Israel's unilateral withdrawal from all 21 Gaza settlements and four in the West Bank has created a new reality for Palestinians. How the Palestinians choose to respond to these changed circumstances may well determine whether or not they at last achieve an independent state. So this moment may prove to be the Palestinians' greatest opportunity. Or, in the words of Abba Eban, it may be yet another opportunity to miss an opportunity.
How the Palestinians respond depends largely on how the Palestinian body politic deals with the growing power of Palestinian Islamic movements, which undoubtedly expect a significant share of power in post-withdrawal Gaza. Will armed groups resume their fight against Israel, or will the Palestinian Authority act to defuse or combat the attacks? To what degree are Fatah, the secular movement controlled by Palestine President Mahmoud Abbas, and the Islamist Hamas ready to reach an understanding about how to proceed after the disengagement?
Abbas and other Palestinian Authority (PA) officials stress the need for "one regime, one legal system, and political pluralism." Abbas also wants weapons in only one set of hands -- those of the Palestinian Authority. He successfully persuaded Palestinian militants to hold their fire and show Israelis and the world that dismantling settlements need not involve Israeli-Palestinian violence.
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But can he translate this achievement into an extended ceasefire, peaceful elections and consolidated PA rule in Gaza and the northern West Bank? Failure to do so will lead to yet another defeat for the legitimate Palestinian aim of attaining a viable state.
The diffculty of the task ahead can hardly be overstated. Hamas has launched an intensive media campaign to appropriate the Israeli withdrawal as a victory of its "armed struggle." The campaign and its themes reflect an internal fight for control of the Gaza Strip and other PA-administered territories, and stresses Hamas' determination not to be disarmed and to continue the "armed struggle" in the West Bank.
Hamas also revealed two "military secrets" during the evacuation. The first is a new missile named Sajil, which has a range of 15km and can reach more Israeli towns and cities. The second is the "Qassamits," young women who are engaged in combat training. Hamas timed these revelations with the disengagement to create the impression that its intensifying military strategy had prevailed.
According to one Hamas slogan in the streets of Gaza during the Israeli withdrawal, "Four years of sacrifices weigh more than ten years of negotiations." Similarly, Mohamed Deif, the leader of Hamas's military wing, asserted on a recent videotape that the lesson of Gaza is that Israel can be forced out of the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Haifa.
All of this is designed to reinforce one point: the Gaza withdrawal belongs to Hamas. A survey published on a Web site associated with Hamas claimed credit for killing 54 percent of all the Israelis who died as a result of Palestinians' armed struggle, and this body count is Hamas's claim to success.
In these circumstances, who will administer the evacuated areas until elections are held? How will tax revenues be divided between those who claim leadership of the resistance and those who claim exclusive legitimacy to govern?
These are not problems that can await resolution. Someone must decide soon, for example, about the division of the land and the apartments to be built in what is already known as "Khalifa bin Zaid City," located on a former Israeli settlement in the Gaza Strip. There is no answer yet to any of these questions. Whereas Hamas has demanded establishment of a Palestinian administration to supervise the areas vacated by Israel, Abbas has rejected this, agreeing at most to a "monitoring committee" in which representatives of Hamas will participate. In any case, there will be no "division of areas" until Israel withdraws completely and the ruins are cleared away. Then the bitter political struggle will begin in advance of the elections.
No matter what happens the day after Israel's final Gaza disengagement, one cannot escape the fact that Hamas's military options have diminished greatly. Construction of the separation wall on the West Bank has made it almost impossible for Hamas fighters to reach Israel proper. In addition, after the reoccupation of the West Bank's cities in April 2002, Israel arrested about 7,000 Palestinians who are allegedly associated with Hamas, Fatah and other Palestinian groups. Continued armed struggle by Hamas will not be easy.
Hamas knows this, and is therefore focusing its attention on the Gaza disengagement, seeking to exploit this victory by demanding its share in the post-disengagement order. It has agreed to participate, for the first time, in the election of the Palestinian Legislative Council, which is due in January, and is expected to win a lot of seats. This would, of course, cement its central role in Palestinian politics -- and it would just as surely exacerbate the challenge facing Abbas.
Mkhaimar Abusada is professor of political science at Al-Azhar University-Gaza. Copyright: Project Syndicate
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