Since former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) declared his "special state-to-state" policy in 1999, no matter under which political regime, the people of Taiwan in principle have not recognized the "1992 consensus," where both sides of the Taiwan Strait agreed on as much as they could on the formula of "one China, with each side having its own interpretation."
Although President Chen Shui-bian (
The Chinese, however, clings to the phrase "one China" and generally ignores all other ambiguities; in the international community, "one China" means the People's Republic of China (PRC), but considering the unique linguistic qualities of the PRC's language in relation to Taiwan, China interprets the meaning of "one China" as "both the Mainland and Taiwan are a part of China."
But China's uncompromising stance on its international affairs is obvious to all; it believes that the government of the PRC is the sole government representing China, and no other interpretation by Taiwan is allowed. In reality, if our expectations regarding the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong depend on the Chinese government loosening up on its "one China" interpretation, then the "1992 consensus" was actually not a consensus at all.
Beijing has for years insisted that a cross-strait agreement on the meaning of "one China" was reached at the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong; in other words, China is accusing Taiwan of refusing to admit that it has changed its mind. Whether the former Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) legal head Shi Hwei-yow (
In fact, the meeting's main purpose was to reach agreements on the issues of cross-strait certified mail and professional certification. No agreements were signed due to differences in interpreting the "one China" principle, and hence the delegation of the ARATS stopped any further negotiations and returned to Beijing on Nov. 1. Waiting for a few days and not seeing any signs that the meeting could resume, Shi then returned to Taiwan.
From a brief transcript of the 1992 meetings from Oct. 26 to 29, we can assert that the representatives of both sides of the Strait did not reach any substantial conclusion about the definition of "one China" at the time. In turn, it was not until both sides returned to their respective nations before ARATS asked for SEF's copy of its original proposal [about "one China"] by sending a letter asking for ratification of the agreement on Nov. 16.
Obviously, after Zhou went back to Beijing, a thorough analysis by Chinese authorities was conducted and the Chinese were excited about the SEF's sentence that "the two sides insist on the one China principle," and was eager to gain official acknowledgement.
On the Taiwan side, the authorities probably realized that the implications were extremely serious, and so they delayed responding. ARATS then took the initiative and eagerly planned the Koo-Wang talks. After obtaining mutual consent, these cross-strait talks finally took place in 1993.
From a historical perspective, there is not enough evidence to support a bilateral consensus on the "one China" principle. We can only say that if an agreement was signed in the four-day meeting rather than left hanging, it would be difficult for Taiwan to deny the "1992 consensus."
In the past 12 years, the political environment in Taiwan has gone through a major change, and the concept of "one China" now is not the same as in 1992. As a result, since the "special state-to-state" policy was proposed by Lee, the government has ceased talking about the "1992 consensus," which is pragmatic considering Taiwan's political environment. Chen, in his Double Ten National Day speech, mentioned his willingness to "use the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong" to reopen a channel for a cross-strait dialogue.
Chen revealed his grasp of political language in using "1992 consensus," and replaced it with the "1992 meeting in Hong Kong." For senior ARATS officials, especially those in the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong, Chen's speech must have caused them to have mixed feelings.
Whether Beijing will decide to respond to Chen's speech may be a crucial factor shaping cross-strait relations. If China responds by expressing its good will, a formal talk between the DPP government and China will be feasible.
On the contrary, if Beijing continues its indifferent attitude, Chen's China policies during his next four years of administration will be futile. It should be interesting to discover whether the Chinese Communist Party will continue to use the "one China" principle to hound Taiwan after President Hu Jintao (
Lee Fu-chung is an assistant professor of Taiwan history at National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY LIN YA-TI
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