The creation of the pan-blue presidential election ticket was a result of negotiations between Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) as well as cooperation between their parties.
They had planned to win the presidency and then decide on how to share power. Unfortunately for them, their plans fell in a heap. But how will they formulate strategy after defeat?
Lien and Soong initially thought that after securing power, many legislators could be recruited to the Cabinet and the rest given priority for nomination in the following term.
They also thought that victory would win them more seats in the legislature in December, thus giving the parties new blood. Whether the two parties should merge after the election was not a pressing issue at the time.
But the cruel reality of one plus one not equaling two has made a post-election KMT-PFP merger impossible. Will the legislative election show that one minus one equals zero?
KMT lawmakers, seeing a difficult campaign ahead, are particularly worried. They are afraid that their party will perish as they risk losing the support of both the "deep blue" and pro-localization factions.
The most optimistic scenario for the KMT was put forward by KMT Legislator Apollo Chen (陳學聖). He proposed that the party let Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) jointly take over party management while Lien and Soong jointly lead the party.
But because the KMT and the PFP will not merge, this proposal does not accommodate Soong or his party, because it regards the pan-blue camp as under the control of the KMT. Campaigning separately for the legislative elections is the best choice for both parties to make.
But coordinating candidates for the legislative election also makes good sense. That is, the two parties could negotiate the number of candidates to be nominated by each party, but each party would have to campaign on its own.
But the KMT definitely will not finance the PFP, despite the former having enormous assets: they are competing with one another for the same pan-blue support.
This is not the only cause of tension between the KMT and the PFP. Most importantly, Lien may end up dealing only with the presidential election dispute in the future, while Wang would likely work on the legislative election and Ma on party reform.
If this scenario becomes a reality, Lien will remain party chairman in name only, with actual power passed down to the next generation of party leaders.
Yet, with the failure of the Lien-Soong ticket, it is unlikely that the KMT and the PFP can continue to substantially work together. There is also a tension that already exists between Wang and Soong, and even more so between Ma and Soong.
There are three issues worth observing from this point on. First, has the post-Lien period already started? Second, will Lien be willing to hand over his power as chairman and control over party assets? Third, how will the KMT and the PFP diverge and how will they compete?
Chin Heng-wei is editor in chief of Contemporary Monthly.
Translated by Jennie Shih
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