Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (
The agreement between Lien and Hu takes the so-called "1992 consensus" and rejection of Taiwanese independence as its foundation, which is completely in line with the "one China" and anti-independence position the Taiwan Affairs Office of China's State Council outlined in the May 17 statement. The tasks outlined by the Lien-Hu communique are: to establish a mechanism for communication between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the resumption of cross-strait negotiations to achieve peace, promoting cross-strait economic exchanges and allowing Taiwan more space on the international stage. All of these items were included in the Taiwan Affairs Office's policy statement, which actually showed more goodwill toward Taiwan.
The cross-strait problem is a conflict between sovereignties, and at its heart is the principle of "one China." The current talks have sought to replace "one China" with the "1992 consensus" as a means to open up cross-strait interaction and build a brighter future. If the conflict over sovereignty can be put on one side to allow for interaction and negotiation, there is no reason for Taiwan to object to this. But negotiations will necessarily be restricted to the economy and other functional applications, and at this time it will be very difficult to transcend the conflict over sovereignty to sign a cross-strait peace agreement or build a structure for peace across the Strait.
When it was in power, the KMT was aware that the "one China" issue could not be resolved quickly and that there was no room for compromise. In 1996, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council made a study of the "one China" principle and came to the conclusion that "those people who suggested that the Taiwan government should discuss `one China' more extensively in the hope that China would change its mind were simply engaged in wishful thinking."
Does replacing "one China" with the "1992 consensus" actually create more opportunities for cross-strait interaction and greater international space for Taiwan? If the "1992 consensus" is so efficacious, why was there no progress in establishing a cross-strait accord between 1992 and 2000, when the KMT was in power? In fact, after 1993, Taiwan became subject to constant reprimands that it was failing to abide by the "one China" principle. The cross-strait situation became increasingly tense, so much so that from 1995 to 1996 and 1999 to 2000 China threatened Taiwan militarily and conducted missile tests.
In December 2003, during the presidential election campaign, Lien said at a press conference that since China often only mentions the first part of the so-called "1992 consensus" ("one China") but not the second part ("with each side having its own interpretation") he did not want to discuss the "1992 consensus" anymore.
Now he has had the opportunity to meet with Hu for several hours, but when Lien reiterated his interpretation of the "1992 consensus" during their meeting, Hu did nothing to show agreement, nor did he respond in any way. So have the KMT and the CCP really reached a consensus on the "1992 consensus?" If they have not, then how can we expect the Democratic Progressive Party government to accept it?
And lastly, in a televised debate between the presidential candidates last year, Lien said that "the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country, and we will not allow it to join, be annexed by, or unite with, the People's Republic of China." Could it be that this position is also part of the "1992 consensus" and the vision shared by Lien and Hu?
It is to be hoped that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be able to communicate their problems in a straightforward manner. That would be the only way to truly resolve the issue.
Lien's visit has pioneered top-level exchanges between political parties on each side of the Strait, and that probably helps to promote mutual understanding. Lien and Hu, however, have not been able to approach the heart of the cross-strait issue head-on. The fact that the meeting between the two only amounted to an endorsement of China's statement on May 17 last year may not be a big help in solving the cross-strait issue.
Tung Chen-yuan is an assistant professor at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Ian Bartholomew and Perry Svensson
In their recent op-ed “Trump Should Rein In Taiwan” in Foreign Policy magazine, Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim argued that the US should pressure President William Lai (賴清德) to “tone it down” to de-escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait — as if Taiwan’s words are more of a threat to peace than Beijing’s actions. It is an old argument dressed up in new concern: that Washington must rein in Taipei to avoid war. However, this narrative gets it backward. Taiwan is not the problem; China is. Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions
The term “assassin’s mace” originates from Chinese folklore, describing a concealed weapon used by a weaker hero to defeat a stronger adversary with an unexpected strike. In more general military parlance, the concept refers to an asymmetric capability that targets a critical vulnerability of an adversary. China has found its modern equivalent of the assassin’s mace with its high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons, which are nuclear warheads detonated at a high altitude, emitting intense electromagnetic radiation capable of disabling and destroying electronics. An assassin’s mace weapon possesses two essential characteristics: strategic surprise and the ability to neutralize a core dependency.
Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) said in a politburo speech late last month that his party must protect the “bottom line” to prevent systemic threats. The tone of his address was grave, revealing deep anxieties about China’s current state of affairs. Essentially, what he worries most about is systemic threats to China’s normal development as a country. The US-China trade war has turned white hot: China’s export orders have plummeted, Chinese firms and enterprises are shutting up shop, and local debt risks are mounting daily, causing China’s economy to flag externally and hemorrhage internally. China’s
During the “426 rally” organized by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party under the slogan “fight green communism, resist dictatorship,” leaders from the two opposition parties framed it as a battle against an allegedly authoritarian administration led by President William Lai (賴清德). While criticism of the government can be a healthy expression of a vibrant, pluralistic society, and protests are quite common in Taiwan, the discourse of the 426 rally nonetheless betrayed troubling signs of collective amnesia. Specifically, the KMT, which imposed 38 years of martial law in Taiwan from 1949 to 1987, has never fully faced its
RSS