Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) wanted a formal state visit, complete with a White House dinner, like his predecessor former president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) received during his first visit to Washington (during the Clinton era). US President George W. Bush's moral equivalent of a state visit -- a trip to the ranch in Crawford, Texas -- was offered to Hu, but he held out for the state visit that never was.
Beijing decided to call it a state visit anyway, insisting on a full 21-gun salute during Hu's White House ceremony. Unfortunately, there was a 22nd blast, from a loose cannon in the press gallery. Wang Wenyi (王文怡), representing the Epoch Times, a pro-Falun Gong newspaper, interrupted Hu's remarks, demanding an end to China's persecution of her banned (in China) religious sect.
Was this a deliberate administration attempt to embarrass Hu? Of course not. Nonetheless, conspiracy theorists will have a field day with this one and Beijing will be watching closely to see if Wang really gets the jail time most are forecasting.
From a foreign policy perspective, the visit underscored just how far apart both sides remain on major issues. On North Korea, Bush pointedly urged China "to use its considerable influence." For his part, Hu merely observed that "the six-party talks have run into some difficulties;" he hoped Washington and Pyongyang "will be able to further display flexibility" in order to "create necessary conditions for the early resumption of the talks." Washington is clearly getting frustrated with Beijing's approach, which seems to blame the US as much as North Korea for the current impasse.
On the other two US "hot button" issues, Hu made it clear that China was not prepared to back a hardline US position on Iran and would address revaluation of the renminbi on its own timetable, promising vaguely to "continue to take steps" in that direction.
Bush was careful not to plow any new ground on Taiwan, merely repeating his "we oppose unilateral changes in the status quo" mantra. Beijing was hoping for a specific rebuke of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), given his February declaration that the National Unification Council had "ceased to function," but this was not meant to be.
In public, Bush also stuck with the "do not support independence" formulation, while Hu praised Bush for saying that he "opposes Taiwan independence;" a formulation Bush has never used publicly (although other senior officials have) but reportedly did say privately to Jiang (and one surmises to Hu as well).
Bush also made it clear that Beijing needs to move further down the road toward greater democracy and respect for human rights: "China can grow even more successful by allowing the Chinese people the freedom to assemble, to speak freely and to worship."
Of course, every time Bush mentions religious freedom, the first thing that comes to Chinese minds is Falun Gong, thus raising questions anew about the South Lawn incident.
On a more positive note, Bush did refer to both countries as "stakeholders in the international system," reinforcing the "responsible stakeholder" theme that has become the buzzword for Sino-US relations.
By calling both nations stakeholders, it should reduce somewhat Beijing's complaints about the judgmental nature of the term (although disagreement over who gets to define what behavior is "responsible" remains the primary bone of contention).
From a business perspective, the trip was only slightly more productive. Hu's US$16 billion buying spree, while a mere drop in the bucket (given the over US$200 billion annual trade deficit), was nonetheless appreciated and his expressed commitment on protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) and moving toward a more consumer-based economy were welcomed, albeit skeptically. There even appeared to be a "wink and a nod" regarding revaluation in the not-too-distant future.
But, while China remains an attractive place to do business, given the profit potential, Beijing's slow movement toward fundamental economic reform -- greater regulatory transparency, the removal of structural impediments, and observance of the rule of law -- has caused even the most bullish on China to remain wary.
Two years ago, both sides were proclaiming that Sino-US relations were "the best ever." This phrase is seldom if ever heard today. While it is still premature to describe the relationship as "hot economics, cold politics" -- a catch phrase now being used to describe Japan's relations with China and South Korea -- politics at present are, at best, lukewarm and the trend is heading in the wrong direction. And, without serious movement on the trade imbalance, IPR, revaluation and greater financial transparency and reform, "hot economics" could become "hot potato" economics as the US' fall election campaigns begin to heat up.
Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal.
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