Beijing's new grand strategy is to dominate East Asia without fighting. This strategy incorporates diplomatic, defense, cross-strait and domestic policies. As these policies become increasingly integrated, the total effects are multiplied (one plus one equals more than two). Although it may never openly admit it, one of Beijing's ultimate goals is to gradually replace US dominance in East Asia through economic and cultural means.
Beijing is rapidly building up its advanced military capability to strengthen its use of non-military instruments such as diplomacy. It prefers to keep military force prepared, but not used.
The seven important elements of this new grand strategy are:
One, defusing the domestic "time bombs," such as intensifying protest movements.
Two, emphasizing cooperation over contradictions with the US: while being frank on differences, Beijing strives to expand bilateral communications.
Three, actively implementing its policy on neighboring countries, to make them feel rich, secure and friendly toward Beijing, and to replace East Asia's "China fear" with "China fever."
Four, elevating relations with the EU as a counterweight against the US: EU trade with China has exceeded that with the US since 2003; therefore, the EU will likely lift its arms embargo against China.
Five, rapid and quiet development of "acupuncture warfare" capabilities and a nuclear deterrent: if you hold a big stick and speak softly, who does not listen?
Six, prioritizing a peaceful cross-strait resolution and being prepared to wait: five days after Chinese President Hu Jintao (
Seven, using Latin America against the US and entering Africa to drive out the US: Last year about half of China's foreign investment was in Latin America; it has also used oil diplomacy in Africa to quickly fill up the vacuum left by the US.
Only one link in this grand strategy chain is related to Taiwan. Hu's tactics will be more creative and varied.
Being prepared to wait includes three strategies. One, Beijing believes that the US' strategic expansion will slow down, so there is no need to be hasty over the cross-strait issue. This is the greatest difference between Hu's and Jiang Zemin's (
Two, emphasizing a non-military strategy: apart from launching psychological warfare, legal warfare and media warfare on Taiwan, Hu has also engaged Taiwan on the diplomatic, economic, cultural and even religious fronts.
Three, be harder on the Taiwan government but softer on the Taiwanese people: Beijing avoids allowing the Taipei government that clearly rejects the "one China" principle to gain any credit. Beijing seeks to exert pressure on Taipei through other capitals, especially Washington, to prevent Taipei from declaring de jure independence.
Beijing will be agile and proactive in trying to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. Its favored plan is to annex Taiwan without war. Its second option is "coercion to the brink" to threaten Taiwan without bloodshed or destruction.
It's lowest option is to use military force to deter the US and seize Taiwan -- and by no means will it directly attack the US and destroy Taiwan. Ultimately, its aim is to pull Taiwan into its embrace as a "stolen bride" or a "golden egg-laying goose," with the minimum killing and damage.
After Hu's supporters in the Communist Youth League and Tsinghua University alumni take up senior appointments in the Taiwan Affairs Office, a flexible approach in dealing with the Taiwan issue may come to the surface. There are also an increasing number of semi-governmental academics studying the model of "one nation, three seats" represented in the UN by the former Soviet republic, Belarus and Ukraine, the concept of "overlapping sovereignty" and the possibility of a "United States of Chinese Republics."
US President George W. Bush has won a second term with a shining victory. While his ambition is still strong, objectively the conditions are no longer as favorable as they were four years ago. China's economy has grown dramatically, which has set in motion its national power.
The two sides of the Strait are becoming increasingly unbalanced. Furthermore, Beijing has never relinquished its use of military force against Taiwan, and continues to suffocate Taiwan internationally, degrade its political status and divide Taiwanese society. While wrestling with a giant, Taiwan must win with wisdom.
The challenges faced by Taiwan today are as follows: its economy may weaken, its diplomatic standing may slip, its social divisions may worsen and its governance may be further paralyzed. We must reduce internal attrition and win through wisdom. Therefore, putting our house in order is the only way to avoid defeat. This is what we must do:
Prioritize our competing national goals: political dignity, economic development and military security are all things we want, but in what order should they come?
Strengthen lateral communication within the ruling party and the government: Only with improved communication can we maximize our strength.
Seek harmony and consensus in society: democracy is not simply majority rule. Minority rights are equally important.
Stabilize Taiwan-US relations: Prior consultations are not demeaning and are standard behavior among allies. In such communication, one can express differences; it is far easier to advise the other party beforehand than to explain afterwards.
Acquire asymmetrical warfare capabilities: national defense reform should emphasize elevating military scholarship, better understanding of our enemy, pluralizing promotion channels and internationalizing our soldiers.
Implement a China policy of allying with the majority to deal with the minority: we should win over 95.3 percent of the Chinese population (the mass of people and local elites) to deal with the remaining 4.7 percent (the Communist Party and the central government).
We shouldn't treat everyone in China as the enemy.
Lin Chong-Pin is a professor in the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, and the author of the recently published book Win With Wisdom: When Wrestling With A Giant.
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