In his recent inauguration speech, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) noted that "regional integration is not merely an ongoing but also a future trend." After heaping praises on the EU's achievement in regional integration, Chen continued to call on China to create an environment based on "peaceful development and freedom of choice" together with Taiwan, and expressed willingness to resume cross-strait dialogue to establish a dynamic yet stable framework for peace. In this context, we can surmise that Chen's goal for his second term is to replace the "one China" principle with the EU's framework of regional integration.
Chen's proposal for political integration is reminiscent of his 2001 New Year's speech that sparked discussions on the EU model, which represents a functional integration without political unification. At that time, China insisted on its "one China" principle and rejected the EU's integration model. In my opinion, if the leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait can recognize the logic behind the EU integration and weigh the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives to the current situation, they will realize that only integration offers a path to peace.
The logic behind the EU has never been a natural integration driven by market economies. Instead, the EU's integration has involved a project of precise political engineering. Not entirely economic, the EU's initial incentive was to circumvent war in Europe. We can even boldly posit that economic and market integration is merely an EU side effect rather than its original intent. If the two sides of the Strait attempt to settle or waive the sovereignty dispute via economic integration, this approach, though well-intended, would be fruitless and premature.
One thing needs to be made clear -- it is on the basis of creating a political alliance that the EU member states have chosen to push forward toward economic cooperation (such as cooperation in the coal and steel industries). Despite occasional discord over issues of sovereignty, the EU member states have never denied each other's sovereignty. In contrast to EU members' mutual recognition, China pursues reunification while refusing to acknowledge Taiwan's sovereignty, while Taiwan seeks independence and renounces the former regime's claim to China. Given these tensions, the EU model is inapplicable.
For example, one of China's strategies is using economic integration to pressure Taiwan for political unification. On the economic front, this strategy is effective insofar as economic exchanges have continued to increase over the past decade. On the political front, however, cross-strait antagonism has only escalated, as Taiwan's outflow of capital and companies to China may also carry away the nation's pro-China voice.
In addition, saber-rattling across the strait means the animosity between Taiwan and China is unlikely to flag. China has resorted to military intimidation, yet the threats of force against and the diplomatic blockade of Taiwan only drive the Taiwanese further away from China.
The reason for China's miscalculation is that it has overlooked the divergence between economic integration and political unification. All EU member states strive toward achieving a European Gemeinschaft without anticipating a particular political framework such as a federation, confederation or European commonwealth.
Within the framework of integration, the EU's member states do not exclude any ultimate form of political union. In theory, a member state can opt out of the EU at any time, reverting to its status as a sovereign nation outside of the EU framework.
By contrast, the "one China" framework tries to limit the range of uncertain cross-strait interactions by imposing a predetermined outcome. No matter how both sides respectively make their interpretations, the "one China" principle means that Taiwan belongs to one "China," and the ultimate form of this "China" might well be the People's Republic of China.
Even if there may be other ultimate forms, the "one China" principle preemptively excludes the possibility of Taiwan not being part of China in its ultimate form.
The problem is that any framework implying an ultimate form may be unilaterally vetoed by China or Taiwan. For instance, China will not accept a commonwealth or confederation, since both entities presuppose that members are sovereign countries. On the other hand, Taiwan will find it extremely difficult to agree to "one country, two systems" or to a federation, because these models presume that Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to China.
Another example is the "interim agreement" the US suggested in 1999. Although such an agreement would allow the deferral of a showdown on sovereignty and could temporarily stabilize the cross-strait situation, the shadow of "one China" is still there. Therefore, there is little incentive for Taiwan to participate in such an arrangement. Unless either side is willing to concede its position on this sovereignty issue, any ultimate framework for cross-strait interactions is unfeasible.
Are both sides willing to accept a quasi-EU model of integration? If the two sides fully understand how the EU's framework of integration operates, then this integration could be a win-win strategy.
To put it simply, the EU's mechanism is based on a direction toward integration. The direction is further consolidated by an interlocked system of "path dependency" while an uncertainty about the final outcome is maintained. This is why the UK and Denmark did not opt to break away from the path of European integration even when they were dissatisfied with the EU's pace of integration.
But theoretically, the UK and Denmark retain the power of sovereign states to drop out of the EU. Yet the cost of withdrawal is high, so the probability of such a move is therefore small.
Similarly, a framework of cross-strait integration is acceptable for China, since it means the direction toward unification is set unambiguously. Also, as the institutions and policies of the two sides grow more interwoven, either side wanting to pull out from the integration framework will have to pay a formidable price. Therefore, once Taiwan enters a cross-strait integration framework, the possibility that the country will declare independence will decrease.
Unless China wants to seek immediate unification by way of war, the integration framework would be a worthwhile objective for China to pursue. The integration framework is also acceptable to Taiwan because the final outcome of the integration remains uncertain, even though the direction toward integration is set. Once the direction is set, the irrational threats from Chinese nationalism will be weakened. Moreover, because the results of integration are uncertain, the two sides may avoid any immediate showdown on the sovereignty issue.
But why should China accept an uncertain integration outcome? The answer is that the direction of integration usually limits the range of forms the integration will ultimately take. Then why should Taiwan accept integration, knowing it will make the country increasingly dependent and eventually lead to unification? Apart from the potential benefits of economic integration, the integration process presupposes that Taiwan's sovereignty is robust, and integration is a process of pooling sovereignty.
Therefore, once the integration process begins, China will have admitted that Taiwan has a certain form of sovereignty or autonomy. Taiwan will thereby naturally have the right to drop out of the integration process at any time, even though the likelihood of such a move is extremely low.
Hence the two sides can immediately activate a systematic integration framework and establish a clear direction in exchange for an uncertain outcome. Otherwise, as we sit idly watching the current impasse periodically worsen, due to Taiwan's elections and China's internal power struggle, and the two countries' identities drift further apart, we may be forced to greet each other on the battlefield and launch a unification or independence war.
If the leaders of the two sides are genuine in saying "never give up peace easily if there is still hope for peace," why don't they give the integration framework a try?
David Huang is an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica.
TRANSLATED BY WANG HSIAO-WEN
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