While in the US the news is preoccupied with hurricanes in Florida, the Russian school tragedy, Iraq and of course the presidential election, which is in full swing now that the two conventions are over. As always with elections, there is continuous speculation about what it would mean if one side or the other wins. Foreign policy and anti-terrorist security issues are played up more heavily by the Republican side and are debated to a greater degree than usual, while the Democratic side tries to keep domestic economic issues in the public debate. To some degree these strategies seem similar to those of the two camps in Taiwan's recent presidential election.
Short of some actions or provocations in the cross-strait relationship that might dangerously raise tensions, it's not likely that the subject of Taiwan's legislative elections will get much attention in the international media. The three months before the elections take place should be a time to fortify the international community's confidence in Taiwan's management of its important political reforms.
At this time, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has almost decided on its candidates and is bolstering the issues it wants them to pursue. The party will not gain a majority of seats in the legislature on its own, however, as it does not have enough candidates.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is still deeply divided between those who wish to move forward in preparing for the election, and those who want another try at the presidency by canceling the results of the March 20 election. Most people believe it will lose seats in the next legislature in any event. The People First Party, headed by Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜), may gain some seats despite its internal differences, but is not likely to reach the number needed even in coalition with the KMT.
The Taiwan Solidarity Union, supported by former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), is expected to gain some seats, and in coalition with the DPP may gain a precarious majority. There will be two other small parties that are likely to win very few seats, if any, and several independent candidates who will do a little better.
With three months to go until the election -- and three months can make quite a difference -- it appears at this time that there will not be a strong majority in the legislature either way. Most parties support the important and badly needed reforms, although they may have different priorities. How much can be done, and in what way, will be greatly influenced by the make-up of the next legislature.
The size and election process of future legislatures may change with the amendments being made to the Constitution, but the make-up of the next legislature, which must pass the legislation for the constitutional amendments, will be much like the present one until the election in 2008.
If the coming elections result in such a profile, the passage of legislation on constitutional reform, which needs a three-fourths majority, will be quite an undertaking, to say the least. The recently-passed legislation allowing the number of legislators to be reduced by half and changing the way they will be elected in the future was supported by both the ruling and opposition parties, and presumably by the electorate.
It was not easy, nor was it a sure thing up until the last minute. It needed a special session in which reform was vigorously debated in the Legislative Yuan. Its promulgation was often questionable, but finally, and much to their own surprise, compromises were found and the bill passed into law, ready for the next stage of the process.
Perhaps that will create momentum to amend other elements of the Constitution. President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has mentioned reducing the number of government branches from five to three: executive, legislative and judicial. He also suggested changes to the relationship between the president, the premier and the legislature, and other issues will arise as the debate on constitutional amendment progresses.
There will likely be vigorous negotiations within political parties and between them; in party meetings and legislative caucuses. Interest groups will lobby both. Newspapers and TV news will do their best, more in pressing their biases than in educating the public. All of this would sound rather familiar to most audiences in any democracy if it were expressed in that way. The people there would see this as the way a democracy works. Sounds good. Unfortunately, it's not quite so simple. First, it won't sound that way to China. Anything that strengthens Taiwan's democratic government will be labeled a "move toward independence." Beijing will embellish this with redlines, provocation, or claims that Chen can't be trusted, and this has always been able to generate cries of caution from the international community. This, despite the experiences of the recent past.
When Taiwan made domestic political changes that were labeled as provocative (and often not only by Beijing) -- the direct election of the president and the freezing of the provincial government come to mind -- democratic, open debate itself did much to reassure the international community, and China itself, that the action was not meant as a threat to unilaterally change Taiwan's status.
For the US, the challenge will be difficult. Living up to its commitments to both Taiwan and China, supporting the strengthening of democracy in Taiwan as well as in other countries, and yet preventing differences between Taiwan and China from becoming a catastrophe, will require close liaison and clear understanding between it and Taiwan.
This may not be to Beijing's liking, but it is also in China's interest that the US will be able to manage this veritable minefield over the long period it will take before the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are likely to resolve their differences.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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