As US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has been nominated to succeed Secretary of State Colin Powell, attention in Taipei has focused on the extent to which the [Washington administration's] new Asian team would form and the impact it might have on the future cross-strait situation.
Some argue that Powell was simply a victim of the power struggle between the moderate and the so-called "neo-conservative" camp within the Bush administration. Nominating Rice to fill Powell's shoes represents an intensification of hawkish forces, as well as the notion of "unilateralism" in President George W. Bush's second term.
Others worry that Powell's resignation will worsen US-Taiwan relations because of the dissolution of his Asian team, which has long been considered to be friendly to Taiwan.
The fact is, any speculation on whether the rotation of people dealing in Asian affairs in the new Bush Cabinet will bring about a huge change of policy toward the region would be an exaggeration. From a global and regional strategic perspective, the second Bush team will stick with the old path and pursue an even tougher campaign against international terrorism. When it comes to its influence in Asia, the new team will put North Korea on top of its priorities.
For both policies, Washington will need Beijing to cooperate.
But where does Taiwan fit into such a transforming international landscape? The US stated quite clearly in its "Six Assurances" of 1982 that it would not be a mediator between Taiwan and China, and this policy has not changed. However, the role of the mediator could be indirect. Since the growing Taiwanese consciousness has met with China's closed-door policy, Washington has no choice but to play a more positive and constructive role in securing peace and stability across the Strait.
Therefore, initiating the resumption of cross-strait dialogue constitutes the most urgent task for Rice's new Asian team. Since President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has suggested the establishment of a peace and stability framework, as well as a non-military buffer zone in the Taiwan Strait, the Bush administration should utilize every possible channel to encourage leaders from Beijing to go to the negotiation table. The meeting between Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) at the APEC summit this week is the most appropriate timing for Washington to ring the bell.
As far as Taipei-Washington relations are concerned, issues relating to Taiwan's holding of a referendum and the proposed enactment of a new constitution over the past 10 months has stirred up misunderstandings and tensions in the bilateral relationship.
Bush's explicit statement last December that "the US opposes any unilateral change to the status quo of the Taiwan Strait initiated by the Taiwan leader" was considered a huge setback for Chen. Avoiding a repeat of such a public statement at the Bush-Hu summit will require tremendous effort from the Chen administration. To win international support, Chen should elaborate on the significance of making the peace and stability framework a lot more predictable and manageable.
The international community should work together to monitor and facilitate cross-strait dialogue to reduce the possibility of surprises and miscalculations. By it nature, this framework echoes international anticipation of a constructive relationship of peace and stability between Taiwan and China.
Only through establishing frank, candid and institutionalized channels of communication between Taipei and Washington can the second Bush administration continue to uphold its commitment to the security of Taiwan.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,