Why is China so angry with President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁)? Because he is not delivering Taiwan on a platter. Otherwise he appears quite reasonable, even from a Chinese viewpoint. For instance, in his recent inauguration address he scrupulously avoided the question of independence for Taiwan. He simply sought Beijing's cooperation "to guarantee there will be no unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait." Indeed, he hasn't ruled out "any possibility, [for relations between Taiwan and China, including unification] so long as there is the consent of the 23 million people of Taiwan."
For all his efforts at moderation, Beijing has branded his "provocative pro-independence activities [as] the biggest threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait." It has declared that "we will absolutely not tolerate Taiwan's independence" and would crush it "at any cost."
The sub-text of this harsh message is that Beijing doesn't trust Chen, no matter what he says. They also feel frustrated at the lack of credible political alternatives in Taiwan to advance China's unification goal. Indeed, Chen has consolidated his position by polling about 11 percent more votes than in 2000.
Taiwanese may not all be keen on formal independence for their country, but they certainly like to forge their own identity. In Chen's words, "We must seek to create an identity with this land and a common memory and to build a new and unified sense of shared destiny."
And this is what bugs China. In Beijing's view, this is clever semantics advancing the goal of an independent Taiwan. Hence the need for constant haranguing and warnings of disaster ahead if Taipei were to cross the line.
But such threats are counter-productive because "this will only serve to drive the hearts of the Taiwanese people further away and widen the divide in the Strait."
Apparently, Beijing thinks that such threats will work. First, because it will frighten Taiwanese people and erode Chen's position. So far, though, it hasn't worked. He polled significantly better that he did last time. Second, it is designed to weaken US commitment under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. By raising the temperature on Taiwan, Beijing hopes to use its increased leverage from the US' present difficult political and military situation to its advantage. So far this hasn't worked either.
Apparently, Taipei has been under US pressure not to provoke China and Chen had to take that into account. But, at the same time, US-Taiwan military cooperation is increasing and the US is keen to sell advanced weaponry to Taiwan. Indeed, the US House of Representatives has passed legislation to broaden military contacts with Taiwan.
Ever since Sino-US relations were normalized in the late 1970s, Beijing has sought to pursue its Taiwan policy at two levels: first, US facilitation of China's unification agenda, and second, military threats to assert its intent.
It might be recalled that the process of normalization of US-China relations, beginning in the early 70s and culminating with diplomatic ties in the late 70s, began against the backdrop of a shared perception of a Soviet threat between the two countries. This made them strategic partners.
In this larger scheme of things, Taiwan was downgraded as an issue. It was, therefore, a shock of sorts to Beijing when Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 to underline US commitment to help defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. But China vigorously sought in the 80s to curtail and, hopefully, bring to an end US military sales to Taiwan.
During the Cold War when the Soviet Union got increasingly bogged down in Afghanistan and then US president Ronald Reagan upped the ante by talking of the "evil empire" and missile defense ("Star Wars"), Beijing sought to maximize its leverage as a strategic partner to influence America's Taiwan policy. Its thrust was that since the US was committed to the "one China" principle, it might as well work to strengthen the Sino-US strategic partnership.
But it never worked out because US commitment to the "one China" principle was predicated on peaceful reunification, which essentially meant that Beijing and Taipei needed to sort this out between themselves. But China remained opposed to this, and still is. Taiwan is, therefore, left with no option but to accept Beijing's terms with, at best, the status of an autonomous province.
While Beijing was seeking the unification of Taiwan by any means, two things happened to weaken its position. The first was the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 1989, which created an enormous backlash in the US against China's communist leadership. The second was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which undermined the much-vaunted US-China "strategic partnership" against the now moribund communist empire.
All through the 1990s the Sino-US relationship was marked by strategic ambiguity. Regarding Taiwan, China sought to test US resolve by exercising its military muscle in the Taiwan Strait during the 1996 presidential election. It found US commitment to defend Taiwan unchanged when then president Bill Clinton moved in two aircraft carriers to deter China from undertaking any military adventure.
Under President George W. Bush, the relationship faced a crisis during the spy plane incident when China impounded the US plane and its crew. The incident ended with Washington issuing an apology of sorts in exchange for the return of its personnel. Things, however, changed after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks as China became generally more cooperative with the US on Afghanistan and Iraq.
As during the 1970s, Beijing is once again seeking a quid pro quo of sorts on Taiwan, and was, therefore, not impressed when Washington gently chided it for its harsh language against Chen's moderate inauguration address.
But this can be expected when rhetoric takes over policy. There might be more of it in the near future if Beijing clings to its rigid position on Taiwan. There are too many imponderables, however, for China to risk a military invasion of Taiwan.
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
RSS