The history of cross-strait relations since 1979 has always seen short-term moves to address the realities of the change that takes place continuously. We now may be witnessing another phase in this relationship.
It has often been said that while last March's presidential election was to be a benchmark of where Taiwan would go, the legislative election last month would be equally important. The changes that preceded the two elections and the results that followed were not expected, however.
China had already begun to move away from the threat that it would consider no movement toward unification as a basis for war, to a threat that any moves toward independence is what would trigger such action. The new threat remains ambiguous, but gives more breathing room for those who place economic development in a higher priority. The subsequent move to pass a law on secession will mollify those who prefer a stronger stance against Taiwan.
Taiwan's elections did not result in a quick road to determining Taiwan's national identity, but instead have brought greater pressure to either compromise on this issue or establish the means of setting the issue aside while placing higher priority on strengthening effective governance in Taiwan.
The US, with priorities in Iraq, the Middle East and halting nuclear proliferation, seems now to put its priorities in cross-strait relations on avoiding confrontation first, ahead of strengthening the spread of democracy in the region. This in turn means greater involvement in moderating any potential crisis there.
China's intentions on a broader scale, its growing economic strength and the upgrading of its military capabilities will continue to influence how the US and other major powers determine their relationship with China. At the same time, Beijing's leadership has placed itself in a position where it must continue to show determination in the eventual taking of Taiwan, while at the same time keeping open vital trade and foreign capital investment.
The most recent example of this balancing act has been the temporary agreement for direct air links during the Lunar New Year period. It raises the potential for expanding economic interchange between China and Taiwan, something the business communities on both sides want. At the same time, China has publicly stated that it will have new legislation that outlaws any secession by any entity of China (which they insist includes Taiwan).
That must please those in China who call for stronger efforts to absorb Taiwan, though it is provocative to Taiwan and challenges the US' effort to maintain the status quo.
For Taiwan, the impact of these same concerns varies. While Beijing's immediate priority on cross-strait matters is to prevent independence, its ultimate objective has remained the same: Taiwan's absorption into China. That has not changed. The two elections of last year in Taiwan show that domestic political differences on cross-strait matters remain. Here too, as in the past decade, the leadership must continue to balance actions or statements regarding cross-strait relations to smooth out these differences.
It is still not yet clear whether the two elections of last year have actually altered the differences that were indicated in the polls of that time.
Then, the largest preferences were for either the status quo or independence in the future, while immediate independence or unification was not strongly supported. Whether this same equation continues may well depend on the make-up of the new administration in Taiwan.
The Cabinet of the new administration has not been decided. How much can be done will depend in large measure on participation by opposition members. The Democratic Progressive Party is the largest party in the Legislative Yuan, but needs the participation of other parties to pass bills into law. Its closest ideological partner, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, does not have sufficient members to create a majority. The two ideologically close opposition parties, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the People First Party, do have enough members to forge a majority, but do not appear to have settled their relationship.
This composition of political parties, and the possibility that the ruling party can forge an agreement with one or more of them to develop sufficient options to get laws passed, is the gist of great attention in Taiwan's media. As is the case in so many political maneuvers in Taiwan's young democracy, it is new and untested ground. It also does make possible setting aside irresolvable cross-strait differences within Taiwan and moving forward on needed reforms in government.
In the US, President George W. Bush has once again stated that his top priority is the spread of democracy around the world. With its main attention elsewhere, it is understandable that the US seeks to avoid possible confrontations beyond those it already has.
In the past there was a simple solution in the long-standing cross-strait problem: the old standby of hoping that Taiwan could maintain a low profile in anything involving China.
With the coming of Taiwan's democracy and China's growing international economic power, that option is not practicable.
US pressure for China and Taiwan to retain the status quo is also understandable, but difficult to sustain. Inevitably, America has become more involved. Discussions on cross-strait matters between China and the US are frequent, with a variety of people, and often requested by Beijing. Given its political system, such discussions on China's side speak with one voice. Given its status as a recognized country, the discussions are often at senior levels, involving direct exchanges between decision makers.
Discussions with Taiwan are considerably different. They are often surreptitiously managed and are unclear on the status of participants, the scope of negotiations and at what level they take place. The fundamental purpose in getting involved with both sides is to lower the likelihood of confrontation between the two sides and, hopefully, to prevent provocation and coercion by either one. That is a difficult task for the US, given its many interests, but also given the unbalanced means of communicating with the two sides of the Taiwan Strait that it has imposed on itself.
As in China and Taiwan, the US leadership also faces domestic pressures on the cross-strait issue. Up to this point, aside from off-the-cuff statements in interviews, the US has worked within its stated policies of maintaining the status quo and opposing any unilateral change to this by either of the other cross-strait players.
What we are seeing among the three main players in this relationship today, however, are the initial moves on what is likely to continue to evolve as the new administrations begin to settle in. How this new phase works out is still a question to be watched.
Nat Bellocchi is former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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