Since the visits of Taiwan's opposition leaders to Beijing and their meeting with China's president, articles and commentaries have said that Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) has a "new Taiwan policy." In essence, the policy is that China can live with Taiwan for some time under a "no independence" status quo (though unification is the ultimate goal).
In these circumstances, voters in Taiwan will inevitably be encouraged by this to vote for the status quo, or vote for any candidate that supports it. Many in Taiwan would like that, and many in the US would see this as meeting its cross-strait objectives of a peaceful resolution of the situation, along with the requisite free assent of the people of Taiwan.
If Taiwan accepts the "one China" principle that China demands -- and that seems to have been done unofficially by the party leaders that visited China, who accepted the so-called "1992 consensus" -- then of course the options for Taiwanese voters under the status quo would drop to two: "one country, two systems" of some kind, or unification.
But even without the "one China" principle, the present status quo with its three interpretations is to Beijing's advantage, not Taiwan's. The US' interpretation -- requiring a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status and the assent of the people of Taiwan for any change in that status -- can be met anytime the two sides agree (though it would have an impact on US regional security objectives).
The other two interpretations of the status quo are much more difficult for each side to accept. Taiwan insists it is sovereign and independent, that any resolution that diminishes this status is unacceptable and that any change must be approved by the people of Taiwan. China simply insists that it has sovereignty over Taiwan and will not accept any alternate resolution.
If there is a new Taiwan policy emanating from Beijing that amounts to gaining the support of a majority of the Taiwanese people for eventual unification, are those who will make that decision ready for it? Hu certainly does not have to worry about getting the consent of the people of China.
The people of Taiwan have responded to frequent polls on what should be pursued with regard to the relationship with China. The latest one, taken for the Mainland Affairs Council, shows that 37.3 percent of Taiwanese prefer the status quo, with a decision later on resolving the situation; 22.6 percent opt for the status quo indefinitely; 14.1 percent opt for the status quo with independence later; and 11.9 percent prefer the status quo with unification later. The remaining respondents favor independence now (5.2 percent) and unification now (1.2 percent).
That tells us that 85.9 percent of those polled would rather not make a decision now, if ever. Of course, these figures can be manipulated, depending on one's bias. The first two numbers can be used by either independence or unification supporters to bolster their arguments.
The conventional wisdom in Taiwan and the US is that a large majority prefer independence, but are cautious in saying so. Those with a unification bias point out that the majority of Taiwan's legislators -- who presumably represent their constituencies -- are members of the parties whose leaders visited Beijing recently.
As I pointed out in a previous article, if counting noses is to be used to determine Taiwan's status, the status quo option is not very helpful. It would leave the US side uncertain about how to proceed, and the other two sides in yet another standoff over how to count votes.
But nothing in this "new policy," which apparently is meant to attract the Taiwanese to accept unification, changes China's coercion strategy. For several years, for example, the number of missiles it has aimed at Taiwan has been growing.
If there is anything new it is that, according to the recent publication from the US Department of Defense, China is building its military capability to counter the US' capability to assist Taiwan if needed. Publishing this was meant to enlighten understanding of the potential danger. This has angered China, of course, but it must be of some comfort to them that the purchase of needed military equipment continues to be blocked in Taiwan by the opposition parties.
The migration of large portions of Taiwanese industry to China has presented Beijing with an important opportunity to influence the people of Taiwan in many ways. Its efforts to influence the leaders of individual companies to support friendly political parties or individuals are already apparent. Support for Taiwan's political parties on economic arrangements that will "lock in" dependence on China is another tactic. Pre-mature transport links and some agriculture arrangements also come under this category.
China is using its increasing economic strength to pressure other countries to isolate Taiwan. Its hostile behavior at the WTO, despite previous agreements to work with Taiwan as an equal member, continues. As well, its opposition to Taiwan's full participation in APEC continues, even in matters it had agreed to before; it persists in interfering with Taiwan's participation in any form in the World Health Organization, even after the SARS crisis and now perhaps with the dangers of the spread of bird flu; it is working to prevent the nation's participation in new regional organizations; and it continues to block Taiwan in international financial and economic organizations, with increasing effectiveness.
Whatever interpretation a country has on the status quo, all of these actions have been taking place and growing under that name. The US version of the status quo has meant that Taiwan's status must be resolved peacefully and with the consent of the people of Taiwan. On the surface, this objective is genuine and right. Unfortunately, however, underneath that surface, much is going on that can hardly be considered the status quo. Given the imbalance in the strength of the two sides of the Strait, the status quo under Hu's "new Taiwan policy" is good -- for China.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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