Earlier this month, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) made a 10-day trip to visit Paraguay and Costa Rica. The government asked Washington for permission to stop over in New York or a city in California, but the Bush administration merely offered a brief refueling stopover at Anchorage or Honolulu, without overnight stay. Chen then opted to transit through Abu Dhabi and Amsterdam on his way to Latin America and stopped over in Lybia and Batam, Indonesia, on the return trip. On the first leg of the trip, Chen’s plane was in the air for 37 hours, at one point not knowing where to land for refueling when the planned stop at Beirut was denied due to Beijing’s intervention. This transit saga was most disconcerting and humiliating to the Taiwanese people as well as the Taiwanese-American community in the US.
Various reasons have been offered for the US snub of Chen: that in view of Chinese President Hu Jintao’s inauspicious visit to the White House on April 20, the US State Department wanted to make amends by downgrading Chen’s transit, or that Washington needed China’s cooperation on the Iran resolution before the UN Security Council and this was a tradeoff. The most authentic reason, however, was given by US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in his testimony at the House International Relations Committee on May 10.
In response to a complaint about the treatment of Chen by Representative Thomas Tancredo, US Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said:
“What President Chen has said to us is that his word is good, and that the things he has committed to the United States he has followed up on ... It’s very important, if people do give their word, whatever their basis, that they keep it.”
“When some political figures ... decide they want to either change their word, or go back from something, or push the edge of an envelope that could lead to conflict, well then, yes, our government will respond,” he said.
Zoellick said in effect that the snubbing of Chen was a response to Chen’s cessation of the National Unification Council (NUC).
When Tancredo mentioned the precondition for Chen’s five noes pledge in his 2000 inaugural speech, Zoellick’s retort was that the precondition was “provided China doesn’t use force to attack. Now that may be a summary of it, but China hasn’t used force to attack.” Here Zoellick misstated Chen’s precondition in a substantive way. The actual language was “provided China doesn’t intend to use force against Taiwan.” The key word is “intent.”
China has modernized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and has targeted more than 800 missiles against Taiwan, with the focused aim of attacking the nation if it drags its feet in surrendering its sovereignty. China has enacted an Anti-Secession Law authorizing the PLA to launch an attack at a time of its choosing. These actions clearly indicate China’s intent to use force. Beijing has also stated many times that it reserves the right to resort to force. The precondition for Chen’s five noes has been destroyed by Beijing. The US has no valid basis for pressuring Chen to keep the five noes promise while Washington is unable to compel Beijing to renounce the use of force and to cease its fierce efforts to prepare for war.
Representative Diane Watson met Chen in Costa Rica, where the president told her that Taiwan had been slighted and that he felt hurt. The Congresswoman was embarrassed and protested to Zoellick that denying an overnight transit showed a lack of respect for any leader of any country, and queried whether the State Department was “playing with Taiwan” for the benefit of the Chinese. Zoellick replied: “We make our own decisions. We don’t clear them with China.”
This is bad. When Chen announced his plan to abolish the NUC, the US State Department lodged a strong protest immediately, even before Beijing reacted. We now have a US State Department which is more aggressive than the Chinese in advancing the interests of the People’s Republic of China.
US-China relations have improved markedly since the Sept. 11 attacks on the US. Washington needs Beijing’s cooperation in the war against terror and in solving the nuclear issue in North Korea and Iran. US forces are also tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan and extrication appears years away. So Washington has a great incentive to be sensitive to Beijing’s fear that the Taiwanese public may prefer to keep their democracy and de facto independence.
Taiwan actually should have been more sensitive to Washington’s fear that any action by Taiwan which may be perceived by Beijing as a move towards formal independence could trigger conflict in the Taiwan Strait at a most inopportune time. Chen has repeatedly made important pronouncements affecting Taiwan’s current or future status without prior consultation with the US. On August 3, 2002, Chen declared that there was “one country on each side” of the Strait, a statement which Beijing deemed provocative. In conjunction with Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election, Chen also decided to conduct a referendum on national defense, again without prior warning. The latest gaffe was over the shelving of the NUC.
Taiwan needs to put its diplomatic house in order. It needs to pay due regard to the interests and concerns of the US, which is the nation’s most important ally. Without Washington’s support, Taiwan cannot hope to preserve its freedom very long.
Some in the pan-blue parties are gleeful at Chen’s transit misfortune. Since they look forward to early annexation of Taiwan by China, they are happy that US-Taiwan relations have now reached a historic nadir.
Yet their perception is skewed. American Institute in Taiwan Director Stephen Young was right when he minimized the recent transit spat and stressed that “US-Taiwan relations are fundamentally sound, fundamentally healthy. Democracy, economic cooperation and security are three planks of our ... engagement with Taiwan.”
According to Harry Harding of George Washington University, the Bush administration espouses the following set of core foreign policy objectives in Asia:
Maintaining a favorable balance of power and preventing regional dominance by any other power;
Fostering regional prosperity and promoting access to Asian markets for US exporters, investors and consumers;
Deterring hostilities and promoting resolution of disputes in the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait; and
Promoting human rights and democratic values.
Asia is a strategically important region with vibrant economies. The US is also a Pacific power and its national interests are intertwined with the nations of Asia. That interest will not change, regardless of which party controls the White House or Congress in 2008, and the preservation of Taiwan’s freedom is an indispensable element in reaching the core US goals.
Nevertheless, there is an imbalance between these long term US goals and its short term policy of maintaining the “status quo.” First of all, China is steadily eroding the “status quo” by improving its military capacity to overwhelm Taiwan, by infiltrating Taiwan’s electronic and print media to undermine the Democratic Progressive Party government and fan anti-US and pro-China sentiments, and by coopting the pan-blue parties to work with Beijing to scuttle Taiwan’s democracy and sovereignty from within. The united front tactics are proving effective. Second, in the 2008 presidential election Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is widely expected to win. Ma has announced during his March visit to Washington that if elected he will negotiate an interim agreement with China. In other words, Taiwan will pledge to become part of China in return for peace and some degree of autonomy. Once such an accord is reached, past experience shows that Taiwan’s armed forces will be disarmed and the PLA deployed in short order, perhaps within a year. Third, the US’ “one China” policy and non-support of Taiwanese independence demoralize the majority of the Taiwanese who wish to defend the nation’s freedom and de facto independence and strengthen the pan-blue supporters who crave early unification with China. While this policy serves the short term need to avoid conflict, it also works against the long term core goal of preventing Chinese hegemony.
The political, economic and security landscape of Asia has undergone tremendous changes over the last thirty years. Taiwan has evolved into a vibrant democracy and a strong economy. China is emerging as a rising power. Its GDP is now US$2.26 trillion. It has the largest armed forces in the world. The PLA is modernizing at such a pace that it could challenge US dominance before long. The US must pay closer attention to the growing Taiwan-China economic integration, the rapidly deteriorating domestic politics in Taiwan where the opposition parties are essentially in open revolt against the executive branch of the government, and the accelerating PLA military threat against Taiwan. Merely chanting the mantra of the “one China” policy and leaning towards Beijing could be a prescription for Taiwan’s loss of freedom and a disaster for US national interests in Asia.
In his Congressional testimony, Zoellick said the potent words: “Independence means war.” If avoidance of war becomes the supreme goal of US policy, then the US might as well give up its goals in the whole region of Asia.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania
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