The nostalgic parade of the dispossessed across the Taiwan Strait has petered out. Dreams of pandas in the Taipei Zoo have been put on hold.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and its pan-blue-camp partner the People First Party did not do well in the National Assembly elections.
Now a tempest is brewing in KMT ranks. At issue is the selection of KMT chairman on July 16.
The selection process had already been delayed, which conveniently allowed KMT Chairman Lien Chan (
Lien's flattering reception by the PRC however has been countered by his party's unceremonious loss in the National Assembly elections.
Thus, as July rapidly approaches, the selection of the KMT chairman takes on renewed and greater significance.
Three issues come to the fore.
Who will be the candidates for KMT chairman?
This is important since the party's chairman could well become the party's nominee for president in 2008.
Second, will the selection at long last be achieved democratically? Third, who will control the party's war chest and other assets?
First, the candidates.
The two main contenders are Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (
Wang represents the old guard while Ma represents a greater tolerance for new thinking and new blood in the party.
Ma, never known to be a whirlwind, has still been the more aggressive in his campaign.
He has stressed what he would do if elected chairman and how he would more equitably resolve the party's finances.
This is pertinent since the KMT Central Standing Committee recently approved a proposal to lay off 65 percent of the 1,700 KMT employees to solve its financial problems.
As the top brass don't seem to be suffering financially, KMT workers have threatened to go on strike on the day of the chairman's selection to voice their dissatisfaction.
Further, Ma has indicated that if elected chairman, he would make the party accessible to members all over the country.
Central Standing Committee meetings would be held in other locations around Taiwan and not just in the party's northern stronghold of Taipei.
Ma is making an effort to appeal to and involve a broader base of KMT supporters, which must please the younger crowd.
Wang, on the other hand, has waged a low-key campaign; he has solidified his power base with the old guard and, not wanting to offend them, has not suggested many changes.
With him you feel that the party would keep its hierarchical structure, privileges and order.
He has even stated that he would step down from running if Lien seeks another term.
Ma has not gone that far.
Lien has repeatedly said that he will not run for the chairman's position, but several leaders in the old guard -- those who have more to lose if the party status quo and leadership change -- have been suggesting that he reconsider.
Lien could certainly bow out at this point and take an advisory role. His place in China's history is secure.
He is the first KMT leader to have returned to China to discuss reconciliation and reunification with the Chinese.
Whether Lien is sincere about retirement and a final acceptance of democracy for the KMT, or whether he is playing the traditional "humble" role by refusing the chairmanship offer five or six times before accepting remains to be seen.
Such a scenario would require that those offering be so finely culturally attuned as to keep requesting.
Lien has no fear of that since the old guard, under Lien's command, are just as well versed in this.
This leads to the second and larger issue: whether the selection of chairman will finally be democratic.
The selection of the KMT chairman has always been a back room deal. The candidate is agreed upon by privileged leaders and then presented for ceremonial confirmation.
For the KMT it has been increasingly difficult to recruit younger members and tell them to represent the party in the nation's democratic processes when the party itself does not practice or respect these processes.
If Lien chooses to enter a democratic election for chairman, he runs the risk of being embarrassed by not being selected and losing whatever cachet he gained from his trip to China.
The KMT undoubtedly remembers the embarrassing results of the 2000 presidential election, when Chen Shui-bian (
Lien has also publicly stated that it is time that democracy came to the party, another ironic admission since it has already been over 100 years since Sun Yat-sen (
July approaches. What direction will the KMT take? Can it tolerate democracy and new ideas?
The need for democracy in the selection of party chairman leads to the third issue: control of the diminishing KMT war chest.
The strength of the KMT depends on state-owned property and media outlets it has controlled since the days of the one-party state.
If the leadership changes, who will control these businesses and funds? Can they be trusted or shared with the younger generation?
Previously they had been the preserve of the old guard, who would certainly prefer to find a way to pass them on to their children instead of newcomers.
Party assets have been a key factor in staving off breaks in the ranks.
In the early 1990s we watched the rise and fall of the New Party. Launched with an agenda for reform, the New Party had initial successes.
Soon however it became evident that its leaders focused more on privilege than on reform.
Without money or the principles and platform needed to develop a support base, the New Party has gone out with a whimper and not a bang.
Control over money has also been the crucial determining factor in who came out on top after the split between the KMT and the People First Party.
When the two parties joined forces for last year's presidential election, the election ticket posted Lien as president and James Soong as vice president and not vice versa.
Strategy would have listed the more charismatic Soong as the top candidate, particularly since Soong had 36 percent of the vote in 2000 to Lien's 23 percent.
The KMT however had the war chest for the campaign and so Soong had to take a back seat.
So now, the old guard of the party faces the choice of democracy or protecting its dwindling money base.
The old guard claims that Lien is needed for stability, and that only Lien can handle cross-strait dialogue -- all the more strange since the KMT does not have the right to represent Taiwan.
Will money still talk? Has the KMT war chest been so diminished that financial help is needed from across the Strait?
Or will the KMT finally allow democracy into its ranks? Which will prevail?
Forget the pandas, this is the ticket to watch. The Ides of July plus one draw near.
Jerome Keating is co-author of Island in the Stream, a Quick Case Study of Taiwan's Complex History.
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