Taiwan has put much more vigor in its "go south" policy since Nauru established relations with Beijing last July at the expense of Taipei. The government has broken with its practice of dollar diplomacy. Now it does not hesitate to use thinly veiled economic threats to score diplomatic gains. Recent rows with Thailand and Indonesia have highlighted that policy shift.
The cancellation last Decem-ber of President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) trip to Indonesia triggered fierce protests by top officials. Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) rejected apologies from the Indo-nesian government and warned of an economic boycott. Vice Minister of Economic Affairs Yiin Chii-ming (尹啟銘) even suggested that Indonesia could be excluded from a list of countries receiving Tai-wanese investments. And law-makers from across party lines urged the government to maintain the ban on the importation of Indonesian workers and stop talks on the purchase of natural gas from Indonesia.
Taiwan also reacted aggressively after Thailand denied visas in January to a delegation led by Legislative Yuan vice speaker Chiang Pin-kun (
Taiwan froze the imports of Thai workers when Thailand refused to issue a visa last August to Council of Labor Affairs Chairwoman Chen Chu (
Are such harsh tactics justified to promote the "go south" policy? Does Taipei make an effort to assess the interests of Southeast Asian countries before implementing a policy?
Both Thailand and Indonesia officially adhere to the "one China" policy. Their attitude was therefore not surprising. Taiwan can criticize Beijing, the media, or its own officials for those diplomatic setbacks. But it shouldn't blame countries it is trying to lure away from China.
The threat of economic sanctions was not justified in the case of Indonesia. It could almost be considered a lack of gratitude since Indonesia allowed Lu to visit Jakarta and meet its minister of manpower and transmigration despite China's pressure. Beijing even reportedly threatened to sever diplomatic ties with Jakarta if Lu had met Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri.
It is also unfair for Lu to say that the Indonesian government must bear all the responsibility for Chen's canceled trip.
Indonesia proved its goodwill throughout the three months necessary to prepare Chen's visit. It sent two special delegations to discuss the details of the trip with top officials. And the two nations' presidential offices cooperated to arrange the visit. So why should only Indonesia take the blame?
Taiwan similarly failed to take into account Thailand's national interests. Chiang's visit would have coincided with a trip to Bangkok by Chinese Vice Premier Li Lanqing (李嵐清) and therefore put the Thai government in an embarrassing situation. The government underestimated the pro-China stance of the ruling Rak Thai Party, less eager to engage in relations with Taipei than its predecessor, the Democrat Party.
Taiwan has two main advantages in its diplomatic battle against China. It has substantial investments in Southeast Asia and it can absorb workers from the region. But were Taipei to overuse its economic muscle in the promotion of the "go south" policy, it could cancel out those advantages or worse, cause resentment.
Southeast Asian nations increasingly resent Beijing's constant pressure to honor their commitment to the "one China" policy. Taipei's use of economic threats could trigger a similar resentment and increase the nation's diplomatic isolation by deterring potential strategic partners from initiating a rapprochement.
One danger of a too aggressive "go south" policy could be to force Southeast Asian countries to choose between Taipei and Beijing. Such a trade-off would plausibly lead them to tilt toward the more powerful -- China.
Another danger is the window of opportunities it could open for Beijing. After Taipei threatened economic sanctions over Chen's aborted trip, China agreed in December to a US$400 million loan agreement for Indonesia, the first ever between the two countries. What matters in the "go south" policy is not to unrealistically achieve immediate gains.
It is more important to generate a debate in the region on the legitimacy of the "one China" policy by multiplying attempts to make diplomatic breakthroughs. For instance, some Thai lawmakers panned their government when it refused to grant visas to the Taiwanese legislative mission.
The Chen administration is right to revive the "go south" policy, which officially aims to diversify investments away from China and unofficially aims to strengthen the nation's sovereignty. But it is wrong in the means it is using. A too aggressive approach could jeopardize a policy that is still in its infancy, especially at a time when Taipei is seeking free-trade agreements with such countries as Thailand and Vietnam.
The Chen administration wants immediate results to have a good record before next year's presidential election. But it must learn that diplomatic setbacks are part of the game when it takes risks to improve relations with countries adhering to the "one China" policy.
It also needs to be more patient for it takes time to cultivate the support of lawmakers in Southeast Asia.
The Chen administration is pushing for the establishment of pro-Taiwan committees in the region to upgrade bilateral ties and eventually obtain the dual recognition of Beijing and Taipei. But such a difficult task won't be achieved overnight.
Trung Latieule is a former editorial assistant at the International Herald Tribune and now a freelance reporter based in Paris.
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