Taiwan recently submitted a letter of request for price and availability data to the US Department of Defense for the AGM-88C High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and the GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) for Taiwan's existing inventory of bombs. Such weapons are often characterized as offensive and many believe that this might be a violation of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which restricts the type of weapons sold to Taiwan by the US.
According to a US defense source, the US provision of price and availability data to Taiwan implies approval to release such a weapons system to Taiwan. Fearful of Beijing's reaction, the US National Security Council staff and State Department are expected to oppose the release of these systems. Opponents will argue that the TRA calls for release of weapons of a defensive character, so Taiwan has to argue that JDAM and HARM are inherently defensive.
Despite potential opposition to the sale, the US has sold Taiwan offensive weapons in the past. With the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan in the 1990s the US also sold GBU-12 500-lb Paveway and 2000-lb GBU-10 bombs to Taiwan. In 1999 the US released the AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missile to Taiwan. Furthermore, the US government released the software and hardware necessary to convert Taiwan's existing inventory of Harpoons into land-attack cruise missiles. This capability, called Coastal Target Suppression, puts precision GPS receivers onto each missile, allowing it to go after targets in southeast China.
There are three basic reasons why HARM would fit into Taiwan's defense needs. First, it would enable suppression of China's ship-based radar systems and provide Taiwan's future P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft more freedom to operate. Without the ability to suppress China's navy air defenses, including the naval version of the HQ-9 missile, Taiwan's P-3s would operate in a very dangerous threat environment.
Second, HARM would enable suppression of Chinese radars that are supporting air strikes against Taiwan. China's air force and navy air operations are highly centralized and dependent upon positive air control for coordination and direction of complex strike missions. This air control relies upon radar data for situational awareness. By disrupting the air controllers' source of information, one disrupts China's ability to conduct strikes against Taiwan.
Third, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) would be necessary to enable Taiwan to conduct strike missions against key nodes of China's conventional ballistic missile forces with minimal losses. Key nodes would include command and control centers, logistical hubs -- going after launchers is not a feasible or cost effective option since there are too many of them. Looking at Second Artillery missile operations as a system, one seeks to neutralize nodes -- assuming one is able to identify them -- that would have a systemic effect. The idea is to go after that node in the most cost effective way possible. HARM would enable suppression of surface-to-air missile systems operating along China's southeast coast.
For example, during the annual military exercise, Hankuang 18, the Taiwan air force, after surviving simulated Chinese air and missile strikes, attempted to conduct a major air campaign against key targets in China, applying about 90 percent of its F-16 fleet. They lost 70 percent of their F-16s to Chinese air defenses. The main reason is the lack of a SEAD capability, including HARM, land attack cruise missiles, airborne Signal Intelligence platforms that could provide operating parameters of radars operating along the coast, airborne jammers, attack helicopters and special operations forces.
For Taiwan, there are two advantages to JDAM. First, Taiwan would reduce the risk of collateral damage by using precision-guided bombs versus dumb bombs. JDAM kits would enable the bombs to hit their targets and not some neighboring village or children's hospital. Secondly, using smart bombs means that Taiwan's pilots, assuming they are able to solve the SEAD problem, would only have to make one pass over a specific target.
A Taiwan government source said that the purchase plan will not affect the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology's Tien Chien (Sky Sword) 2A anti-radiation missile program, because if it successfully develops it the US will be forced to think about lowering the HARM's price. Procedure for the HARM's budget will be passed during the next legislative session after the year-end legislative elections.
Those in the US government who argue these systems are offensive do not understand Taiwan's defense requirements. Taiwan cannot properly defend itself without these types of munitions. In short, satisfying Taiwan's request for HARM and JDAM is necessary for Taiwan's defense and would not represent a break in US export policy toward Taiwan.
Wendell Minnick is the Taiwan correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly.
In their recent op-ed “Trump Should Rein In Taiwan” in Foreign Policy magazine, Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim argued that the US should pressure President William Lai (賴清德) to “tone it down” to de-escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait — as if Taiwan’s words are more of a threat to peace than Beijing’s actions. It is an old argument dressed up in new concern: that Washington must rein in Taipei to avoid war. However, this narrative gets it backward. Taiwan is not the problem; China is. Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions
The term “assassin’s mace” originates from Chinese folklore, describing a concealed weapon used by a weaker hero to defeat a stronger adversary with an unexpected strike. In more general military parlance, the concept refers to an asymmetric capability that targets a critical vulnerability of an adversary. China has found its modern equivalent of the assassin’s mace with its high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons, which are nuclear warheads detonated at a high altitude, emitting intense electromagnetic radiation capable of disabling and destroying electronics. An assassin’s mace weapon possesses two essential characteristics: strategic surprise and the ability to neutralize a core dependency.
Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) said in a politburo speech late last month that his party must protect the “bottom line” to prevent systemic threats. The tone of his address was grave, revealing deep anxieties about China’s current state of affairs. Essentially, what he worries most about is systemic threats to China’s normal development as a country. The US-China trade war has turned white hot: China’s export orders have plummeted, Chinese firms and enterprises are shutting up shop, and local debt risks are mounting daily, causing China’s economy to flag externally and hemorrhage internally. China’s
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) were born under the sign of Gemini. Geminis are known for their intelligence, creativity, adaptability and flexibility. It is unlikely, then, that the trade conflict between the US and China would escalate into a catastrophic collision. It is more probable that both sides would seek a way to de-escalate, paving the way for a Trump-Xi summit that allows the global economy some breathing room. Practically speaking, China and the US have vulnerabilities, and a prolonged trade war would be damaging for both. In the US, the electoral system means that public opinion
RSS