Presenting a review of US policy toward Taiwan, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia James Kelly testified at a House International Relations Committee hearing on Wednesday in Washington.
Kelly's comments were considered the first official response to recent developments in the Taiwan Strait. While reiterating the US' "one China" policy based on the three Joint Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, Kelly reminded President Chen Shui-bian (
These uncomfortable realities are closely associated with growing misconceptions about Taiwan's status, a lack of trust regarding Chen's steps toward constitutional reform and a potential military crisis originating from China's reckless and irrational miscalculations. It is Washington's conviction that all these circumstances could drag Washington into an unnecessary military conflict with Beijing. Entangled in his own global fight against terrorism, the mishandling of the Iraq fiasco and cost-benefit calculations surrounding the upcoming US election, the last thing that US President George W. Bush wants is more trouble abroad.
Chen's continuing push for recognition of the reality that Taiwan is a de facto independent and sovereign state -- with a new mandate after the recent presidential election -- coupled with his pledge to enact a new constitution through a referendum, caused Washington to draw a "red line" before Chen makes his inaugural speech on May 20. Therefore, Kelly's comments should be read from a broad and strategic perspective; we should not simply take one paragraph out of context. The main reason that Kelly emphasized the "US definition of the status quo" was to establish a "preventive mechanism" to enable the US to monitor every step of Chen's constitutional reform process.
Despite the fact that the Chen administration has outlined the constitutional revision process as a series of moves toward establishing good governance and improved political institutions, and has sworn that the process will have no bearing on the status quo, Washington is still "uncertain" about the context in which Taiwan's government will pursue its reform agenda and about which concrete proposals the agenda might contain. Hence, as Kelly pointed out: "There are limitations with respect to what the US will support as Taiwan considers possible changes to its Constitution."
The US concern over Chen's next step is understand-able, but not necessarily unsolvable. What distinguishes democratic Taiwan from authoritarian China is transparency in decision-making and a democratic system of checks and balances.
While Washington worries about Beijing's "dangerous, objectionable and foolish response" to Taiwan's constitutional changes in the near future -- which might endanger US interests in Asia -- Beijing's response does not justify stopping Taiwanese people from upgrading their democracy. In other words, it is not up to Beijing to decide what Taiwan can or cannot do.
What the US should work harder at is pushing China toward democratic openness and renouncing the use of force against Taiwan. Taiwan is a free and pluralist society where diverse points of view can be valued and added into decision-making processes. Chen is not a dictator but a democratically elected president. Leaders from Zhongnanhai are the troublemakers.
To look on the bright side, though, there is an urgent need for both Taipei and Washington to build efficient, candid and constructive channels of communication. High-ranking and bilateral talks must be instituted on a regular basis as a way to straighten things out.
No matter how the Chen administration plans to engage its Chinese counterparts on framing a peaceful and stable interaction, Washington can play the role of balancer and facilitator. As Taiwan deepens its democracy by redesigning its Constitution, the US can be of considerable help by providing advice based on its own constitutional experience.
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