The People First Party (PFP) lost some of its legislative seats to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in last year's legislative elections. Following the elections, KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) mistakenly treated the two as one party in command of a legislative majority. Completely ignoring PFP Chairman James Soong's (宋楚瑜) feelings and position, he imperiously required the right to form the Cabinet and also made several other demands, implying that he would not balk at once again bringing Taiwan to a stand-still if those demands were not met. Soong, on the other hand, went to the US to get medical treatment and to think about how to play his next card.
He caused an uproar in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which made repeated calls for negotiations and cooperation, and he caused an anxious KMT to say that "he should at least avoid hurting his friends and pleasing his enemies."
While all this was going on, Soong played his first card: It wasn't the China card or the KMT card, nor was it the DPP card. Instead, it was the US card. In Taiwanese politics, the US card is constantly being played. The precursor of the DPP, the tangwai (outside-the-party movement), played it to force the democratization of the KMT dictatorship, the KMT played it to suppress Taiwanese independence activities and China is currently playing it to deal with "separatists."
Soong's US card differs from these, both in the way he played it, and in its qualities. Soong's US card was played merely to pave the way for his next card, or, to put it in other words, to provide a political smoke screen for his next move. With the hand Soong is currently holding, and the effects of the US card, his playing it before he left the US has indeed made the KMT uneasy.
As far as the US is concerned, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Randall Schriver's meeting with Soong for "an exchange of opinion" was a routine matter, since the US Department of State maintains routine contacts with opposition leaders in other countries. What's more, Schriver's main areas of responsibility include Taiwan, and, being a working official, his meeting with Soong for an exchange of opinions is nothing out of the ordinary.
Although the US government is worried over the deadlocked political situation in Taiwan, it is a domestic matter to be solved through Taiwan's political procedures, and nothing that the US can easily interfere with. The US is mainly concerned over three issues: The arms purchase, cross-strait dialogue and maintenance of the cross-strait status quo. Shriver is certain to have expressed the US' views on these issues during his meeting with Soong.
These three issues are seen by the US as crucial to stabilizing the cross-strait situation and avoiding the eruption of a crisis. Taiwan's purchase of advanced weapons is aimed at deterring Chinese use of military force; cross-strait dialogue is aimed at using political means to respond to the cross-strait relationship and avoid tension; and maintenance of the status quo is aimed at reducing the possibility of increased tension across the Taiwan Strait.
Cross-strait dialogue cannot be achieved by one side alone. While Taiwan is working hard at this, China is ignoring the issue, and what is said on each side does not match up. Maintaining the status quo means defining it, but apart from the US and Taiwan having different opinions, opinions about this also differ within Taiwan. Soong's party is not in power, and his opinions differ from the DPP's. The US therefore does not likely pay too much attention to the point of view propounded by Soong.
The US' biggest concern is the arms purchase bill that is stuck in the legislature. Some KMT politicians discuss Taiwan's national security in emotional terms. They believe that Taiwan is playing the big spender in the arms purchase plan, and that the US only is out to make money. During talks between PFP legislators and US representatives, there have even been hints that Taiwan might choose to accept China's calls to cancel the arms deal in order to save the money.
Such unreasonable attitudes are making the US worry that Taiwan will misplay the deterrence card, and that it will be unwilling and unable to resist future Chinese threats. Taiwan's lack of deterrent power of course increases the US burden when it comes to deterring China from physically attacking Taiwan, and this involves important US interests.
It is no secret that the US hold these opinions, and there is no need for any secret high-level talks. For Soong, the best time for him to have met US officials would have been after a successful election, and not at a time when he was under pressure from the KMT. The KMT's demands that the PFP merge with them are, in fact, no different from China's demands that Taiwan accept unification -- they both mean that the smaller party loses its sovereignty and independence, making it clear who has gained the most.
From Soong's perspective, it is already an impossibility that he would join the KMT to become the party's chairman. He has too many old enemies in the KMT who left the party when he was in power, and who blame Lien's defeat in the 2000 presidential election on Soong's leaving the KMT to run for president.
Although some Taiwanese politicians inside the KMT managed to get promoted with Soong's help, these people will not support his returning to the fold to become the leader and get his hands on a lot of resources. Accepting annexation of his party by the KMT would therefore be his worst choice.
Avoiding the worst choice is natural and if Soong wanted to make that choice, there would have been no need for him to play the US card. He could simply have returned to Taiwan, admitted defeat to Lien and accepted a PFP-KMT merger.
Playing the US card shows that he has better options at his disposal. The second best option is to prioritize Taiwanese stability and development and avoid creating another deadlock, begin to cooperate selectively with the DPP, and avoid a belligerent attitude where the majority forcefully blocks every attempt at legislation. The party can also cooperate with the KMT on legislation where the two parties' viewpoints are similar.
As long as the PFP returns to rational and normal implementation of balancing power, and becomes a party that avoids focusing on blocking Taiwan's development, it would expose the KMT's vile behavior and force that party to choose between changing its ways or being abandoned by voters. If this route will lead the PFP to the political vantage point of democracy and promoting Taiwanese interests, the party would both maintain the initiative and regain public support.
Soong's best option would be formal cooperation with the DPP on non-ideological issues in exchange for administrative resources. It is understandable that Soong may want to avoid suspicion by not striving for power within the administrative system, but this is not necessarily true where other PFP politicians are involved. What kind of politician would they be if they were not trying to gain a high official position?
Even if Soong is not doing so himself, helping other party members to plan for positions in the Cabinet, the legislature and the Control Yuan is necessary to acquire new talented members and expand the party. Even if the party does not want Cabinet seats, it would not be perceived as greedy if it exchanged cooperation for the positions of legislative or deputy legislative speaker, or president or vice president of the Control Yuan. Since these two institutions basically are monitoring the government, the PFP would be able to use them to balance the power scale when coop-erating with the DPP. If Soong is given the position as "cross-strait peace emissary," he cannot be accused of political booty-sharing.
By choosing to act using these two options, the PFP would destroy the KMT's talk of a pan-blue majority. It would result in venomous abuse from the KMT, and there would also be an internal reaction within the PFP. PFP members have become used to opposing former president Lee Teng-hui (
From this perspective, playing the US card may have resulted in minimizing the internal impact: Soong can now say that the US is concerned over the Taiwan situation, and that the PFP has the responsibility to stabilize Taiwan's political situation and the cross-strait situation.
He can also say that he has made guarantees to the US that cooperation between the PFP and the DPP mainly is beneficial to maintaining the status quo, and he can say that such cooperation is in the interest of a stable and developing Taiwan, that it serving the bigger picture, that it matches US interests and that it is not for the sake of one party only.
If the US card still is not enough to stop some PFP politicians from deserting to the KMT, that loss will have to be accepted. As long as cooperation between the DPP and the PFP takes place, the KMT's hopes for a legislative majority will come to naught, and the party will not even get its hands on the legislative speaker and deputy speaker seats. Its party assets will be cleaned out and it will find it difficult to prevent members leaving to join the DPP or the PFP. This would mean the beginning of a political realignment, benevolent interparty competition and cooperation.
The KMT would say that the PFP is hurting its friends and pleasing its enemies, but from a democratic perspective, this would at most be a matter of hurting the KMT and pleasing the DPP. Using the word "enemies" when talking of interparty competition is too feudal, too heavy.
Interparty competition is, after all, a democratic milestone.
James Wang is a journalist based in Washington.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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