Few if any government officials, experts or academics who have an interest in cross-strait relations would dispute that the next four years will be a time of great change and high tension. The challenges are intractable and will require political will and innovative policies to address them. A better system of communication between the principal players, including dialogue between all three, must be the first step, and it must be soon.
With regard to cross-strait relations, what are the immediate objectives of the three principal players? The US has an upcoming election that inevitably must place a premium on short-term solutions, or temporary fixes. National security interests must trump economic problems (as was the case in Taiwan), and the US faces a difficult worldwide war on terrorism on one hand, and a war to expand democracy in the Middle East on the other. On cross-strait relations, therefore, its objective is peace and stability while it addresses these wars elsewhere.
China too has larger objectives elsewhere. Economic growth must continue or it risks social instability. It is preparing for the Olympics -- for China a first, and an event vital in strengthening national pride (something like the identity effort in Taiwan). With regard to cross-strait relations, China's focus for the short term is to prevent Taiwan's de jure independence.
Taiwan's objectives are largely domestic, but have important implications for the cross-strait relationship. The most urgent is gaining a solid majority in the December legislative elections, a task which carries with it uncertainties generated by campaign rhetoric. Implementing economic restructuring is another, as is reforming government institutions, which includes the assurance that a referendum will be necessary to vote on any change to Taiwan's status.
Strengthening consensus on national identity is a continuing objective that may accelerate as the generation raised in recent years and schooled under "localization" principles comes of voting age. The challenge will be how this can be done prudently.
For the first two decades of the present system of cross-strait relations, the policies of the three players have been based on the Taiwan Relations Act, the three communiques, the three varieties of "one-China" policies, and the institutions that went with them. Adjustments have occurred from time to time, made cautiously and usually in response to a specific problem. The objectives of the three countries speak much for just how different circumstances have become, while the fundamental means of carrying out the relationships have remained in large measure the same.
It is unrealistic to try managing the cross-strait relations of today with problems that are so distant from those of the past. America's attention is much more on other areas of the globe, and probably will continue to be for some time. China has become an important member of the international community. And Taiwan has become a full-fledged democracy. That calls for change in how we communicate with each other -- but as always, it calls for caution and understanding.
One other factor that should be included in any assessment of policy change should go beyond politics. This factor is the vast change in communications media, and the resulting speed with which information can affect policy decisions. A statement in one country by someone who matters is known worldwide almost immediately. The meaning behind that statement tends to be clear, however, only after a reaction by other countries has already been publicly stated. This kind of unpredictability and misunderstanding can bring disaster. This is a global problem, but narrowed down to the sensitive cross-strait relationship, it can and should be fixed.
The US continues to encourage China and Taiwan to resume dialogue. In the past the US has always refused to be a mediator; I assume the reason for this is its past experiences going back to General Marshall's efforts in China, a commitment included in the "six assurances," and the expectation on the part of both China and Taiwan that the US will somehow support their position (which of course means one side or the other will have to consider this to be interference in their domestic affairs).
Dialogue between the two sides in some form -- and such a channel already exists, if China wishes to use it -- is the best option by far. This would be useful not only for discussions on political matters but also on economic matters, and would enable both parties to deal with tragedies and the inevitable problems of individual people. It would also bring restraint on both sides, as they would want the dialogue to continue.
There are other options in bringing about better communication. In the case of Taiwan, a special nongovernment envoy could bring results, as could an agreement by each side's president that the representative and their "embassies" (ie, AIT and TECRO) on each side have the full support of the president, or a special communications system to be used exclusively for cross-strait purposes. The latter option might involve the US, if this involvement was wanted by both sides, in the form of concurrent bilateral channels between the US and China and the US and Taiwan.
Normal diplomatic communications already exist between the US and China. A special channel for dialogue on cross-strait mat-ters could easily be established if China agrees. Dealing with self-imposed US restrictions on communications with Taiwan would be more complicated, but would be a matter between the US and Taiwan. The present rules were unilaterally developed by the US and are not based on any international interpretations. In any event, the US has established its relationship with Taiwan as "unofficial" and it is up to the US to decide how it is conducted. This does not in any way change the status quo.
Probably more difficult, especially for both the US and Taiwan, is the matter of who talks to whom if a new channel were to be established. This kind of communications channel could be used when needed to talk with a counterpart who has access to the appropriate decision maker. There may be other means of accomplishing this objective, but whatever means is used, it is both important and urgent that it be done.
In countries where national security tensions are uncommon, regular communications are sufficient. Where national security tensions are continuous, such as in this case, the purpose of improving communications is to resolve problems quickly, before misunderstandings gel and tensions grow.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.
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