Cross-strait relations are getting more complicated. China seems to be implementing a carrot and stick strategy, while Taiwan is putting the idea of unification and "one country, two systems" further out of reach, and the willy-nilly US is becoming the middle man. To keep up with the changes, the US will need much better communication channels and more experts on its relations with Taiwan.
I believe this aspect of the cross-strait issue became apparent during Taiwan's presidential and legislative election campaigning last year. It will probably last until after the elections of 2008, when a new president and an entirely different legislature governs Taiwan. Cross-strait issues, including the pursuit of a national entity, became the centerpiece of the campaign challenging the old constraints on public debates on the subject, and bringing the ideology of the main opposition party, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), close to that of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), including the option of independence.
This development jarred the US, causing one of the greatest escalations in tensions between the US and Taiwan in recent memory. It brought an unusually strong reaction from the US State Department, and a softening of the usually strong support in Congress. It also brought many Chinese-American supporters of the opposition in Taiwan to lobby Congress against the Taiwanese government. Taiwan is still making a major effort to repair the damage.
Perhaps one positive result for Taiwan-US relations is a better understanding that the flaws in Taiwan's democratic institutions need to be addressed. There was a short-lived period immediately following the legislative elections in December last year, during which many people thought the result was a move back to the comfortable "one China" principle and a low-profile base for managing the relationship. There may be some changes among the three players -- Taiwan, China, and the US -- but it is more likely to be a change in the rhetoric, not in objectives.
In Taiwan, the alignment of political parties is in flux. The line between pan-green and pan-blue ideologies -- and ideologies within the political camps -- is becoming more blurred. The DPP has the largest number of seats in the legislature, but not enough to have a majority. The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) is a political and ideological ally of the DPP, but the two do not have a sufficient number of seats to form a majority.
The party with the second largest amount of seats in the legislature is the KMT, which with the People First Party (PFP) -- the third largest -- retains a majority, but only tenuously. Come May, the KMT leadership will retire, and likely be replaced by either Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (
The PFP is positioned to play king-maker for either the KMT or the DPP on specific issues if it can control it's sometimes fractious membership. This kind of issue-oriented behavior by politicians will not please voters, who are clearly tired of the continuous wrangling that has stalled badly needed reform. It will make it difficult for party leaders to groom a winning candidate in the next presidential election.
For China, this might be considered an opportunity. For the US, it will find managing its relationship with Taiwan especially difficult.
Unlike the past, China seems to better understand much of what is going on in Taiwan. It mutes the quest for unification while working to block independence. More recently it seems to balance its efforts to gain support of Taiwanese business leaders by supporting such matters as direct flights for Taiwanese doing business in China. At the same time, it is making threats on the political front by moving to install domestic laws which threaten Taiwanese reforms meant to strengthen governance.
For the US, all this seems to make it necessary for more involvement in Taiwan's domestic politics. At the same time, it finds itself trying to work to gain China's support in the "war on terrorism" in the short term, while strengthening its ability to defend its many security interests in the Pacific in the long term.
While deeper involvement in Taiwan affairs may be inevitable, the self-imposed rules that hinder understanding are in need of changes that would help, not hinder, the process. Changing or eliminating the rules of conduct with Taiwan has always been considered a sensitive issue in US-China relations. It need not be.
In this case, China can't have it both ways. It wants US help in managing cross-strait issues, but denies the US a better understanding of its relations with Taiwan. In any event, it can be done with or without China's approval. It has been done before, even on sensitive issues. The objective of helping Taiwan strengthen its democracy while assuring a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues could remain the same.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.The views expressed in this article are his own.
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