Were it not so serious, the current shenanigans of Taiwan's political landscape might be laughed off as a farce. We have the spectacle of the country's opposition trying to act as its government in negotiating Taiwan's future with China's communist leadership. In doing so, it is circumventing the democratic process of an elected presidency which returned President Chen Shui-bian (
Which, in effect, means that no single political party has an entitlement to govern indefinitely. The entitlement comes from the popular choice of the people. If this choice were to appear irregular or rigged, there are appeal channels to contest this. And once these are exhausted, the finality of the decision is accepted and respected by all sides of the political spectrum. The country then gets behind the government of the day. Unfortunately, this is not happening in Taiwan at the present time.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan's (
Beijing got enough mileage out of it though. The passage of its "Anti-Secession" Law had dented its image, costing it the lifting of the EU arms embargo. But Lien's visit and the ensuing bonhomie seemingly made Taiwan's elected government ineffective.
It's clear that Chen is worried by the turn of events, with Beijing trying to manipulate Taiwan's politics to its advantage. Having failed to dissuade the opposition leaders from their ill-advised China trips, Chen is now trying to co-opt this new development as part of Taiwan's political process. For instance, he said Lien had not "overstepped the boundary" during his talks with communist leaders.
In any case, according to Chen, "No matter which Taiwanese party or individuals China chooses to talk to, it ultimately has to approach the leader elected by the Taiwanese people and the government of Taiwan." He seems keen to use People First Party Chairman James Soong (
He wants to establish his government's relevance and efficacy in cross-strait affairs, and to avoid letting the opposition call the shots. The opposition, in any case, is not talking of handing over Taiwan to China in the near future. What they seem to be doing is to accept the principle of "one China," with Taiwan's eventual unification relegated to a longer time frame. In other words: to freeze the status quo over the medium or long term.
As Lien said in Beijing, "The two sides of the Strait must maintain the status quo." But this shouldn't be "static" or "passive," with both sides trying to "seek things in common from our differences and to accumulate goodwill." His vague formulation basically means that unification will happen eventually as China and Taiwan widen their common ground.
The question is: Will this be acceptable to the people of Taiwan? Judging by Chen's nervous and shifting response to the opposition leaders' China visits, he seems to think that they might win political mileage at home by appearing to be make some headway with Beijing. He is, therefore, trying not to appear completely negative about the visits, and is equally keen to start a dialogue by even co-opting the opposition into the process.
Chen is, of course, right to point out that ultimately Beijing has to "approach the leader elected by the Taiwanese people and the government of Taiwan" for any worthwhile progress in cross-strait relations to occur.
The point, therefore, is: How serious is China about entertaining the opposition's idea of eventual unification in a time frame of, say, 50 years?
Having waited for over 50 years to take over Taiwan, China's communist leadership seems rather in a hurry to finish the job. Indeed, their internal political compulsions of creating a legitimacy of sorts as champions of China's nationalism do not brook much delay. The Anti-Secession Law is an example of this.
What that means is that Beijing is playing politics with Taiwan's future, with the witting or unwitting cooperation of the country's opposition forces. They are trying to create the impression that only the opposition, with its newfound capacity to deal with China, can deliver and win popular appeal.
As a result of Lien's visit, Beijing is willing to accommodate the economic interests of special constituencies like farmers. In this way, it will seek to erode some of the ruling party's political support base. It would hope that this will increasingly make Chen's government ineffective and directionless, and forced to be reactive.
It would appear that Chen is already acting reactively by purportedly sending a message through Soong for Hu. He has also separately called for the setting up of a "cross-strait military and security mutual trust mechanism as soon as possible." Chen has also invited Hu to visit Taiwan.
The problem is that Beijing isn't listening because it seems to have put Chen on the defensive by playing politics with Taiwan. And he is unlikely to win this political game of competitive China wooing, because Beijing distrusts him. They find the opposition in Taiwan more responsive. He may, therefore, be well-advised to maintain and reinforce his political line of promoting Taiwan's own identity. It may be painful in the short run, but in the medium and long term it will better serve Taiwan's interests.
In any case, the opposition might find, when they sit down to discuss Taiwan's future, that Beijing is unlikely to wait much longer for the island's incorporation into China.
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
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