In January of 1995, on the eve of the Chinese Lunar New Year, Jiang Zemin (江澤民) made an eight-point declaration on relations with Taiwan known as "Jiang's eight points." In the intervening six years, enormous changes have taken place in the international situation, in relations across the Taiwan Strait and domestically within China and Taiwan. It is interestin to analyze Jiang's eight points in the light of this new situation.
There are two diametrically opposed ways of thinking about how to handle the unification problem between Taiwan and China -- a problem which relates to the long-term benefit of the Chinese people as a whole, peace in the Asia-Pacific region international relations, and China's path to modernization and development.
Illustration: Mountain People
The first way of thinking takes narrow patriotism and parochial nationalism as its rationale and the preservation of privileges for those in power in the PRC as its starting point. It is backed up by the threat of military force against Taiwan; and it twists, covers up or fabricates historical facts to suit its own ends. A united front strategy is used to deceive Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties as well as to undermine any consensus between them. Any cost can be born for the sake of eradicating the ROC and occupying Taiwan. "Jiang's eight points" is a superb example of this way of thinking, which today still occupies a core position in the minds of those in the CCP Central Committee's Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs (中共中央對台小組). Not long ago, Qian Qichen (錢其琛) was still singing the praises of Jiang's eight points.
The other way of thinking considers the problem of peaceful unification between Taiwan and China in the context of China's historical process of modernization. In other words, the unification of China is one part of China's modernization, and China's modernization shouldn't be interrupted or sabotaged for the sake of unifying China. China's modernization should conform to global trends in the development of human society -- that is, demands for democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law and economic globalization.
In this way of thinking, the history and reality of modern China should first be respected and acknowledged. It should be acknowledged that the Republic of China (ROC) has already existed for 90 years, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) has existed for 52 years. It should be acknowledged that there are two China entities, one on each side of the Taiwan Strait. And the fact that the CCP split twice historically and broke up China's unified territory must be squarely faced. The first time was in 1931 with the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic (中華蘇維埃共和國). The second time was in 1949 with the establishment of the PRC.
Diligent promotion
As China is already divided, first consideration must be given to peaceful maintenance of the status quo. The development of each side's economy, society, culture, science and technology should be diligently promoted, and economic and cultural exchanges across the Taiwan Strait should be strengthened. Both sides should work together to advance China's modernization. Given sufficient time, negotiations can be undertaken in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres to reconstruct a unified China. By not using military force in the course of China's modernization, both Chinas develop and, ultimately, when conditions are ripe, a unified China is naturally reconstructed.
The two ways of thinking have two different results.
There are several crucially important points among Jiang's eight points. They include the one-China principle (一個中國原則); one country, two systems, peaceful unification (一國兩制，和平統一); Chinese people don't fight Chinese people (中國人不打中國人); and unification of China by means of Chinese culture (以中華文化統一中國).
Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen have repeatedly used nationalism to emphasize the "one China" principle. Their "one China" is the PRC, and in their minds, the ROC vanished long ago in 1949. The government of the ROC on Taiwan -- meaning the ROC which was established in 1912 -- also emphasizes "one China." In the 1972 Shanghai Communique, which was jointly signed and announced by Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai (周恩來), the US government acknowledged that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but "one China." But it wasn't clearly indicated whether the "one China" that the US government acknowledged was the PRC or the ROC. At the time when the Shanghai Communique was announced, the US government still recognized the government of the ROC and didn't acknowledge the government of the PRC. Clearly, at present, there are three definitions of "one China." The "one China" of Jiang and Qian is the PRC. The "one China" of the authorities in Taipei is the ROC. The "one China" acknowledged by the US government in the Shanghai Communique is neither the ROC nor the PRC. The "one China" acknowledged by the US government should be peacefully worked out by the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan has never been under the control of the PRC, but all of China was under the control of the ROC for a period of 38 years. To this day, in the above-mentioned dispute over the "one China" principle, there is still no definition that is acceptable to both sides. Precisely for this reason, the 1992 consensus on "one China," with each side having its own interpretation" (一個中國,各自表述) appeared.
Qian has criticized Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), saying that since Chen acknowledges "one China doesn't present a problem," he should formally publicly acknowledge "one China." May we ask, if Chen emphasizes once again that according to the ROC Constitution, "one China" is precisely the ROC, what will Qian do? Will he criticize Chen even more more for bringing up "special state-to-state relations" (兩國論) again? Chen is the president of the ROC. Of course he will answer according to the ROC Constitution that "one China" is the ROC. But Qian intentionally pretends not to understand. How unfortunate!
As for the "big three links" (大三通) between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, Qian advocates handling the matter according to domestic law and solving any difficulties in the manner of the "Hong Kong model." The authorities in Taiwan advocate handling the big three links as "special international relations" (特殊的國際關係). May we ask, since Qian has proposed using domestic law to handle the big three links, does this "domestic law" refer to the law of the PRC or the law of the ROC? If the big three links are handled according to the domestic law of the PRC, this is putting the ROC below the PRC. Once again this shows Qian's objective of eradicating the ROC. How can this go through? The key problem preventing realization of the big three links across the Taiwan Strait is the question of how to handle the substantive relationship between the PRC and the ROC. The contradictions between these two existing political entities with their different legally constituted authorities and different systems can't be avoided. Therefore, simply using the three formulae of, "there is only "one China" in the world; Taiwan and mainland China are both parts of "one China;" and the integrity of China's territory and sovereignty must not be divided," to define the "one China principle" won't solve the practical problem. The "one China" announced by Qian should be classified as a future "one China," and the current reality is that there are two Chinas on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait -- the ROC and the PRC. The ROC once governed all of China, including Taiwan, for a period of 38 years. But the PRC has never occupied nor governed Taiwan. Presently the sovereignty and territory of China and Taiwan are divided. The Beijing government couldn't conscript soldiers or levy taxes in Taiwan. Thus Qian completely destroyed the principle of equality and the aspiration for peaceful unification in his attempts to force a future "one China" principle upon Taiwan and awkwardly make the facts fit the theory by, for example, threatening to use military force if peaceful measures do not succeed. He also interrupted the progress of China's modernization. These repercussions fully make clear the first major shortcoming of Jiang's eight points.
A very attractive slogan among Jiang's eight points is, "Chinese people don't fight Chinese people." This declaration was made in January of 1995. However, in the summer of 1996, the Chinese military test-fired guided missiles. They intended to influence the ROC presidential election with the threat of military force. This caused Taiwan's stock market to drop precipitously, and resulted in the US government dispatching two aircraft carrier battle fleets to the region of the Taiwan Strait. Later, high-ranking military officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) made unceasing calls for an attack on Taiwan and even expressed readiness to use nuclear weapons against Taiwan. A formal policy declaration by the head of state, "Chinese people don't fight Chinese people," was torn to shreds by his own armed forces. How should we explain this? I believe that we can only select one of the following two explanations. Either Jiang's policy, "Chinese people don't fight Chinese people," is a fraud and can't be trusted at all, or else it doesn't consider the residents of Taiwan to be Chinese. They are considered foreigners, and therefore Jiang's policy, "Chinese people don't fight Chinese people," doesn't apply to Taiwan. Reasoning on this basis, the PLA fired guided missiles into foreign waters as a training exercise. I believe Jiang was deceiving the people of Taiwan. Verbally he said, "Chinese people don't fight Chinese people," but in practice he is buying and producing large quantities of modern weapons in preparation for an attack on Taiwan three to five years hence. This is the greatest flaw in Jiang's eight points.
Stand out
Among Jiang's eight points, "one country two systems, peaceful unification," stands out. Under the current conditions of antagonism across the Taiwan Strait, Jiang's demand that the ruling and opposition parties in Taiwan accept "one country two systems" and place Taiwan in the framework of the PRC as a special administrative region could never be implemented. May we ask, since both those in power and the opposition in Taiwan have repeatedly expressed that they are not willing to accept the "one country two systems" model, what meaning is there in Jiang and Qian continuously trying to promote this model? Furthermore, the implementation of "one country two systems" has not been successful in Hong Kong. It is enough to take a look at the low morale among civil servants in Hong Kong, the middle class protesting in the streets to demand protection for their property, and the sliding public support for Tung Chee-hwa (董建華) to illustrate the difficulty of implementing "one country two systems" in Hong Kong and the failure of this policy. Why take the unsuccessful system of "one country two systems" and insist on selling it to both the ruling and opposition parties in Taiwan? This can only show that Jiang and Qian are truly unable to present a feasible, effective way to attract the government and the opposition in Taiwan. Another one of Jiang's eight points that appears rather attractive is, "unification of China by means of Chinese culture." In the past six years, how has Chinese culture been effected in China? Let's take Falun Gong (法輪功) as an example. Falun Gong is a great fruit of Chinese culture currently being popularized throughout the world. With nearly 100 million followers in mainland China, Falun Gong asks believers to practice truthfulness, benevolence and forbearance (真,善,忍). This would seem to be a good thing, but with one order, Jiang has transformed Falun Gong into an "evil cult." It should be known that Falun Gong -- established on Chinese soil during the 1980s -- was properly registered, and acknowledged by the relevant CCP departments. There were, moreover, large numbers of CCP political and military cadres practicing Falun Gong alongside the masses. Before government intervention, Falun Gong gradually developed in strength and size, a true product of Chinese culture. Thus, from the perspective of Jiang's eight-point policy, Falun Gong should be hailed, and allowed to flourish freely in China -- not vilified as a "cult" and suppressed. Fearing that the CCP's authoritarian rule was under threat from Falun Gong's numerous practitioners and organizations, Jiang had the CCP's ruling interest in mind when he ordered the ban on Falun Gong. The group has, however, developed a strong following in Taiwan, making it all the more clear that Jiang's call for "unification of China by means of Chinese culture" was a lie, a mere slogan, which China has no intention of acting upon.
In sum, four of Jiang's eight points are lies. How much substance does that leave? When Qian extolled the eight points as "the principal guidelines of the age" not long ago, he was really stretching it. At the same time, the line of thinking whereby China seeks to achieve unification through modernization has seen development over the past six years.
Trade and investment between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have developed rapidly with the expansion of both economies. Currently, Taiwan's investments in China represent China's second largest source of foreign capital. According to incomplete statistics, these investments somewhat exceed US$100 billion. Taiwanese businesses account for quite a large proportion of the approximately 360,000 foreign companies that have established factories and companies in China. These forces of a capitalist economy -- both tangible and intangible -- have tied China and Taiwan tightly together. Large numbers of Taiwanese businessmen have emigrated to China or travel back and forth across the Taiwan Strait over the long term. Taiwan is also engaged in a plan to recruit highly skilled personnel and technical workers from China. The combined forces of capital, trade and technology are quietly and unobtrusively changing people's way of life and patterns of thinking on both sides of the Taiwan Strait today.
Driving forces
These forces are driving China's historical process of modernization. It is estimated that in the second half of 2001, China and Taiwan will join the WTO in the same session. This will create favorable conditions for strengthening the economic and trade relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and establishing a greater China economic sphere. Once the greater China economic sphere truly takes form, this will create a stage for peacefully unifying China politically and structurally and establishing a future "one China."
There is no market in Taiwan for Jiang's eight points. May we ask, with over US$100 billion in investments backing them up and tens of thousands of factories and enterprises in China, how is it possible that either those in power in the ROC or the opposition will lightly abandon the ROC and disregard their own interests?
At the same time, the Bush administration in the US will support the ROC in resisting a military invasion of Taiwan by the PRC.
In this international environment, how could the authorities in Beijing dare to lightly start a war?
In the face of the above-mentioned facts, how could those in or out of power in the ROC have faith in Jiang's eight points?
Thus, regardless of whether Jiang's eight points are used as a deception or whether war is used as a threat, the "one-China" goal of Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen -- that is, having Taiwan under the rule of the PRC -- will never be achieved.
What can be done? Circumstances are more powerful than people. Taking economic cooperation and exchanges of science and technology as the vanguard and taking entry into the WTO as the stage, a model is currently being created to move forward gradually, interact harmoniously, enjoy mutual benefit and unify peacefully. This is a powerful force. Without doubt, this force, which is currently in effect and growing, will prevent the PRC from wanting to use the forces of deception and extortion or use war to eradicate the ROC.
I believe that the Beijing government should change its way of thinking. They should abandon their attempts to unify China by means of deception, threats or extortion and accept the way of thinking in which China is unified in the course of its historical process of modernization. The only straight and smooth road to a unified China runs via each side of the Taiwan Strait separately developing its own democratic government, free economy, open society, and Chinese culture as well as absorbing the best aspects of cultures from around the world with the goal of ultimately establishing a future, unified, democratic and free "new China."
Chris Wu (伍凡) is editor in chief of the China Spring and China Affairs magazines.
Translated by Ethan Harknes
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
The National Development Council (NDC) on Wednesday last week launched a six-month “digital nomad visitor visa” program, the Central News Agency (CNA) reported on Monday. The new visa is for foreign nationals from Taiwan’s list of visa-exempt countries who meet financial eligibility criteria and provide proof of work contracts, but it is not clear how it differs from other visitor visas for nationals of those countries, CNA wrote. The NDC last year said that it hoped to attract 100,000 “digital nomads,” according to the report. Interest in working remotely from abroad has significantly increased in recent years following improvements in
RSS