The Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress has begun discussing anti-secession legislation. This move has caused concern in parts of Taiwan's society and shows that Taiwan must strengthen its psychological defenses and self-recognition. China's hegemonic attitudes and ambition to annex Taiwan must be condemned.
From a legal perspective, the "anti-secession law" is but a domestic Chinese law. If Taiwan considers itself a country (leaving the discussion of national title aside), the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is international in nature, which means that international law should apply and that Chinese domestic legislation is not binding on Taiwan.
The Chinese Constitution has long included an article defining Taiwan as being part of China's "sacred territory." But when was this article ever valid? Since Taiwan sees itself as an independent state, it is not part of China. So what does it matter to Taiwan if China passes an anti-secession law?
One important benchmark for national independence is that no other state holds jurisdiction in that state. This being so, no law passed by China has any power in Taiwan.
A case in point is China's inclusion of the Diaoyutai islands in its territory in the Law on China's Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas in 1992. It has no legal effect in Japan, and is merely a political statement aimed at Japan.
China has stated that the anti-secession law is a special law aimed specifically at Taiwanese independence. Not only does it not apply to Hong Kong or Macau, it doesn't apply to separatist activities in Tibet or Xinjiang either, and this is in fact quite illogical. The use of an "anti-secession law" instead of a "unification law" in fact excludes the East-West Germany, North-South Korea and EU models as well as the confederation, federation and commonwealth models, and uses legislation to state clearly that China is unified.
A "unification law," at least in name, recognizes that the two sides are separately ruled, but predefines unification of the two as the only future option. An "anti-secession law," however, does not comply with the current status since it defines the two parties as domestic, and it makes China the definer, lawmaker, judge and executor.
From the proposal for a unification law to the initiation of the anti-secession law, the pressure on Taiwan has increased. The anti-secession law defines the current status as both sides of the Taiwan Strait being one entity, and attempts to give the outside world the impression, wrongly, that China is the keeper of the cross-strait status quo.
However, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have long been separated. Why else would there be a need to discuss unification? If it was a matter of civil war, there would only be the problem of who the ruler would be, and no problem regarding unification.
China's unreasonable declaration that Taiwan is a part of it is the same as Iraq's legislation making Kuwait its 18th province. As far as the cross-strait situation goes, this is definitely a matter of unilaterally changing the status quo, and a serious provocation.
China is attempting to manifest its determination to block Taiwan's independence by adopting an anti-secession law, and is also making the mistake of believing that such a law is an important deterrent to US intervention in the cross-strait issue. The result, however, may be similar to the result of China's Taiwan policy white paper published in February 2000, which instead reversed Taiwan's strategic disadvantage in the triangular Taiwan-US-China relationship.
The US is demanding that Taiwan not change the status quo, and has even said that Taiwan is not a sovereign state, that the two sides of the Strait should be peacefully unified, that the US has no duty to defend Taiwan and that Taiwan is part of China.
It has used this to apply pressure on Taiwan. The anti-secession law might, however, lead to US concerns that China may use military force against Taiwan. Because the US is opposed to the use of military force by China to resolve the Taiwan issue, and because it hopes a solution to the cross-strait issue can be approved by the people of Taiwan, Taiwan should make good use of this opportunity and launch an intense effort to explain to the US government, and academic circles, that the anti-secession law may change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. It should also rebuild mutual trust between Taiwan and the US to change the strategically disadvantageous situation in which it has found itself over the past two years.
It is worth noticing that we absolutely must not bow to China's threats and coercion, because that would encourage China to take military action even sooner. China is not a country ruled by law, and a Chinese decision to take military action is related to its military strength, not to whether Taiwan crosses the line.
The only way for Taiwan to avoid a war across the Taiwan Strait is to strengthen its national and psychological defenses to make China understand that the cost of war would be too high, instead of fearing attack.
It must be remembered that the enemy is most afraid of that which they are doing their utmost to prohibit us from doing.
Translated by Perry Svensson
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
RSS