While much is going on politically in Taiwan, the international concern about cross-strait relations seems to have quieted. One could attribute this to the calendar -- it's August, when politicians and many others take time off from work. But there are better reasons as well. In Taiwan, attention is on political developments that could alter the security architecture in the Western Pacific region.
Past events in Taiwan have brought in different forms of intervention, not only from China, but sometimes the US as well. It may become a little different in the future. The US may, or may not, wish to change its involvement, but in any event, in the meantime, it most surely will require continuous and expert attention.
China, on the North Korea issue, is playing more the mediator than the active player, while its more active involvement in cross-strait issues is done on the sidelines, and always in the role of an internal matter. But its major focus inevitably is on its own domestic issues, with the US relations and other external concerns the next priorities. It has entered the world community, but with the rapid pace of economic growth it has also begun to show increasingly more problems in managing it.
There has been a rise in the number of demonstrations or riots around the country (the government has recently set up new police units in some 36 cities). The tightening of rules on information available to the people, and reducing the activity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are some examples that clearly result from government nervousness in maintaining its control.
Cross-strait relations, however, remains for China a separate domestic issue. China's continuing economic growth gives it considerable influence in the international community, which in turn enables them to isolate Taiwan. At the same time, with the help of the opposition parties in Taiwan, it has established a line of communications between Taiwan's opposition political parties and China's only political party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Not surprisingly there follows offers of even greater economic and other activities with these parties, which accept the "one China" principle, thus avoiding any relationship with the Taiwan government which does not. That and its ability to expand its military capability increasingly puts pressure on Taiwan's existence as a separate entity. This is for China and its friends in Taiwan a domestic activity which is to be expected to grow.
In the US for many, including politicians, this is also a time for rest at home or family trips. Issues that don't go away, even in August, are the Middle East and Iraq, or at home gasoline prices and Supreme Court nominees. Even in Asia, the North Korea talks are given a few weeks to meditate.
Nonetheless there is much discussion in government and think tanks on US -- China relations. Various economic problems, including the growing energy issue, the security concerns relative to China's growing military capability, and not yet as vocal as these but growing is China's increasing tightening of information and human rights actions that could increase instability.
For the US, consensus on these subjects can best be described as soft consensus -- work with China in strengthening relations on issues that are in both country's interest, and dialogue with them where the two country's differ. But in every case, one hears the caution that there is a need to continue studying China's intentions.
Relatively few public statements from abroad are heard these days, even from China, on the subject of Taiwan. It's understandable. China, with its new friends in Taiwan, sees things moving in its direction. It most certainly does not want American involvement at this time. As for the US, it doubtless must be watching with interest, but interfering in what transpires between the two sides is not a likely option, for two reasons. First, there is no consensus on what the US would like to see happen, second the US commitment to both sides on the cross-strait issue in no way suggests it would interfere if both sides agree on a resolution.
So one turns to what is taking place in Taiwan. Given the long-held bias most of the media has toward the opposition parties, the change in the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) leadership and the opening of relations between the three opposition parties and the CCP, would make one believe that Taiwan's political architecture has completely changed. To some extent it has. There are several questions still to be answered to know to what extent this change will be.
At this time, the ruling party and the major opposition party have publicized their platform for cross-strait issues. Experience would indicate this is more a point of reference than a solid commitment, but how both are changed over the next three years will be worth watching, as the voting numbers may continue to be as close as in the past.
The ruling party's "guidelines" are to protect Taiwan's sovereignty, pursue democratic reform, protect Taiwan's interests and make Taiwan a great country. It also will oppose Beijing's "one China" or "one country, two systems" policies, the so-called "1992 consensus," unification and the "Anti-Secession" Law.
The opposition KMT's positions also briefly are that to gain reunification China must reverse the Tiananmen verdict, that it opposes the "Anti-Secession" Law, supports the Falun Gong and that China must become a democratic country. At the same time, the KMT will oppose Taiwan's independence and "one country, two systems," and will respect the so-called 1992 consensus.
In addition to the clear differences above, many others will arise on domestic issues as well. To what extent the ruling party can cope with the plans and activities the opposition parties have with China, for example, and to what extent the new KMT chairman will be able to pursue reform within the party are open questions that will determine Taiwan's future.
In addition, there will be county and city elections this December, the inevitably difficult rearranging of election districts and the voting for the much diminished number of legislators in the elections of 2007, and the presidential election in 2008 will follow. Each of the elections requires many different strategies. Understanding the complexities involved will be difficult but necessary.
There is, therefore, an important need for the US to have Taiwan experts (not China experts with a little knowledge of Taiwan) following events there, and the same could be said of Taiwan in understanding the US. In the growing complexities of Taiwan's political system, both will be critically needed. Taiwan may be a relatively small nation, but its history and its location makes its importance to the US critical to understand.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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