After two consecutive presidential election defeats, the pan-blue camp should face up to reality: The contender they confront is a new party on the rise, a growing force that does not come to a halt at the election victory.
Beaming with vigor, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took only 14 years to go from its hazardous founding in 1986 to its ruling position in 2000. Among various reasons for the DPP's success, the lack of a heavy historical burden is the most salient.
Unfettered by outdated modes of thinking when proposing political reforms, the DPP is able to hew out a path and proceed to expand its territory without hesitation. With its grassroots origin and adroit leverage of public opinion, the DPP climbed to the highest rank of power in the shortest time.
The rise of the DPP, however, is based not only on the accumulated wisdom of the party, but also on the alliance of reformist forces in Taiwan's society.
Since March 20, the DPP has sped up the pace of its reforms. While deploying new personnel, the DPP also plans to meet the year-end legislative elections with policy preparations for a long-term administration.
In contrast, still in the grip of its post-election sentiment, the alliance of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and People First Party (PFP) dreams of overturning the election results. Except for this fantasy, the KMT-PFP alliance shows no broader political vision.
An opposition party refusing to move on is forgoing any possible historical turning point. From the perspective of inter-party competition, the KMT-PFP alliance has rashly given up its chance to compete.
In the foreseeable future, the KMT and PFP, as an alliance or as individual parties, are unlikely to return to power and must prepare for a long-term opposition role. This is because the KMT and the PFP have never been courageous enough to unload their historical burden.
The reason for the DPP's rapid rise is its adherence to localization and reform. These two directions, mutually beneficial, evolve with time to gain depth and new dimensions.
The localization line simply cannot be reduced to mere de-Sinicization. In fact, the Chinese value system and mode of thinking have been localized and internalized into the DPP's localization line.
As for the reform line, the DPP not only actively revamps the KMT's institutional legacy, it also simultaneously reforms from within. The most telling evidence of this is that the DPP's intraparty democracy has continued since the party's founding. As an extension of this tradition, new generations rise to take turns holding power and thus keep the DPP's power structure rejuvenated and galvanized.
Both the localization and the reform line may easily invite criticism. Nonetheless, it can not be denied that these two lines are the wings of a growing DPP.
In contrast, heavily burdened by its history, the KMT nearly has no line at all. Any issue related to political reform will only make the KMT's leaders heave a sigh of lament. When attempting a localization route, the KMT is shack-led by de-Sinicization and contemplates changing its name to the Taiwanese Nationalist Party.
The localization line, however, cannot be just slogans and assertions, but must be a comprehensive mode of thinking and a guiding principle for action. If the KMT fails to recognize that party politics are focused on Taiwan's society rather than China's territory, then the future localization dispute will cause division within the KMT.
For both the KMT and the PFP, the greatest obstacle to reform is the party's own power structure. While the KMT and the PFP declare that they're fighting for democracy and freedom in the external arena, they disallow these two values inside their parties.
KMT Chairman Lien Chan (
The effect of the initial Lien-Soong alliance was to subdue the rise of a new generation in both parties. Under these graybeards, the KMT and PFP appear even more blighted and aged. Such old parties on the wane can never counterbalance a blooming DPP in its spring.
A bigger difficulty for the KMT is its inability to confront the issue of party assets. Sitting on a heap of wealth, the KMT still suffers financial deficiencies and fails to deliver regular paychecks to its employees. A party failing to put its own house in order is unlikely to govern a country well.
Post-election reform should start with the head of the party, but the KMT perversely commences with party workers. Such a party cannot even measure up to the comradeship between gangsters, let alone envisage political reform. In possession of assets but short of a political direction, the KMT is destined to go downhill in the face of a self-reforming DPP.
Unless they readjust their power structures and political directions, the KMT and the PFP have a long journey ahead as opposition parties. The new generation inside the KMT has demanded a generational change, yet even a power transfer within the party does not mean the road to the Presidential Office will appear.
Since March 20, Taiwan has witnessed the losers lambasting the elected winners, but has seen no sign of the KMT-PFP alliance reflecting on its own direction. On the point of a generational change, the KMT must put forth far more urgent issues of political direction than that of power transfer.
Otherwise, the KMT will never catch up with the DPP, a party that gained power in 14 years. It might take the KMT and the PFP 28 years, or even longer, to return to power.
Chen Fang-ming is a Chinese literature professor at National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY WANG HSIAO-WEN
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