Taiwan's economic miracle has been widely recognized both at home and abroad. Now some people are complacent about the success of Taiwan's democratization, calling it a political miracle.
I believe it is too early to call Taiwan's democratic transition a political miracle. First, those who call it a miracle mistakenly believe that it happened miraculously in a short time, from the later years of Chiang Ching-kuo's (
Yet these visible historic events were preceded by many years of social ferment, sacrifice and struggle during which the social support for democratic transition was amassed. The transition has not happened miraculously in a short period of time, so to call it a political miracle is misleading.
Next, there is much dispute among political scientists about whether Taiwan is a fully democratized country. Many believe that Taiwan's democratic transition has not been complete ("consolidated"). Many scholars of democratization point out that unconsolidated democracies can devolve or even collapse. So it is definitely too early to call this democratic transition a political miracle.
Some scholars believe that the democratic transition became complete when Chen won the nation's second direct presidential election in 2000 to oust the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government that had governed for over half a century. Yet upon closer examination, Taiwan's democracy currently faces three crises.
First, while a study found that three-fourths of survey respondents said they felt they had the power to affect the way the country is governed through the electoral and legal system, two-thirds of this sample said they thought that the government was not responsive to their concerns. This indicates that Taiwan's political process may lack an important feature of liberal democracy, namely multiple and ongoing channels for expression and representation of the public's interests beyond political parties and elections.
In addition, there are significant flaws in the way the elections are conducted. Informal institutions and channels such as corruption, local factionalism, personal connections, political clientelism and organized crime ("black gold") play substantive roles in the process of political representation. Vote-buying is still widespread and few candidates voluntarily abide by rules governing campaign funds and spending, as laws governing campaign violations are ineffective. Negative campaigning crowds out positive campaigning in most elections, and the law has little or no way of changing this.
Democracy's second obstacle is that while the law provides citizens with many liberties and rights, few laws effectively keep public authorities from committing unsavory deeds for political and personal motives. For example, at various legislative levels -- particularly the Legislative Yuan, the country's highest representative body -- members can do or say almost anything they want, exhibiting the most degrading and despicable behavior and voicing outright lies. Naturally this phenomenon is a matter of the legislator's personal qualities and moral discipline, but it also relates to the lack of legal restraints.
As another example, people can assert their rights to freedom of expression and assembly, but when they obviously cross the publically acceptable boundaries of such rights and freedoms, the authorities often fail to take action to preserve order. A case in point was the activities and behaviors of the pan-blue demonstrators on Ketegalan Boulevard after the presidential election.
A third barrier to democracy's consolidation is a lack of consensus on national identity. Domestically, the issue of national identity has been distorted, manipulated and unjustifiably portrayed as a matter of ethnic harmony, social stability or democratic rights. Externally, the national identity issue deprives Taiwanese of a unified position toward China's political, economic and military threats, undermining domestic and foreign policies.
Without a consensus on national identity, Taiwan has no clear statehood. As political scientists Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan write, "Democracy requires statehood. Without a sovereign state, there can be no secure democracy." Among countries that are undergoing democratic transition, Taiwan is a unique case in this regard. (Hong Kong has a similar problem, but Hong Kong is not a sovereign state.)
The change of government represents a very significant milestone in Taiwan's history and democratization. As such, Chen bears the great responsibility of installing the rule of law and firmly establishing national sovereignty. Until then, Taiwan's democracy is not miraculous but precarious.
Shane Lee is a professor of law and politics at Chang Jung University.
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