The biggest nightmare for China's oligarchy is the fear of losing power. Fifteen years ago, in June 1989, the party felt so threatened that it let loose its army on an ill-organized student movement agitating for a measure of democracy in the country's governance.
This was the Tiananmen massacre. Its reverberations still resound, keeping the ruling Communist Party on edge.
So much so that one of their own, the deposed party general secretary Zhao Ziyang (
The ruling junta has also come down hard on the Falun Gong movement, declaring it an evil cult and putting scores of its adherents into the country's fathomless dungeons. The party seeks to control religious revival in China for fear of creating alternative centers of power.
It is in this context that one would need to understand the party's hysteria over the democracy movement in Hong Kong; a reminder of how things nearly got out of control in 1989. Since the former British colony's reversion to China's sovereignty in mid-1997, it has been governed under a 50-year "one country, two systems" formula, which allows it a fair degree of autonomy with the promise of greater democratization. But Beijing is backing out of this promise. The ruling junta believes that it alone has the power to interpret and decide Hong Kong's future without reference to its people or anybody else. And has severely criticized the US and UK for their unwarranted criticism and interference in its internal affairs. Surprisingly, it has succeeded in warding off sustained international criticism on this score.
Why is this so? An important factor is China's economic and political clout -- not so much the reality of it (though that too is important) but the perception of it.
There is a sense that China is an emerging superpower. Most countries would like to keep their relations with it at a friendly level to maximize real and anticipated economic opportunities.
The case in point is the Chinese premier's recent visits to France and Germany, where he received extravagant treatment and his hosts scrupulously avoided mentioning human rights. Even in the US he was accorded elevated status befitting a head of state. China has acquired a larger-than-life stature as a global power.
This perception is further accentuated because of the US' Iraq quagmire. The US is over-stretched and its global strategy has become hostage to developments in Iraq. It therefore doesn't have much time and resources for other issues, like China's emergence as a strategic rival. Indeed, it looks to China for political support, particularly on the North Korean nuclear proliferation issue. At the same time, the publicity about the maltreatment of Iraqi prisoners has compromised its high moral ground on human rights. The timing is, therefore, right for China.
But China's oligarchy is still worried. And it better be, because it lacks domestic political legitimacy. Hong Kong is a reminder that a measure of autonomy and relative economic prosperity aren't enough to win over people in the absence of democratization.
In the same way, Taiwan is also a serious worry. China, of course, is committed to annex Taiwan, and feels thwarted because of a US commitment to defend Taiwan.
The easiest way, therefore, would be to persuade Washington to abandon or dilute this commitment. Beijing continues to work on this, especially since its enhanced political leverage in the context of US overstretch. Just before US Vice President Dick Cheney's recent Beijing visit, its foreign ministry issued a call for the US "to stop being committed" to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 underpinning its commitment to defend Taiwan.
In light of its heavy-handed interference in Hong Kong, a democratic Taiwan's incorporation could become the ultimate nightmare for China's oligarchy.
Taiwan is no Hong Kong. Taiwan's population is three times that of Hong Kong, and it has a functioning, well-entrenched democratic system. Unlike Hong Kong, it wasn't a colony of some imperial power, so its people do not have a colonial hangup requiring its return to the motherland. The people have an identity of their own.
Any invasion and subsequent occupation of Taiwan would be a terribly risky proposition. Even its "peaceful" incorporation under a more liberal (than Hong Kong) version of "one country, two systems" will be problematic. Its democratic character will prove corrosive for the communist party's political monopoly. Any attempt to suppress Taiwan's democracy could backfire.
In the circumstances, could it be that China's power-hungry oligarchy might simply continue to mouth the unification slogan while letting Taiwan function in a grey zone of creative ambiguity? That would suit the United States, and might not be so bad for Taiwan's political and economic establishment.
A recently published poll in China found that 5.6 percent of respondents didn't oppose Taiwan's independence. What is surprising is that the government allowed such a survey to be published with even a small minority of its citizens not obsessed with Taiwan's status. Is this a pointer to a gradual shift on China's part?
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
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