While the world's attention is riveted on Iraq, the Colombia Plan, developed by the US to fight drugs and left-wing guerrillas in Colombia, may soon be applied as a general strategy across the nations of the Andes, if not all of Latin America.
Colombia, it seems, is only mentioned nowadays in connection with President Alvaro Uribe's re-election bid later this month. As a result, the spread of the Colombia Plan, despite its meager and ambivalent results, has remained obscured.
When it was unveiled in 2000, the Colombia Plan had a double rationale: to slash narcotics production and exports while strengthening Colombia's counterinsurgency campaign against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels. Back then, the US saw Colombia as hosting two increasingly interwoven threats, which, without a successful military response, heralded the grim prospect of Colombia becoming a failed state.
Indeed, despite receiving almost US$1.4 billion from the US between 1989 and 1999 to fight drug trafficking, Colombia had not reduced the problem. Worse still, the economic, territorial, and military insurgency of the FARC guerrillas was growing stronger. Indeed, between 1995 and 1998, the Colombian army suffered its worst setbacks -- including casualties, captures, and ambushes -- in the four decades of the insurgency.
With the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the response of the Bush administration, the "war against terrorism" became relevant to Colombia. As a result, the failed three-year dialogue between the government of Andre Pastrana, Uribe's predecessor, and FARC was buried in February 2002, with the conflict definitively internationalized through massive and indirect US intervention.
Between 2000 and last year, Washington paid out nearly US$4 billion to Colombia, with approximately 75 percent of the total going to the military and the police, and increased its presence in the country with 800 soldiers and 600 private security contractors. Indeed, Colombia is now the fifth-largest recipient of US aid in the world.
US policy was (and remains) aimed primarily at the "war on drugs," to be fought mainly by Colombians themselves. But the "war on terrorism" in Latin America has also fallen to the Colombians, with a US rear guard backing up the Colombian state in order to avoid American casualties on a new front, and an overextension of US military commitments.
Evaluated as an anti-narcotics strategy, the Colombia Plan's failure is self-evident. Even though the Colombian government chemically eradicated 523,000 hectares of coca between 2000 and 2004, 114,000 hectares of coca remained under cultivation last year. Likewise, although Uribe's government approved the extradition of 304 Colombian nationals and 11 foreigners (most to the US) between 2002 and last year, drugs-linked organized crime continues to thrive and expand in Colombia.
Of course, the large cartels no longer exist. Instead, the business has become more "democratic" with the multiplication of so-called "boutique cartels." This has created an even greater diversity of drugs (natural and synthetic) at lower prices and higher purity than 15 years ago, during the heyday of the Medellin drug barons.
The results of the Colombia Plan's counter-insurgency effort are equally mixed. The military strengthening of Colombia in the last five years has been massive, with the offensive capacity, geographic deployment, and public credibility of the armed forces much greater than before.
Until 2002, some 3,000 kidnappings were reported each year in Colombia; by last year, the government had reduced that figure to less than 1,000. Between 2000 and 2004, the National Liberation Army (ELN) was seriously weakened, and the FARC retreated to a smaller area, notably reducing its combat potential.
However, while ELN may be strategically beaten, the FARC is not. On the contrary, since last year, the FARC has been escalating its attacks. Moreover, Colombia has not effectively recovered territorial sovereignty in areas controlled by armed right-wing groups like the United Self Defenses of Colombia. The implicit immunity from prosecution these groups received in exchange for their demobilization has done little to help.
So, after five years, the Colombia Plan, a part of two simultaneous global wars -- against drugs and terrorism -- has produced only uncertain and scanty results. Yet this has not led to any official questioning of tactics. On the contrary, both the US and the Uribe government regard what has happened in Colombia as "model" to be emulated across the Andes in order to prevent other countries in the region from becoming failed states.
In fact, this "model" is already being applied in the region. In Ecuador, the US has deployed its military power through the renovation of the Manta military base. The US continues to pressure Peru's government to shoot down planes supposedly linked to drug trafficking, and is trying to convince President Evo Morales's new government in Bolivia to continue a failed "war on drugs." But, as in Colombia, the effort to militarize the "war on drugs" and the "war on terrorism" seems likely only to generate more disorder.
Juan Tokatlian is director of political science and international relations at Universidad de San Andres, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
The gutting of Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) by US President Donald Trump’s administration poses a serious threat to the global voice of freedom, particularly for those living under authoritarian regimes such as China. The US — hailed as the model of liberal democracy — has the moral responsibility to uphold the values it champions. In undermining these institutions, the US risks diminishing its “soft power,” a pivotal pillar of its global influence. VOA Tibetan and RFA Tibetan played an enormous role in promoting the strong image of the US in and outside Tibet. On VOA Tibetan,
Sung Chien-liang (宋建樑), the leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) efforts to recall Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Lee Kun-cheng (李坤城), caused a national outrage and drew diplomatic condemnation on Tuesday after he arrived at the New Taipei City District Prosecutors’ Office dressed in a Nazi uniform. Sung performed a Nazi salute and carried a copy of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf as he arrived to be questioned over allegations of signature forgery in the recall petition. The KMT’s response to the incident has shown a striking lack of contrition and decency. Rather than apologizing and distancing itself from Sung’s actions,
US President Trump weighed into the state of America’s semiconductor manufacturing when he declared, “They [Taiwan] stole it from us. They took it from us, and I don’t blame them. I give them credit.” At a prior White House event President Trump hosted TSMC chairman C.C. Wei (魏哲家), head of the world’s largest and most advanced chip manufacturer, to announce a commitment to invest US$100 billion in America. The president then shifted his previously critical rhetoric on Taiwan and put off tariffs on its chips. Now we learn that the Trump Administration is conducting a “trade investigation” on semiconductors which
By now, most of Taiwan has heard Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an’s (蔣萬安) threats to initiate a vote of no confidence against the Cabinet. His rationale is that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led government’s investigation into alleged signature forgery in the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) recall campaign constitutes “political persecution.” I sincerely hope he goes through with it. The opposition currently holds a majority in the Legislative Yuan, so the initiation of a no-confidence motion and its passage should be entirely within reach. If Chiang truly believes that the government is overreaching, abusing its power and targeting political opponents — then
RSS