What does US President George W. Bush's recent Asia trip signify? For Taiwan it was encouraging in the sense that it was held up as an example of a successful functioning democracy that China might one day emulate. To quote Bush, "Modern Taiwan is free and democratic and prosperous. By embracing freedom at all levels, Taiwan has delivered prosperity to its people and created a free and democratic Chinese society."
But by describing Taiwan as a "Chinese society" it somehow seemed like a restatement of the "one-China" policy, albeit with the US' preference for a democratic China. Washington appears to be sending mixed messages, especially when one considers Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's description of Taiwan in August as a "sovereign nation." Still, a favorable mention of Taiwan as a model democracy on the eve of Bush's China visit was important.
Apart from this largely symbolic gain from Bush's praise of Taiwan's democracy, it was business as usual with China's hard-line attitude toward Taiwan. Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) said that Beijing was "committed to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait." Though he warned that "we will by no means tolerate so-called Taiwan independence." Nothing new there.
While in Tokyo, as part of his whirlwind Asia tour, Bush described his country's security alliance with Japan as a "pillar of stability" and a "source of confidence in Asia's future." Emphasizing their shared commitment to democracy [along with Taiwan, incidentally], Bush said, "Freedom is the bedrock of the US' friendship with Japan and it is the bedrock of our engagement with Asia."
No prizes for guessing that Bush's remarks were mainly directed at China. What he seemed to imply was that without democracy in China, US engagement with it will lack that common ingredient it shares with Japan, Taiwan and other democratic countries in the region. In other words, it will lack wholesomeness.
It is interesting that Bush was quite open about his democracy message for China. He highlighted political and religious repression in China when he said, "The people of China want more freedom to express themselves ? to worship without state control and to print Bibles and other sacred texts without state control." And, while attending a church service in Beijing, he told reporters, "My hope is that the government of China will not fear Christians who gather to worship openly."
Well, Bush's message of political and religious freedom was grossly flouted as China continued to detain or put under house arrest many dissidents eager to exercise their democratic rights, even as Bush was visiting the country. Bush simply had to be satisfied that Hu had at least mentioned human rights.
Hu reportedly said that China was "continuously raising the level of human rights enjoyed by" its people. But, he emphasized that progress in this regard must reflect "China's national conditions" and that the country would have "democratic politics with Chinese characteristics," whatever that means.
The irony is that Bush tended to even put a spin on it. He said, "Those who watch China closely would say that maybe a decade ago, a leader [of China] wouldn't have even uttered these comments." Bush added, "He talked about democracy." Well, they have been talking of people's democracy or democracy with Chinese characteristics ever since the communists took power in China. And when they talk of democracy, it has an Orwellian ring about it.
Why would Bush feel the need to sanitize China's democracy charade? One reason would be to tell his constituents at home that his China visit was not without some results. The fact of the matter is that Bush's China visit has been a spectacular failure. Beijing hasn't budged an inch on human rights or democratic freedoms. In terms of their growing military power, they don't feel obliged to explain its doctrine or strategic rationale.
In economic matters, China promises to do more [how and when always remains vague] on issues like currency reform and its huge trade surplus with the US. Which has been their stan-dard response whenever these issues are raised. And by way of applying some balm on US wounds, they signed a US$4 billion deal with Boeing in Beijing to buy 70 737 airliners. That should win them goodwill in the important aviation industry, currently short of orders and facing competition from Europe. In real terms though, US$4 billion is peanuts in a US$11 trillion or more US economy.
China's annual trade surplus with the US is already approaching US$200 billion. And it has accumulated vast foreign exchange reserves which are invested in US securities. In a sense, China is now one of the US' most important lenders, giving it the capacity at some point of time to possibly destabilize the US economy. But, at the present time and for some time to come, China's interest lies in dumping its undervalued goods onto the US market. All this is known in the US, but somehow there is a sense of omnipotence in that country.
In the Asia Pacific region, China has an edge on the US politically. The security alliance between the US and Japan [with Taiwan likely to be factored in] is indeed a massive military machine and China is currently no match for it. But nobody is talking of a war between China and the US, at least not in the near future. In these power relationships, politics are as important as the military. And in this respect China has greater regional empathy than the US and Japan.
Commenting on the energized US-Japan alliance, the Jakarta Post, Indonesia's leading English daily, said in an editorial, "Japan must think of itself regionally first, rather than as an extension of the US policy." As for the US: "Well, it remains a welcome associate of East Asia and still plays an important role as an anchor for regional stability." But: " ? we are hopeful that local players will be the primary determinants of this region's destiny, without being subject to US national interests."
China is the region's biggest local player. The US has already been excluded from the scheduled East Asia Summit meeting next month. The formation of APEC killed off the Malaysian-proposed East Asia community. The latter would have excluded the US. APEC, with the US among its 21 mem-bers, recently held its meeting in Busan, South Korea.
Starting with much fanfare and promise of regional trade liberalization about 15 years ago, APEC has since lost its shine; though it still is an important talkfest for regional leaders. No wonder much of the interest is starting to shift to the upcoming East Asia Summit, where China will feel quite at home. Perhaps, there is a moral here for the US. Which is that it should pay more attention to the political dynamics in the region.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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