The issue of Taiwan and China signing an "interim agreement" has again come under some discussion as a result of the recent trips to China by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (
This concept is the guiding principle of the cross-strait "interim agreement" proposed by Kenneth Lieberthal in 1998 when he was senior director for Asia at the US National Security Council. The idea was to have an agreement in which -- for a period of 50 years -- Taiwan would not declare independence and China would not use military force against Taiwan.
In itself, the spirit of "no independence, no use of force" would seem to maintain the political status quo, with neither Taiwan formally declaring a change in political status nor China unilaterally imposing unification.
At first glance the idea may seem worth contemplating. But the idea of maintaining the status quo in Taiwan's cross-strait policy -- and even in US-Taiwan policy -- assumes ambiguity as to what that status quo really is.
To some people, whether Taiwan currently is the Republic of China, part of China or an independent sovereign state is subject to multiple interpretations.
The problem with the "interim agreement" is that it requires Taiwan to acknowledge that it is part of China, thereby ending any ambiguity and sealing the fate of Taiwan at the end of the 50-year period.
In other words, unification would no longer be just an option, the acceptance of which would require the approval of the people of Taiwan. What a price to pay for 50 years of peace.
In view of the country's level of political democratization, it would be foolish to think that any single politician, including the president himself, has the power and authority to decide on the nation's future by signing such an agreement without the consent of the people of Taiwan.
A recent article published in the Liberty Times indicated that former US president Bill Clinton, during a meeting with President Chen Shui-bian (
Indeed, the right of future generations to say "no" to unification would be effectively stripped away. Some say that Chen, in the second term of his presidency, is hoping to create a place for himself in the history books. However, signing an "interim agreement" would certainly not earn him the chapter that he desires.
Finally, how would this supposed interim agreement be enforced? The original idea was to have the US serve as a witness to the agreement, implying that it would have to step in if China went back on its word and used force.
However, the US already opposes the use of force by China against Taiwan. If that in itself is not enough to keep China from using force, how will signing an interim agreement help?
There is no simple and straightforward answer to what constitutes "independence." It is indisputable that Taiwan has de facto political independence. Does "no independence" then simply mean no new name and no new constitution?
Even if Taipei were to sign an agreement, if Beijing fails to see eye-to-eye with it on these issues Taiwan could still find itself living under the threat of invasion, since any action it takes could be unilaterally interpreted by Beijing as "pro-independence."
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
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