As the nation's media outlets continue to report on the scandals allegedly involving President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) family and aides, so do China's print and electronic media outlets. The reports by the Chinese media have for the most part reflected Beijing's conventional attitude toward Taiwan -- highlighting Taiwan's black gold politics, mocking the performance of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government and reinforcing its argument that democracy is useless.
Nonetheless, I have also found that while Chinese Internet users' view of the corruption scandals in Taiwan is influenced by Beijing's traditional stance, they also applaud Taiwanese prosecutors and question the impotence of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Chinese Communist Party, the police, prosecutors and courts.
Given that China's propaganda machine is well-known for its sophisticated planning and skill, it is surprising that it did not foresee the side effect of reporting on Taiwan's scandals. However, it is worth noting that as of early this month, Beijing has unified its reporting on the issue and news is less frequently updated.
It is hardly surprising to see Beijing gloating over the allegations against Chen's family and top officials. Is Beijing's decision to limit media coverage and give a consistent take on the issue intended to cover up its own inadequacies?
I do not think that is the main reason. The Chinese media has recently started reporting any misconduct or corrupt practices by local top officials, including provincial governors and ministers. On the surface, it appears that China is serious and does not fear comparison with Taiwan in this regard.
Some media experts suggest that China is taking a new approach to dealing with Taiwan to avoid escalating the cross-strait war of words and prevent pro-green diehards from using China's taunts and jeers to consolidate and attack the blue camp.
I do not think that is the main reason either, for there are countless other occasions where Beijing has obstructed and criticized the Taiwanese government while at the same time maintaining its exchanges with the pan-blue camp. This shows that Beijing is not worried that mocking Taiwan for its corruption scandals will help the green camp's case.
The main reason Beijing has toned down its reports on the scandals in Taiwan is that -- confident that it can control Washington -- it does not want to show its hand yet as to who it would support in the post-Chen era.
Beijing is convinced that the future development of cross-strait relations will increasingly be to its advantage. Following China's rising political and economic influence, Washington's global strategy has begun to focus on "transformation diplomacy." Since US President George W. Bush began his second term in office, the Sino-US relationship has leaned toward cooperation.
US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's idea of "transformation diplomacy," aimed at the peaceful transformation of autocratic regimes, is a step back toward the policies of former US presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton. This gives Beijing time for "peaceful development."
Beijing believes that fumbling along eventually will allow it to succeed and it is letting Washington shoulder the responsibility for preventing Taiwan from declaring independence. As long as the US prevents chaos from breaking out in Taiwan, Taiwan will continue to be caught up in internal fighting, no matter who occupies the top seat. Beijing would be better off trying to co-opt Taiwan's top businesses or grassroots organizations if it wants to ensure future cross-strait integration. Under these circumstances, Beijing is certain to remain detached to a certain degree from the political scene in Taiwan.
This detachment is aimed at winning time to "mind its own business" and calmly observe and deal with Taiwan's political situation, especially as Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) still has a second term as president and party secretary-general ahead of him, while Chen is reaching the end of his second term.
If the pan-blue camp regains power following Chen's departure in 2008, Beijing would certainly be pleased to see the implementation of the consensus reached by Hu and former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰).
If the blue camp fails to regain power, the green camp will still have to come up with a strategy to seek domestic and cross-strait reconciliation to sustain Taiwan's economic development.
Beijing believes that it is unlikely and unneccessary for Taiwan's other top leaders to follow Chen's retrenchment policies. Although Beijing is gloating over the misfortune of Chen's family, it does not want to appear harsh to other top leaders in the green camp.
My observation is that although Beijing's think tanks, academic circles and government agencies in charge of Taiwan affairs are well disposed to the pro-China pan-blue camp, they do not have much confidence in the pan-blues. On several private occasions, Chinese officials have lamented that the present-day pan-blue camp shows the same lack of central ideology, strategic vision and internal cohesion as the KMT that fled to Taiwan decades ago.
The KMT's current popularity is built on one political superstar, but it still lacks a critical mass of support. If China wants to promote cross-strait unification, it still needs a reliable foundation on which to execute its strategy of using Taiwanese to contain Taiwanese independence.
It shouldn't be difficult for China to understand the green camp's motivation behind the cross-strait cultural and educational exchanges and the extensive visits to China by Taiwanese businessmen that have taken place in recent years. It is therefore hardly surprising to see the two sides engage in unofficial, informal and indirect multilateral talks.
With all the information, options and time on its side, why would Beijing want to make any rash moves to exclude any possibility of a cross-strait detente in the post-Chen era? Although both the green and blue camps seem poised to engage in further confrontation, Beijing chose to ink another deal with the governing party to increase cross-strait charter flights for cargo and passengers. This is an indication of Beijing's flexibility.
If Beijing is following such a strategy, then the governing and opposition parties, currently busy bickering, should really give some serious thought to the current changes in cross-strait relations.
Chang Teng-chi is a doctoral candidate in the department of politics at the University of Sheffield.
Translated by Daniel Cheng
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