There are two schools of thought in the US foreign policy establishment -- realist and neoconservative.
The realists are represented by Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig; both former secretaries of state; Brent Scowcroft, former national security advisor; and academics such as David Shambaugh of George Washington University and Kenneth Lieberthal of the University of Michigan. The realists believe that foreign policy should be guided primarily by national interests, not idealistic goals such as advancement of human rights and expansion of democracy across the globe. In their view, China's rise to the status of a great economic and military power is unstoppable and the US must seek accommodation with China in order to keep the peace in Asia and beyond.
In the realists' view, Taiwan is a small nation. Its population is less than 2 percent that of China. China is determined to annex Taiwan and may be willing to bear whatever political, diplomatic, economic and military cost that is required to achieve that end, including a military conflict with the US. Therefore, it is in the US' interest to encourage cross-strait dialogue and economic integration, hopefully leading to a peaceful unification of the two sides.
The realists realize that the Taiwanese have striven hard to turn the nation into a democracy and it would be unseemly for the US to push democratic Taiwan into the arms of authoritarian China. This policy is thus sometimes justified with the argument that economic reform and globalization will inevitably lead to political liberation and democracy in China.
Besides, Taiwanese businesses and Taiwan's government appear amenable to eventual unification with China, as evidenced by cumulative direct investments in China that total over US$100 billion, and growing exports to China, which were 34.5 percent of total exports last year. Nearly 7,000 factories were shut down in Taiwan last year, while the number of Taiwanese living and working in China exceeds 500,000 and Chinese citizens legally residing in Taiwan number 300,000. So the realists do not see an independent Taiwan free from China's political control as a viable option in the long run.
The neocons differ from traditional conservatives in that they advocate pro-active US involvement in world affairs. Examples of prominent neoconservatives include Paul Wolfowitz, deputy defense secretary; Bill Kristol, the chief editor of the Weekly Standard; and scholars affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute such as Thomas Donnelly. The neocons believe that expansion of democracy -- a universal value -- is not only morally right, but also serves the US' national interests because democracies tend not to attack each other and are less likely to become breeding grounds for terrorists. In contrast to the realists, who stress commercial gains for multinational corporations, the neocons are more mindful of US geopolitical interests and national security.
The neocons worry about the growing US trade deficit with China (US$124 billion last year). They are also worried about China's rapid economic growth, which enables the People's Liberation Army to acquire advanced weapons from Russia and modernize itself with state-of-the-art military technology to help China achieve its objective of absorbing Taiwan, turning Japan and Korea into China's vassal states, replacing the US as the dominant power in Asia and eventually challenging the US' role as the sole superpower. The neocons therefore firmly support Taiwan's status as a de facto independent nation, at least until it becomes clear that a rising China will not threaten US strategic interests and national security with its imperial expansionism.
US policy toward Taiwan is the result of a debate between the neocons and realists, and often reflects the influence of both schools. Since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the US, however, the voice of the realists, in support of warmer relations with China, has become stronger, while the voice of the neocons advising caution has become muted. There are three main reasons for this development.
First, the US needs China's cooperation in the global "war on terror." While China's part in this war effort is not substantial, it does have the ability to obstruct US actions by virtue of its veto power as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Second, the US hopes that China will apply its leverage with North Korea to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons program. While the US is solicitous of Chinese help, Beijing's response has been rather lukewarm in six-nation talks thus far.
Third, there is the complex and difficult situation in Iraq. US President George W. Bush decided to invade Iraq and overthrow former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein based on neocon arguments that Saddam was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD); that Saddam was colluding with al-Qaeda; and that the US could transform post-Saddam Iraq into a democracy, which might inspire other Middle East nations to follow suit.
But no WMD were found and no meaningful links between Saddam and al-Qaeda link have been found. The prospects for a democratic Iraq look increasingly dubious given the intensity of the insurgency and the inadequate ability of the US forces to ensure the security of the Iraqi public. The neocons at the Pentagon have lost face and influence. When National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice formed the Iraq Stabilization Group to centralize Iraq policy at the National Security Council last October, the Pentagon was not consulted.
For now, regarding China and Taiwan, the realists are up and the neocons are down.
China's policy of lien mei chu tai (
As US casualties in Iraq continue to mount, Bush's popular support is waning. In a Time/CNN poll conducted in May, only 48 percent of those polled said the US was right to invade Iraq, down from 53 percent in April. In a ABC News/Washington Post poll conducted last month, only 50 percent of the respondents approved of the way Bush is handling the US campaign against terrorism, compared to a 95 percent approval rate in October 2001. A Bush victory in November's presidential election is no longer a sure thing.
So what will happen if the Democratic candidate, Senator John Kerry, wins the White House? Kerry clearly belongs to the realist camp. He imbibed his realism early in life, at the knee of his diplomat father. In April, Kerry said that the goal of the war in Iraq should be "a stable Iraq, not whether or not [Iraq] is a full democracy."
While campaigning in Iowa, Kerry had this to say: "Now is the time for us to also be strong with Taiwan and make it clear that while we are supportive of the democracy ... we are not going to permit them to declare independence, that would be unacceptable. And I think the way to resolve it is to continue to push, as we did with Hong Kong, Macau ... for a `one China, two systems.'"
Kerry's reference to "one China, two systems" is a major blunder. But what candidate Kerry says is not the same as what President Kerry could actually do. Kerry cannot simply waive away the US' Taiwan policy, which has been constructed carefully by the previous six US Presidents. Kerry seemed to be aware of this when he also said in Iowa: "No president can possibly allow Taiwan to slip backward from the democracy it has achieved ... we will not tolerate any kind of invasion."
In conclusion, regardless of whether realists or neocons are in the ascendancy and no matter who occupies the White House, the future of Taiwan is basically in the hands of the 23 million Taiwanese. With the re-election of Chen, the Taiwanese have indicated their wish to preserve their democracy and to reject annexation of Taiwan by authoritarian China. Taiwan has an opportunity now to deepen its democratic values and institutions and to consolidate its status as a de facto sovereign nation, provided the government and people of Taiwan can accomplish three critical tasks in a timely manner.
First, Taiwan must improve communications and build trust with the US government, explaining to Washington that pressure for a new constitution is coming from the public, who are fed up with the stalemate in the Legislative Yuan. It is unreasonable for Beijing to label such reform as tantamount to a declaration of formal independence and for Washington to parrot the Chinese position. Taipei, for its part, should be sensitive to Washington's desire not to give Beijing any excuse to initiate military action against Taiwan when the US military is stretched thin and will be stuck in Iraq for some years.
Second, Taipei should be attuned to Washington's concerns about the cross-strait military balance, which is rapidly shifting in China's favor, and about Taiwan's feckless posture about its own national defense. Wolfowitz recently told a delegation of legislators led by Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) that if the Taiwanese are not serious about their own national defense then the US won't be either. Wolfowitz could not have been more candid.
Third, Taipei must take care that its policy of cultural and economic integration with China and its program of opening Taiwan's gates to Chinese investment and immigration does not irreparably impair Taiwan's economic viability and national security.
Li Thian-hok is a Pennsylvania- based freelance commentator.
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