Unsurprisingly, the comments made by US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage that Taiwan was "probably the biggest landmine" in US-China relations as well as "the US is not required to defend Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act" stirred up domestic finger-pointing in Taipei.
When the US sneezes, Taiwan catches a cold. We have seen this pattern repeated over the past year. Partisan calculations aside, can Taiwan's leaders -- from both camps -- ?learn lessons and re-examine their strategy toward the new US-Taiwan-China relationship?
The Armitage quote was made Dec. 10 -- on the eve of Taiwan's legislative elections. The PBS network chose to run the interview more than ten days after the pan-blue camp secured a majority. Washington must have been relieved that the pro-new-constitution, pro-name-rectification pan-green forces failed to win the campaign. There is no need for Washington to intentionally sabotage the Chen Shui-bian (
Armitage was simply explaining an old nuance in the TRA and the Three Communiques, and not a new policy change. But no one can deny the incremental adjustment in the US tendency to replace its old strategy of "ambiguity" with a clearer identification of what can and cannot be done.
Washington's move to draw a clear "red line" has been closely associated with a growing misperception of Taiwan's status and a lack of trust in Chen's next step regarding constitutional reforms and name change.
Taipei's lack of determination to strengthen its self-defense capability in the face of a potential military crisis originates from China's reckless and irrational miscalculation.
The US conviction is that all these factors would drag it into an unnecessary military conflict with China, which the Bush administration does not want and would be unable to solve.
Therefore, Armitage's comments displayed a unified Bush administration attitude to send clear messages to Chen's government, the pan-blue camp and Beijing.
Washington's warning to Chen is simply "don't take the US for granted." There is indeed a presumption in Taiwan -- advocated mostly by Taiwan's independence proponents -- that Taiwan can be provocative to China, and the US will bail Taiwan out.
Despite the differences between Chen and former President Lee Teng-hui (
Such a notion that "the US will come to our aid anyway" has led to even more worrisome behavior by the pan-blue force's mindless and irrational boycott of the 6-million dollar purchase of eight diesel submarines, six Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile defense batteries and 12 P-3C maritime patrol aircraft.
In keeping with the TRA, the US should provide Taiwan with weapons sufficient for its defense to deter military action, but there is a difference between "deter" and "defend." Without showing any will to defend itself, how can Taiwan count only on the US' assistance?
To Beijing, it is not a good time to take advantage of US policy maker's criticisms of Taiwan's leader, either. The alleged move to enact the so-called "anti-secession law" is a straight manifestation of unilaterally changing the status quo of Taiwan Strait.
As one of the actors, China should not portray itself as both arbitrator and law-enforcer. The move is not conducive to a peaceful and stable cross-strait dialogue.
Liu Kuan-teh is Taipei-based political commentator.
Why is Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) not a “happy camper” these days regarding Taiwan? Taiwanese have not become more “CCP friendly” in response to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of spies and graft by the United Front Work Department, intimidation conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Armed Police/Coast Guard, and endless subversive political warfare measures, including cyber-attacks, economic coercion, and diplomatic isolation. The percentage of Taiwanese that prefer the status quo or prefer moving towards independence continues to rise — 76 percent as of December last year. According to National Chengchi University (NCCU) polling, the Taiwanese
It would be absurd to claim to see a silver lining behind every US President Donald Trump cloud. Those clouds are too many, too dark and too dangerous. All the same, viewed from a domestic political perspective, there is a clear emerging UK upside to Trump’s efforts at crashing the post-Cold War order. It might even get a boost from Thursday’s Washington visit by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. In July last year, when Starmer became prime minister, the Labour Party was rigidly on the defensive about Europe. Brexit was seen as an electorally unstable issue for a party whose priority
US President Donald Trump is systematically dismantling the network of multilateral institutions, organizations and agreements that have helped prevent a third world war for more than 70 years. Yet many governments are twisting themselves into knots trying to downplay his actions, insisting that things are not as they seem and that even if they are, confronting the menace in the White House simply is not an option. Disagreement must be carefully disguised to avoid provoking his wrath. For the British political establishment, the convenient excuse is the need to preserve the UK’s “special relationship” with the US. Following their White House
US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House has brought renewed scrutiny to the Taiwan-US semiconductor relationship with his claim that Taiwan “stole” the US chip business and threats of 100 percent tariffs on foreign-made processors. For Taiwanese and industry leaders, understanding those developments in their full context is crucial while maintaining a clear vision of Taiwan’s role in the global technology ecosystem. The assertion that Taiwan “stole” the US’ semiconductor industry fundamentally misunderstands the evolution of global technology manufacturing. Over the past four decades, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, led by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC), has grown through legitimate means