China is very uncomfortable that the US is seeking to dominate the world. It is therefore scouring the globe to create a united front of sorts against the US -- an old ploy the Chinese Communist Party used at home to win the Chinese Civil War in 1949.
Russia seems an obvious ally, with President Vladimir Putin increasingly unhappy with the US. Among other things, he fears that Washington might try to destabilize his regime on the lines of democratic change in Ukraine. As it is, the US is seen to be encroaching into Russia's security zone.
China has similar fears and more. During President Hu Jintao's (
Amplifying on their summit, Hu said that the two sides had discussed cooperation on Taiwan and Chechnya, promotion of stability in Central Asia, UN reform and "the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula." Russia supports China on Taiwan, and Beijing is behind Moscow in its war against separatism in Chechnya.
"Any actions aimed at splitting sovereign states and kindling ethnic discord are inadmissible," according to the two leaders.
Putin has described the new relationship between Russia and China as a "partnership" designed for the good of "our own peoples and for the entire world." In other words, China and Russia are striving to create a new global power center to counter the US.
Russian partnership is important to China because of its nuclear arsenal, which gives it a global status. It is also important because of its energy and other natural resources which China will increasingly need for its development. And it is a source of sophisticated military weapons and technology for China.
Fearful of US designs on the former Soviet Central Asian republics, China and Russia are also building up an alternative political and security structure in this region. Since 1996, at China's initiative, they have created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which also includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is designed to create multiple linkages of these Central Asian countries with China and Russia, to ward off or counter US incursions on China's periphery.
These countries are also seen as rich in energy resources, potentially rivalling the Middle East oil fields. In today's world of high oil prices and looming energy shortages, China is very much part of the scramble for these resources anywhere and everywhere in the world.
China is also busy creating its own political and economic zone in the Asia-Pacific region -- ? something like the wartime Japanese version of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," but without Japan's overkill. It is doing this through a series of bilateral and multilateral political and economic initiatives. The idea is to create a benign image of China.
It is worth recalling that only a few years ago China was having problems with its neighbors over the ownership of islands in the South China Sea. It had a serious image problem, and was seen as a threat to regional security and stability. But, in the last few years, it has managed to soften, if not reverse, this image.
An important change in the last few years has been the advocacy of multilateral initiatives. Not long ago, Beijing was primarily interested in bilateral dialogues for fear of being isolated or pinned down in multilateral forums. Now it has built up enough political and economic capital to turn things in its favor. Its "charm diplomacy" is fostering an image of China as Asia's economic powerhouse with opportunities for all regional countries, if only they would hop on the Chinese bandwagon.
And it seems to be working, even though there is a big gap between the hype and reality. The reality is that exports to the US still drive Asian economies, including that of China. And this regional perception of China as the emerging, if not emergent, superpower is starting to worry the US.
Washington is worried about China's increasing defense budget, its missile buildup against Taiwan, its failure to discipline North Korea on the nuclear issue, its rapidly mounting trade surplus, its failure to revalue the yuan and a host of other matters. China appears to be building itself up as a strategic rival to the US.
Beijing's immediate interest is in Asia, and it would like to see the US eased out to establish China's primacy. A senior US official reportedly told a closed-door gathering of strategic analysts in New Delhi recently that, "The worst outcome for the US is an Asia from which we are excluded."
He added, "If I were China, I'd be working on kicking the US out of Asia ... Right now, we have a lot of alliances but there is no architecture embedding us in Asia. This worries us."
Which brings us to the "New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship," forged in Washington on June 28. This looks like part of a new US security architecture in Asia, with India and Japan as two nodal points.
There has lately been some improvement in India-China relations, but it is still marked by an element of mutual distrust. The border issue remains unresolved, though it is not being allowed to impede the overall relationship between the two countries. It is hoped that the momentum thus generated will create its own dynamics for an eventual resolution of the border dispute. But there is a question mark.
The growing US-India strategic equation is important to both countries. India straddles East and West Asia, and an alliance could enable the US to "embed" itself in Asia. For India, access to US arms sales and technology is an important consideration. A wide-ranging strategic partnership with the US could also mean a technological leap for India.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
RSS