It is instructive to hear the views of an insider on US global leadership, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. During a recent visit to Australia to attend the annual Australian-American Leadership Dialogue in Sydney, Richard Armitage, who was until recently deputy US secretary of state, expounded at length on this. Even though his primary focus was Australia-US dialogue, he nevertheless couched it in regional terms. He highlighted how the "whole center of gravity in the world" was shifting to Asia with the rise of China and India; the latter being more like an afterthought (important, though, in its own right) to reduce China's larger-than-life image.
Against this backdrop, he cautioned Australia against cozying up to China too much. Which is interesting because, until recently, Washington had taken its alliance with Australia too much for granted. According to Armitage, "If I were Australian ? and I was beginning to feel the tectonic plates move a bit by the ascension of China, the ascension of India, then I think I would opt on the side of `maybe I'll just keep this security alliance a while longer,' because ultimately that's the guarantor that Australians very much will enjoy their lifestyle."
It must be worrying the US a fair bit having to remind Australia to hang on with it, lest China gobble it up along the way. More importantly, it shows how much the level of strategic competition with China is heating up. As Armitage bluntly put it, his country is in a "very active competition" with China for influence in the Pacific, and "we're not doing very well."
Take the case of the recent Sino-Russian military exercises: Washington is worried, even though it under-played their significance. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, speaking at a Pentagon press briefing, said he didn't regard the exercises as a threat to Taiwan, or anybody else. But it is significant that, at that particular time, he described Taiwan as a "sovereign" nation and reiterated US obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) "to work with Taiwan on fulfilling security and arms sales provisions of that act." In other words, the US is not going to be deterred by China's (and Russia's) high military profile.
It is not just the Asia-Pacific region where the US is being challenged. China and Russia are also actively seeking to eject the US from Central Asia. The entire region is now a refurbished version of the 19th century Great Game that played out between czarist Russia and the British Empire. Instead of the British Empire, we now have a reinvigorated and emboldened China (backed by Russia) staking claim to the region.
And today's game has even higher stakes because of the potential oil and gas bonanza. US oil conglomerates would like use an intricate network of pipelines to pump oil and gas through Afghanistan, to Pakistan and India and beyond the Indian Ocean; and from Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to the Turkish Mediterranean coast. It is a high stakes game in a volatile region. China and Russia are using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes the four former Soviet republics, to make the region into their own backyard.
China's economy is growing at a frantic speed. This has its dangers, but that is another story. What is relevant here is that it is creating a rush on scarce global resources, particularly oil and gas, between China and the US. And that scramble is going to get more acute in Central Asia, and other places that are regarded as potential major sources of oil and gas reserves after the Middle East.
Returning to the Asia-Pacific region, the exclusion of the US from the East Asia summit in Kuala Lumpur in December, is a serious blow. It is difficult to imagine the US being left out of an important regional Asia-Pacific forum, when it is a significant political, military and economic presence in the region.
The proposed East Asia forum has China's encouragement and blessing, and is a victory of sorts for Beijing. At a time like this when China's political stock is high in Asia, it was unwise of Washington to downgrade its representation at the recently held ASEAN Regional Forum in Laos from the secretary of state to her deputy Robert Zoellick. Such peevishness is not a substitute for sound policy.
Armitage is worried about the US' exclusion from the inaugural East Asia Summit and has suggested that Australia should represent US views at the conference.
He said in Sydney, "I think there's a very large role for Australia if Australia chooses to play it, representing her own voice uniquely, but saying `This is the American point of view,' not making a judgment of it but making sure our voice can be heard."
It doesn't look like Canberra would be too keen to act as the US' proxy, having worked hard to secure an invitation to the summit.
While China is undoubtedly a major political player in the Asia-Pacific region, it still has a fair way to go before becoming "a formidable military power." But it is steadily heading that way. As Armitage noted, even though China's weapons are now directed at Taiwan, "let's be clear, the military capabilities that are poised toward a Taiwan scenario could also be poised to a Japan scenario." And Tokyo is fully aware of it, going by its recent threat assessments.
Will China put its Taiwan threat into practice? Not in the near future, considering that the US is standing by its commitment to defend Taiwan under the TRA. And this not withstanding the new bonhomie between China and Russia as evidenced in their bilateral military exercises. But China will keep up the pressure all round to wear out Taiwan and the US.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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