A presidential recall motion that is certain not to be passed is enough to create political confrontation between the government and the opposition, bringing society as a whole to the brink of hysteria.
A presidential recall motion is a major move, and should operate within the limits of the constitutional system. Since the Legislative Yuan has already begun to review the motion, the pan-blue camp should wait until the bill is passed before mobilizing the public as the final step in the recall procedure is a public referendum.
However, the pan-blue camp has held a series of demonstrations on the issue, claiming it was essential to drum up support for the motion. If that were true, the shift in public opinion shows that it is having the opposite effect.
When President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) son-in-law Chao Chien-ming (趙建銘) was taken into custody, public support for the recall peaked at around 45 percent, whereas it has now dropped to around 40 percent. At the same time, public opposition to the recall has climbed from 30 percent to the current 40 percent, putting the forces for and against the recall almost at the same level.
Some attribute this phenomenon to two reasons. First is the "family card," that is, public concern about the first family. This includes first lady Wu Shu-jen's (吳淑珍) failing health, the president's daughter Chen Hsing-yu (陳幸妤), who is about to give birth, and her son Chao Yi-an (趙翊安), who has been deprived of a father. But, this explanation is flawed as during this period, 60 percent of the public has a formed a bad impression of the first family.
The other explanation is pro-localization groups have been vigorously playing the "localization card," telling the people that it is necessary to support Chen to protect the pro-Taiwan government and consolidate pro-independence fundamentalist support. This explanation is also flawed for although Taiwanese consciousness has moved into the mainstream, fundamentalists have yet to account for 40 percent of the population.
A national identity survey recently conducted by National Chengchi University showed that a record low 5.1 percent of respondents identified themselves as Chinese, or what we might term pro-unification fundamentalists. Meanwhile, 43.5 percent of respondents said they were both Taiwanese and Chinese, making them the moderate mainstream who want neither unification nor independence. The largest group, 46.4 percent, identified themselves as Taiwanese, but not all of them were pro-independence fundamentalists, who probably account for only 30 percent of the population.
Not long ago, Chen's and the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) popularity ratings dropped to a low 20 percent. That implies they had lost even the support of some pro-independence fundamentalists. However, in a recent poll made at the same time as the poll about the recall, Chen's popularity rating had gone up to almost 30 percent, and almost 30 percent of respondents said they had a positive impression of the much criticized first family, an indication that pro-independence fundamentalists had resumed their support for Chen.
Even when Chen's support rating dropped to 20 percent, 30 percent of poll respondents still said they opposed the recall motion. This implies that the fundamentalists now supporting Chen -- 30 percent -- still fall short of the 40 percent that currently oppose the recall.
The implication is that in addition to the fundamentalists, a substantial number of moderates oppose the recall. More than 80 percent of the population is either for or against the recall, which shows the high level of polarization in Taiwan. The 20 percent that have not taken side are probably not interested in politics rather than middle-of-the-road voters.
There are far more people who oppose the recall than support Chen, which only goes to show that people might not like Chen, but neither do they like the pan-blue camp's recall bid. Aside from hoping to avoid the political unrest that would ensue from a presidential recall, many people also dislike the blue camp's attempts to paint itself as just and uncorrupt. They detest, in particular, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) deployment of pan-blue legislators, county commissioners and mayors to promote the recall bid. Many of these people have been linked to corruption cases, with some even designated as the main suspects. Despite this, they still point an accusing finger at Chen even though it is Chen's aides, close relatives and family members who are allegedly involved in the scandals, not Chen himself.
The best way to mobilize pro-independence fundamentalists is to talk about the "pro-localization government." Middle-of-the-road voters, however, probably oppose the recall bid because they feel that the more the pan-blue camp pushes for it, the more obvious their double standards are. The most jarring image that comes to mind is the TV ad where Ma campaigned for the Taitung County commissioner candidate, saying that, "There is no guilt by association, it's as simple as that."
When it involved consolidating his own power base, those words came easily for Ma, but when he started attacking his political foes, his tone changed. Prior to the People First Party's (PFP) efforts to mobilize support for the recall motion, Ma said that the matter should rest until there was direct evidence of Chen's involvement. But, responding to accusations of being a weakling, Ma changed his tone, saying such evidence was not necessary.
In the same way, Ma first said that we should not gloat, but rather should feel sympathy for Chen because of the scandal involving; however, he later changed his tone and said that Chen should "die a horrible death." Ma deals with issues strictly from a partisan point of view, ignores facts and is inconsistent. This attitude scares middle-of-the-road voters and, as a result, the stronger the blue camp's push for a recall bid, the stronger the counter-reaction.
PFP Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) was the first to talk about a presidential recall. His goal is to win the support of die-hard, pan- blue supporters since that is the only way he can win a dominant position in the blue camp. At this point he doesn't care about mild or moderate supporters in the blue camp or middle-of-the-road voters.
With the pan-blue die-hards on the move, Ma feels threatened, which has initiated a race between Ma and Soong. While this may be damaging to the pan-blue camp as a whole, the pressing issue right now is how we should go about cooling down the hysteria that has pervaded our society.
Lin Cho-shui is a DPP legislator.
Translated by Lin Ya-ti and Perry Svensson
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