Recent political changes in Europe and the new leadership in Germany will most likely prove to be favorable for Taiwan in the long run. On Nov. 22 last year Angela Merkel became the first female chancellor in German history and hopes are high for the new leader of the grand coalition composed of the Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democrats (CDU).
The new chancellor is expected to lead Germany out of the economic doldrums by tackling a host of structural reforms. Notwithstanding such difficult domestic challenges Merkel focused on foreign policy during her first 100 days in office.
The change of government in Germany is already affecting Taiwan positively. While Merkel's government will continue to officially support a "one China" policy for the foreseeable future, it will at the same time approach China in a much more demure way than the previous administration.
More importantly, the German government will refrain from pressing for a lifting of the EU ban on arms sales to China. When Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) met with Merkel last Novem-ber in Germany, a foreign policy spokesman for the Christian Democratic Party told the German media that abandoning the 16-year old embargo was "not on the agenda of the new government." He added that a relaxation of the Taiwan issue would be one of the prerequisites for a possible lifting. German officials in Brussels confirmed recently that the arms ban will not be discussed at EU summits anytime soon.
So far, new Foreign Minister Frank Steinmeier has followed the lines of a newly accentuated German foreign policy. During his visit to China in February, Steinmeier not only emphasized critical subjects such as intellectual property rights and human rights, but allegedly even handed over a list of political detainees. While not denying Germany's economic interest in China, Steinmeier called on China in an interview to "shoulder global responsibility."
However, Germany's China policy will remain a balancing act. China not only represents a vast market for German and EU exporters, but at the same time is a much needed factor in the international community's dealings with countries such as North Korea and Iran.
Consequently, China was not explicitly mentioned in official statements during Merkel's first visit to the US in January. It is still safe to assume that Merkel and US President George W. Bush, who classifies China as a "strategic rival," reached a preliminary agreement on their China policy.
This year's Munich Conference on Security Policy gave first indications on how future US-German strategic approaches towards China might look. Plans to enhance NATO cooperation with other states such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand show a heightened awareness of China's military buildup and the determination of the US-led alliance to take on more responsibility for the security environment in Southeast Asia. A revival of the traditionally strong US-German partnership will considerably accelerate such new strategic alignments.
The inchoate political climate in Europe was not only triggered by the recent political shift in Germany. Looking at another leading EU nation, French President Jacques Chirac is not very likely to run for a third term next year. Certain political scenarios favored by Chirac, such as a future multipolar world order where the EU, led by Germany and France, is supposed to join Russia and China in balancing US power, are thus likely to disappear from the European political agenda.
Given these shifting dynamics Taiwan would be well advised to enhance its visibility for German and European policy makers. Sensitive issues, such as Taiwan's much sought after membership of the WHO and the UN, should be voiced more assertively by Taiwanese lobbying organizations in Germany and Brussels. In return the EU should play a more active role in easing cross-strait relations utilizing its traditional "soft power" capabilities such as silent diplomacy and trade policy.
If Germany were to lead respec-tive initiatives successfully, Taiwan could expect to benefit from Merkel's government as much as the Germans hope to do themselves.
Jan Schlotthus is a German writer based in Taipei.
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