The political situation in China has been heating up lately. Attention has, of course, been focused on Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin (
Although the dust clearly has settled following Taiwan's presidential election, Jiang persists in using hired intellectuals to freely peddle the idea that there must be a war in the Taiwan Strait. He has also shown no restraint in making new appointments to and replacing top leaders in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and inspects local PLA units with much fanfare, engaging in saber-rattling and military exercises.
Although Vice President Zeng Qinghong's (
Although Education Minister Chen Zhili (
Furthermore, although Beijing has been moving toward the view that Shanghai City policies have developed to the point where they must be adjusted, Shanghai's No. 1 man, Chen Liangyu (陳良宇), a member of the CCP Central Committee, secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee and former mayor, is still stirring up trouble wherever he can. He has even directly criticized Premier Wen Jiabao's (溫家寶) macroeconomic control policies as if he is trying to consolidate opposition within and outside the government against Wen's and President Hu Jintao's (胡錦濤) policies.
Jiang has now emerged from behind the scenes to take center stage and kick up a fuss. The Shanghai clique is launching attacks more or less in every direction -- against bosses and go-getters, central and local governments, military and economic affairs, domestic politics and foreign policy alike. It is unlikely that this series of actions was unplanned, or an impulsive venting of anger. It must have been meticulously planned, or, in CCP parlance, "planned, prepared and organized." Of course it had an aim as well, but what was that aim?
As the uninitiated see it, the Shanghai clique wants to discipline Hu and Wen and their followers, and maybe even have them replaced. Some typical expressions of this opinion can be seen in various newspaper headlines: "Wen Jiabao may resign within two months if macroeconomic controls fail," "New blood in the military prior to the 4th plenary session of the 16th CCP Central Committee; Jiang Zemin intends to force military to attack Hu and Wen," "Jiang Zemin wants to use Jiang Yanyong [
In short, the Shanghai clique aims to use the 4th plenary session of the 16th CCP Central Committee to stir up trouble to make Hu and Wen look bad, and maybe even try to have them replaced.
While it might appear to some that Hu and Wen are at the end of their tether, this is not really the case.
I think the people behind these media reports have been deceived by superficial appearances and they don't really understand CCP politics. Nor can we exclude the possibility that the release of all this information has been meticulously planned by the Shanghai clique itself, based on the idea that a good offense is the best defense.
Jiang and his Shanghai clique are faced with an unprecedented challenge. Some CCP leaders are considering asking Jiang to follow the example of Deng Xiaoping (
However, Jiang is not the only one who believes power is more important than his own life. The Shanghai clique is finding itself faced with too many problems and has incurred widespread resentment. The case of Zhou Zhengyi (周正義) -- a real estate tycoon in Shanghai once ranked as China's 11th-richest man, who was sentenced to three years in prison on charges of fraud and stock manipulation -- and the economic bubble has placed the group in an increasingly passive and difficult political situation. The clique cannot afford to lose the protective cover provided by Jiang.
Their recent series of actions, therefore, have but one aim: to bring media attention to Jiang and the Shanghai clique. They don't even care if they have to commit the greatest of crimes, because in their minds, they must "exist." As long as they are seen in the media, they are telling people (including those with voting rights at the 4th plenary session) that they are still a force to be reckoned with.
This is precisely the purpose with the tension deliberately created in the Taiwan Straits. Given the seriousness of this situation, both internationally and domestically, Jiang cannot be ignored. All these words amount to one thing: Jiang shall stay on as head of the military commission and he will continue to wield his excessive power. Once this is clearly understood, it is not that difficult to see that the actions of Jiang and the Shanghai clique, rather than being an attack on Hu and Wen, are an all-out, last-ditch effort to fight themselves out of a corner.
It should be noticed that the official mouthpieces of the Chinese authorities are even rehashing reports of Jiang's army inspections from a dozen years ago. Apart from proving that Jiang would do anything to remain in the spotlight, were these stories an attempt to indicate his "consistent correctness?" If it was, that would just make the whole situation more interesting, because that would imply that the deterioration of the cross-strait relationship and the constant protests and complaints from Hong Kong over the past seven years are the results of Jiang's "consistently correct" leadership.
Wouldn't it be necessary to review past policies to clarify where political responsibility lies before these major problems can be resolved? If Jiang doesn't accept responsibility, but instead continues to remain as head of the military commission, wouldn't that be the same as repeating the same mistake, making it even more difficult to resolve the situation?
Maybe only after Jiang has been forced to accept responsibility and step down will he realize that all this rehashing of old news in the end only served to trap him.
Zhang Weiguo is a freelance writer.
Translated by Perry Svensson
With polls in as many as 76 countries, 2024 is the biggest election year in history. This year’s raft of elections has already produced a left-leaning government in Britain, political gridlock in France, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s return to office for a third term, and the elevation of the pro-sovereignty William Lai (賴清德) as Taiwan’s president, but with his Democratic Progressive Party losing its majority in the legislature. But no election will have a greater global impact than the one in the US. Whether American voters elect Kamala Harris or Donald Trump as the next president, and whether the Republicans
Minnesota Governor and Democratic US vice presidential candidate Tim Walz has connections to China dating back decades that could help inform US Vice President and Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris’ approach to the world’s second-biggest economy, but might also spell trouble with leaders in Beijing and Republicans back home. The little-known Minnesota governor taught English in China’s southern Guangdong Province in 1989 and 1990, making him the first person on a presidential ticket to have that kind of experience living in the country since former US president George H.W. Bush, who served as US ambassador in Beijing in the 1970s. Walz
There is an old saying in Chinese that essentially means that when an academic tries to reason with a warrior, they might as well be talking to a wall. Times have changed, and military men are far more reasonable now than when this saying emerged. Retired army general Yu Pei-chen (于北辰) is a good example of this. Today, academics are now often the ones who cannot be reasoned with. Alice Ou (區桂芝), who teaches Chinese Literature at Taipei First Girls’ High School, and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Weng Hsiao-ling (翁曉玲), who is also an associate professor at National Tsing Hua
Last week, the South China Morning Post reported that Chinese academics and strategists have proposed the creation of a “shadow government” for Taiwan. The plan involves setting up a fully prepared administrative body, referred to as the “Central Taiwan Work Committee,” which would be ready to take over in Taiwan immediately upon unification — whether achieved through peaceful means or military action. The proposal emphasizes the committee’s role in swiftly assuming control of the island’s administration if unification were to occur. The proposed committee would handle tasks such as currency conversion and infrastructure integration between Taiwan and China, while also encouraging