It has been widely noted in these pages that Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan's (連戰) China visit and the agreement he reached with Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) undercuts the authority of the Taiwanese government, is a vain attempt by a has-been politician to remain politically relevant, and will put pressure on President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) to adopt the trade arrangements fleshed out in that agreement.
But what has been addressed only with cynicism is how Beijing's pampering of Lien and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (
If we take seriously the notion that Lien is conspiring with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to "sell out" the country, then we must take seriously the threat this poses to Taiwan's security and autonomy.
Despite all his rhetoric about the importance of the cross-strait status quo -- frequently invoked in slogans during elections -- one doesn't have to read too closely between the lines before Lien's unificationist credentials emerge.
The lofty objectives outlined in the Lien-Hu communique are predicated on the "1992 consensus;" founded on the idea that there is but "one China," of which Taiwan is a part, but what is meant by "China" can be interpreted in different ways. The Lien-Hu agreement seeks to create peace and prosperity not for "Taiwan and China," but for the "Chinese nation," the term used in the agreement to collectively describe both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Such unificationist vocabulary leaves little room for recognizing the authority of the Taiwanese government or the self-determination of its people.
Lien's own words also give away his thinly-veiled contempt for Taiwan's sovereignty and its liberal democratic system. Addressing students at Peking University, the KMT chairman said Taiwan's democracy was threatened by the ever-fearful growth of populism, spawned by independence forces that threatened the well-being of the nation. He even went so far as to suggest that the system was so flawed that there isn't even a genuine democracy to be threatened.
The KMT chairman's role in the united front strategy is conspicuous not only in what he has said, but also what he failed to say -- and even promised to say -- when he met with Hu. Lien sat down in cordial meetings with a leadership that barely a month earlier passed the "Anti-Secession" Law, which threatens military action against the country in which he lives (but does not really consider home).
Not once did he condemn or even criticize the law or the rationale behind it. Not one word was uttered against the law that aims to bring Taiwan into the Chinese fold at any cost.
Nor did Lien take Hu to task over the growing number of missiles China has pointed at Taiwan -- an issue the KMT chairman said he would bring up when he met with the Chinese president. Recent reports indicate that the People's Liberation Army plans to deploy 200 land-attack cruise missiles later this year, and will have up to 1,000 ballistic missiles within striking distance of Taiwan by the end of next year. China's seriousness about unification by any and all means necessary can't be made any more clear than by the amount of firepower it has aimed at Taiwan.
Both Lien and the CCP hope to bring about the realization of the "Chinese nation" through political instead of military means. But for the united front strategy to be successful, it has to be sold to the Taiwanese people. And with Lien's help -- soon to be reinforced by Soong -- Beijing is at present selling Taiwan on closer integration through economic incentives, such as the lifting of travel bans on Chinese tourists to Taiwan and the opening up of the Chinese market to Taiwanese agricultural exports.
Beijing said on Tuesday it was prepared to lift import bans on six types of Taiwanese fruit and revoke heavy tariffs levied on 15 types of fruit exports, including papayas, bananas, grapefruits, apples, pineapples and betel nuts -- a prospect that is sure to turn the nation's struggling southern farmers from green to blue.
This is not lost on the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, which is aware of the political motives behind such lucrative economic offers and rightly treats them with suspicion.
Lien's freelance diplomacy is not without political costs at home. In a poll conducted while he was in China, 64 percent of respondents said they think Lien does not have the authority to represent Taiwan; even 40 percent of self-described pan-blue supporters had this opinion. Seventy-one percent of respondents said it would be "inappropriate" for Lien to sign trade deals with Beijing, and the country is deeply divided on whether the KMT chairman should have made the trip at all.
Thus, economic incentives alone are not enough to lure the Taiwanese people toward the "one China" vision. China would first have to become more attractive politically.
Instead of bad-mouthing Taiwan's democracy in front of university students, what Lien should have done is actively promote political reforms within the CCP. A Taiwanese polity willing to consider cross-strait political integration would require a freer and more democratic China, and it is the united front cohorts on this side of the Strait that stand to gain from a more open and inclusive CCP. Ironically, it is those calling for more democracy and greater human rights in China, namely, the Chen administration and Taiwan's independence movement, who benefit politically from Beijing's continuing authoritarian rule.
It is difficult to predict precisely what Beijing now has planned, but the "peaceful unification" agenda may be advanced by the following:
CCP-KMT attempts to subvert the authority of the government by conducting agricultural trade without first seeking its consent. Merely attempting this would put the government on the defensive, and by halting or preventing "unofficial trade" from taking place, the unificationists could cast the DPP as "opposed to prosperity."
Expanded "party-to-party" dialogue between the CCP and the KMT, including the arrival of high-level CCP officials on Taiwanese soil to visit their KMT counterparts. Continued inter-party communication and dialogue would amount to a tacit admission that the Chen administration would not be included in such dialogue. Government attempts to derail such meetings could be spun as reactionary.
Highly-publicized but largely cosmetic reforms to the Communist Party structure. It is highly unlikely the CCP would give up any aspect of its absolute control of the state, but piecemeal reforms could be cast in a democratic light. Lien could take credit for "sowing the seeds of democracy" in the CCP and for opening up the country.
The election of a KMT president. If the KMT takes back the Presidential Office in 2008, there will be no need to undermine the authority of the government, and the united front strategy could be pursued in a more robust fashion.
China's unification strategy is intended to progress slowly and evolve over time. Moves toward closer economic integration today could pave the way toward closer political integration tomorrow: a kind of creeping unification. If the CCP one day concludes that this approach is a futile endeavor, unification by "non-peaceful" means may be unavoidable.
The task now for the Taiwanese people is to defend the nation's autonomy from those who seek to destroy it.
And to think, the most recent leg of the united front strategy began with Chen's blessing.
Mark Kennedy is a freelance writer based in Taipei.
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