this month the Pentagon will start relocating the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system, along with 600 specially-trained troops from Texas to Okinawa. While designed to defend Japan, the PAC-3 system could also be useful in a Taiwan contingency.
Finally, the North Korean missile test could influence the election of Japan's new Prime Minister next month, to the benefit of Taiwan. The two main contenders are Yasuo Fukuda, who is more pro-China, and Shinzo Abe, who is more appreciative of Taiwan's strategic importance to Japan's vital sea lanes. Fukuda has reportedly been gaining on Abe, partly because of Beijing's calculated peace offensive.
For Taiwan, the North Korean missile tests should reinforce the urgent need to strengthen national defense, including the development of offensive missile capabilities, such as cruise missiles. Taipei should also be diligent in cooperating with the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative, a multi-state program designed to interdict transfer of weapon of mass destruction and other illicit materials.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.
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