China's inability to achieve unification with Taiwan is a problem of practical politics, but whether it invades Taiwan or not will be decided by the international situation, its strength and its determination. It certainly is not a legal problem.
For this reason, I have often derided Beijing's flimflam over the "unification law," because people in Taiwan simply do not need to get tangled up in all of this nonsense.
It was something of a surprise to see Beijing giving its "unification law" a makeover and turning it into an "anti-secession law," which they want to pass before the end of the month, so that they can give the people of Taiwan a great, big Christmas present.
The fact that people in both the government and the opposition have reacted in such a hysterical way has been very frustrating for me.
The anti-session law gives rise to a host of practical and jurisprudential problems, and is really no different from the "unification law."
The first problem arises with the stated purpose of the law. The definition of "secession" is a thorny problem, for if the current situation is one of secession, then China would have to declare war as soon as the law is passed, but if a state of secession does not exist, then the idea of unification is meaningless.
So, is Beijing prepared to ignore the whole issue of de facto independence and deal only with de jure independence (which China eccentricly defines in terms of constitutional re-engineering, or any change to the national title or national flag)? Is it now willing to take a more balanced view over its claims that Taiwan is a secessionist state, while accepting current political reality?
This is the only way that makes sense of the law -- but it doesn't seem that Beijing is capable of such a sharp turnaround at this time.
And, if Taiwan is not regarded as a secessionist territory, then how will Beijing be able to deal with demands for independence by Xinjiang and Tibet?
By making this law, China is only making difficulties for itself. In fact, Beijing has not shown much interest in the "unification law" for some time, but this sudden move to create an "anti-secession law," while thought by some to be a move against hawks in Taiwan's government, is more probably a threatening tactic, seeing that talk of such laws has proved so effective in generating a hysterical response in Taiwan's government and opposition parties.
Taiwan has proved remarkably cooperative in letting China use this method to exert pressure, and by sensationalizing the reports, it simply adds weight to China's words.
The US gladly passed on the news that China was in the process of drafting an "anti-secession law." It also stated that it was an excellent opportunity to scold China for being a "naughty child" for upsetting the status quo -- and we all know how much the US hates any change to the status quo -- and they made a great deal of the matter.
But by letting the issue play out in this way, Taipei has fallen completely into Beijing's trap. First, the reason that China told the US was to exert pressure on it, and the reason the US passed this information on to Taiwan was also to exert pressure. It beggars belief that Taiwan still actually believes that the US is working for Taiwan's benefit.
Second, even if the US believes that China is being naughty for proposing an anti-secession law, the US will also put the blame on the cause of the naughty child's temper tantrum, namely Taiwan.
Finally, though Taiwan's intention is that the US can take care of China for it, the US will use both the carrot and the stick, and it is certain that it is Taiwan and not the US that pays for the carrot. The more serious the problem, the higher the price that Taiwan will pay.
Taiwan believes that opposing the "anti-secession law" is a legal battle, and that China aims to find legal grounds for an invasion of Taiwan. But the root of this legal battle has nothing to do with finding an excuse for invasion. What China aims to do through the use of legislation and government policy is to "de-nationalize" Taiwan. An example of this process is its regulations forbidding the use of the words "Made in ROC" on exports from Taiwan.
China is only feigning this "legal grounds for war" to hide its real goal -- to undermine Taiwan's existence as a nation.
The "anti-secession law" aims to destroy Taiwan's de jure independence, and this is something we should be very concerned about, for in the instance of the ban on the words "Made in ROC," we can see that Beijing's ambitions are not limited to forbidding constitutional re-engineering and changes to the national title and territories.
Because the political establishment in Taiwan does not understand the real situation and are also adept at tripping themselves up with their own "clever" maneuvering, Beijing is able to win substantial advances by playing up illusory issues, and Taiwan loses ground time after time.
The "anti-secession law" has been talked into reality and now Taiwan does not have much choice but to oppose it. But what they oppose should not be the illusory "legal grounds for invasion," but the real danger of Taiwan losing its status as a nation. Taiwan should oppose the strategies giving rise to obstacles in future negotiations and cause it to be blamed whatever it does in relation to cross-straits tensions with a spirit of goodwill and an insistence on human rights.
But to speak frankly, it seems clear that Taiwan in its response has completely fallen into China's trap of engaging in a legal battle, and it is still more of a pity that this trap was largely dug by the efforts of our own government and members of the opposition. It is absurd that Taiwan should come up with "strategies" that only serve to frighten itself.
Lin Cho-shui is a DPP legislator.
Translated by Ian Bartholomew
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