The first stage of the National Unification Council drama is done. Though it may have seemed to be more like kabuki theater than diplomatic negotiations, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and the US apparently have settled the council and unification guidelines problem. The second stage is the reactions of those who oppose his move.
For those of us who watched the birth of both the council and the guidelines, it was clear that the still powerful conservative elements of the then Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government, who distrusted the president, had demanded it. In turn, he minimized both and worked around it to expand democracy.
After Chen, whose party refused to join the council, took office in 2000 the council was completely ignored.
In fact the US had a part in the council's eventual demise, perhaps unwittingly, but nonetheless it is important. It publicly included in its policy that any change to Taiwan's status must have "the assent of the people of Taiwan." Chen, with that support behind him, has used it not only to eventually dissolve the council and guidelines, but also to at least verbally gain support from the opposition not just for scrapping the council, but for any change in Taiwan's status.
In the midst of the unique system both the US and Taiwan seem to have in dealing with each other on cross-strait matters, there has been unconfirmed leaks, supposedly from the US National Security Council (NSC), that the US is now considering a better "balance" between its policies regarding China and Taiwan. This may be part of an overall shift in the focus of US foreign policy -- as evidenced by the recent realignment of diplomatic personnel from Europe to Asia, and the stationing of more US military assets in the Pacific.
If all of this is true, it is still not clear if this is meant to be a fundamental change in US policy toward Taiwan, or a quid pro quo for once again asking the present government to hold off on a fundamental change needed and supported by the voters of Taiwan (the last one being the issue of using referendum).
At the same time there is also a report written by Michael Green, a recent member of the NSC who is much involved in cross-strait policy matters. The report sees Taiwan's democracy as the means for its survival, not the claim to de jure sovereignty. It's a thought which should be pursued despite the obstacles that have prevented it during the past 15 years.
Determining the policies needed to implement these two items -- first a more balanced relationship between Taiwan and China, and second, real support for Taiwan's democracy -- go together. They have the same hurdles -- the relationship with China and the differences within the US regarding Beijing's policies, and the lack of consensus within Taiwan.
In balancing the relationship between China and Taiwan one problem among many others is the concern about the possible reaction by Beijing to anything the US does for Taipei. The concern on many occasions has been publicly stated by the US before any such concern has been raised by China. This is not just a current problem, it has occurred frequently over the years.
This is not wise as US experts do not always accurately analyze China's red lines. Replacing former premier Hau Pei-tsun (
When China had complaints about the direct election of a president in Taiwan, or in recent years about some sovereignty issues, they made it known publicly, without US help. If nothing else, it is seen as a Chinese concern, not necessarily a US one.
If that policy is established, different rules and the political will to make the necessary changes will be needed. The present rules applied to the US-Taiwan relationship were unilaterally established by the US and have always caused costly inefficiency both administratively and in policy matters.
Taiwan was strongly supported in the US as it began to democratize. As in the case of many newly democratized countries, it is great when it happens but frustrating when it doesn't always move in the desired direction.
In 1990, Taiwan began moving in the direction of a populist democracy. People's preferences began to matter. The country's name, UN participation, the Constitution, the direct election of representatives at all levels of government, the impossible continuation of low level politics, to name a few, worried Washington.
By the mid-1990s it was clear that Taiwan's democracy was becoming the major focus (more than the economy) in the bilateral relationship. The US Congress helped strengthen the democratic relationship, although more inter-parliamentary exchanges would help. The US military has made considerable progress in strengthening its part of the relationship. The political relationship between senior levels, however, has lagged behind.
This is inevitable, as those with political responsibility must deal with China. In trying to strengthen Taiwan's efforts to take part in the international community, for instance, the US' own efforts are more focused on encouraging other countries to join it in taking part. That has not been very fruitful and is unlikely to be so.
High profile statements such as the one made by President George W. Bush in Kyoto are very helpful. Direct programs with Taiwan, especially with non-governmental organizations, are likely to strengthen and hopefully expand Taiwan's capability to influence democracy in China and other countries.
These two proposals -- a better balance in cross-strait matters, and strengthening the capability of Taiwan to gain support through its democratic system -- are important. If there is a fundamental shift in the US' Asia policy that includes promoting democracy, there will be a need to change the self-imposed rules that now isolate Taiwan.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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