Following President Chen Shui-bian's (
However, any pan-blue move to conduct a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet would lead to a dissolution of the legislature, and so we are now entering a temporary balance of terror between the pan-blue and pan-green forces. It remains to be seen how the two opposing camps will strategically place themselves in relation to the other side. Will the pan-blues really push for a no confidence vote against Premier Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌)? And will the pan-greens then support a decision by the president to dissolve the legislature and hold new legislative elections?
The pan-green camp says that so long as there is no vote of no confidence in the Cabinet, then the legislature will not be dissolved, and the more the pan-blues push for a no confidence vote, the more certain it is that the legislature will be dissolved.
The pan-blues, however, think the reverse is true. That is, the pan-blues believe that the pan-greens are so fearful of a crushing defeat in a fresh round of legislative elections that they will not dare run the risk of asking the president to dissolve the legislature. The risk that the pan-blues are running is that the pan-green camp really is determined to dissolve the legislature at any cost.
Have the pan-blues then prepared themselves for the ensuing legislative elections? More importantly, even if the pan-blue camp is right about the green camp's fears, will the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) accept Chen's decision if he nominates Ma to the premiership?
If the pan-greens are sensible, they should understand that they cannot afford to face new legislative elections, because the electorate is no longer on their side. However, according to the Constitution and constitutional precedents set by other nations, the outgoing Cabinet can stay on as a caretaker Cabinet led by the incumbent premier or vice premier, a situation that prevails until the new Cabinet is appointed.
In other words, if the pan-blues successfully topple the Cabinet, they would actually help the pan-greens take advantage of this constitutional opportunity -- they could simply refrain from nominating a premier from either the pan-blue or pan-green camps. If that happens, the pan-green camp will formally be off the hook, while the pan-blues will end up being blamed for staging a political campaign to usurp power. They will not be able to form a Cabinet, and may even lose their support in future elections.
If the president dissolves the legislature following a successful no confidence vote, then new legislative elections will have to be convened within 60 days. Although the pan-greens run the risk of being routed in the ensuing legislative elections, a new round of elections will also catch the pan-blues off guard. The process of redrawing the nation's electoral districts has not been completed yet and any confusion during the campaign will reflect badly on the pan-blues.
The Constitution also allows Chen to submit a request to the Council of Grand Justices to deliver an interpretation of whether the legislature elected following a dissolution is a genuinely "new" legislature (ie, the seventh) or an "interim" legislature, to be retained until the seventh legislature is elected as planned late next year. If the latter, then the pan-blue camp, which might do well in the short term, could face a backlash in the legislative and presidential elections next year and the year after.
Chen Chao-chien is an assistant professor in the department of public affairs at Ming Chuan University.
Translated by Daniel Cheng
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
RSS