In his speech in Kyoto, Japan on Nov. 16, US President George W. Bush included the hope that China could look to Taiwan's democracy as an example for China's future political development. Predictably China brushed that aside. Any move that would lower the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) grasp on power is unacceptable. The response on the US side was equally predictable -- with those on one side calling the speech either a failure or an error, while those on the other cheered him for raising democratic values despite Beijing's dipleasure.
China's eventual democratization is in the long-term objective of the US. Having a democracy next door that is culturally close to China, and where people can communicate with the other side, could be a rather important opportunity to bolster that objective. Beijing of course opposes that line of thinking and for many US experts, that is enough to make them hesitate to pursue that objective too strenuously.
The speech showed most clearly that Bush wants US policy to include democratic values in its relationship with China. Some claimed the speech was meant primarily for domestic constituents. That doubtless played a role, but in the process it did help to raise that element of US policy priorities as well.
Bush said Taiwan had "created a free and democratic Chinese society." He also referred to the "need for dialogue between China and Taiwan."
Doubtless there are many in Taiwan that would have preferred him to use "Taiwanese" rather than "Chinese" in that context, but it was a broad statement and -- followed by a reference to dialogue between Taiwan and China -- may have helped keep the use of "Chinese" from being unwelcome.
However, among some people, especially in government, the use of the word "Chinese" in such circumstances prompted some concern that there might be a shift of US policy in the making.
New public statements by government experts are often seen as either trial balloons or creeping change that has already been decided.
One example is recent comments by government officials. Expressions such as "urged Chinese on both sides of the Strait," "potential for increasing contact and integration" and other remarks that praised the visits to China by Taiwanese opposition leaders were very controversial in Taiwan.
References to possible dialogue between China and Taiwan included: A wish to "see the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait resolve these issues," and comments that "It's clear that the mainland side would also like to be seen promoting dialogue without pre-conditions" (a surprising statement), and "it's up to the Chinese on both sides of the Strait to work out," etc.
These were official statements.
Perhaps all of these experts should read, or re-read the Shanghai Communique and a bit of its history. The communique states that "The US side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China."
The difference between the US word "acknowledges," as opposed to China's "recognizes," and what this means in this context, is well known.
Less known is the word "Chinese" in that statement. One might look at a book by the late John Holdridge -- a diplomat during the normalization of US relations with China -- (there are other sources as well), which describes how the US State Department replaced the word "people" in the draft with the word "Chinese" in the final version.
The reason was the view that some, perhaps a majority, of the people on Taiwan might not agree if ever they were permitted to say so.
The word "Chinese" in current circumstances now refers to the people in the People's Republic of China, and those in Taiwan who want it to apply to them. Recent remarks in the US from government officials and some experts, in mentioning visits by opposition leaders to China and how the US sees it as beneficial for the Chinese on both sides, may or may not always mean what is intended.
There has been some speculation in the media that the US and China are drawing closer to an agreement that Taiwan is Chinese and that independence will be opposed. That may be pure politicking in an election period, and in any event would need the consent of the Taiwanese people. For some, a more immediate concern is that the US may be supporting an opposition that would accept this as a matter of policy.
In the Bush speech there was no statement about security differences between the US and China, nor was there much about differences on economic issues. Within the US, there are also discrepancies over how to manage these issues. Experts that consider themselves to be realistic more often seek to compromise, and those that give more importance to values call for a stronger stance.
For the US, comparisons to similar issues with other countries in the past can be made, though no two can be exactly the same. Previous problems with Japan, especially over trade imbalances, were eventually overcome, but Japan financed its economic growth largely with its own currency, and mostly with its own companies. On security issues, trying to work with a strong potential adversary to avoid war while also preparing for the opposite is also not new for the US. In the Soviet era it was called a cold war.
The US-China relationship, and the policies that manage it, are going through a period of uncertainty in both countries. Where they go will have a fundamental impact on Taiwan.
Strengthening Taiwan's democracy at home, and finding ways to influence the people in those countries in East Asia that oppose democracy, especially China, would greatly strengthen Taiwan's relationship with the US, and its place in the international community.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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