In their masterpiece on political campaign strategy, James Carville and Paul Begala provide politicians with a dozen winning secrets. Among them, the key is to "buck up, suck up, and come back when you foul up."
As political consultants for former US president Bill Clinton, Carville and Begala remind politicians of what to do next when they win and how to recover when you really screw up.
The philosophy is simple but frequently neglected: Once you've won, the goal is not to gloat, it's to win again. Do everything you can to set yourself up for another victory. Do nothing that will make your next effort more difficult. But if you mess up, take responsibility, thereby demonstrating that even when you fouled up, you're responsible. Accepting responsibility is better than taking blame.
The pan-blue camp's complacent attitude about its victory in last month's legislative elections -- as well as its leaders' moves to take advantage of the de facto majority to attempt to blackmail the Chen Shui-bian (
The political wrestling among the blue camp also signified their incoherence, especially when it comes to past campaign rivalries and future cooperation.
Not only did the People First Party (PFP) pour cold water on the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) proposal to merge quickly and instead "walk on its own road," their under-the-table dealings with the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have opened the possibility of party cooperation that cross blue and green lines.
While Chen resigned the DPP chairmanship to take responsibility for the party's failure to secure a majority in the legislature, it revealed a timely and skillful adjustment of Chen's leadership strategy to clear the battlefield and move to the next one.
Clearly Chen has a well-calculated agenda in mind. Chen not only took responsibility for his party's poor performance in an unprecedented and modest way, he also urged party members to engage in self-examination.
Later, in his New Year's address to the nation, Chen stressed the need for reconciliation and dialogue between the opposing camps and took steps toward reconciliation and cooperation needed to power the country toward reinvigorating the economy and upgrading its national competitiveness. Chen also left room for party-to-party negotiations on key personnel arrangements and policy decisions by emphasizing that "politics is an art of possibilities."
In order to rebuild his leadership, Chen successfully minimized the "lame-duck effect" by appointing Presidential Office Secretary-General Su Tseng-chang(蘇貞昌) as the acting DPP chairman and began to groom senior DPP official and Kaohsiung City mayor Frank Hsieh.
In terms of regaining control of political agenda, Chen also offered an olive branch to the opposition party leaders by opening chances of policy dialogue and negotiation. Most importantly, Chen echoed the pubic by generating an urgent need for the nation to put aside political finger-pointing and partisan disputes.
While Lien and his followers are still obsessed with the presidential election results and put all their hopes on what they call "the new legitimacy," their chances might have slipped away as the DPP reorients its strategy to meet the new political climate.
During elections, the trick is to not get so carried away with being gracious in victory that you forget what you are fighting for. All victories are fleeting. When you win one, move quickly and decisively to consolidate your gains. No one is ever sustained by past glory.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
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