Yesterday was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, which has been a pillar of the US' Taiwan policy along with the Three Communiques. Coincidentally, the US-Taiwan relationship is currently at an all-important crossroads. This is spurring discussion and providing opportunities for pragmatic adjustments to the relationship.
One factor that might help to create change is a series of personnel changes that have recently or might soon take place. Not only are American Institute in Taiwan Chairwoman Therese Shaheen and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugene Chien (簡又新) stepping down, but the two-year term of institute Director Douglas Paal is about to end as well. With at least two prior attempts at resignation by Chen Chien-jen (程建人), Taiwan's top representative to the US , a new game is about to be afoot, with a very different cast of front-line players.
In making personnel decisions, both the American and Taiwanese governments should give top priority to maintaining instantaneous, direct and unhindered channels of communication. In particular, considering the divisions that exist between the pan-blue and pan-green camps, it is imperative for the US that its information about and analyses of the situation in Taiwan come from both camps, so that the US can maintain a balanced perspective.
This need is plainly evident in the confusion and miscommunication that have occurred over a series of issues in recent years -- such as the defensive referendum, the rewriting of the nation's Constitution and the controversy surrounding the presidential election. In particular, with respect to the election, opportunities were left open for wild speculation that the US intended to intervene and pressure the government of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Such rumors inflamed radical supporters of the pan-blue camp to the point that they nearly got out of control, as evidenced by the violent confrontation in front of the Central Election Commission on March 26.
Even more important is the issue of substantive adjustments to the US' Taiwan policy now that the presidential election is over. To the dismay of Beijing, Chen's re-election unequivocally indicates the mainstream emergence of Taiwanese consciousness and a Taiwan-centered national identity. Having received more than 1 million more votes in this year's election than he did in 2000, Chen is no longer a minority president, but rather a president carrying out the mandate of the majority, who embraced policy ideas such as holding a defensive referendum on the cross-strait relationship and rewriting the Constitution.
Under the circumstances, perhaps amendments to the act and the abandonment of the Three Communiques are not practicable, but at least in terms of substantive policy implementation and enforcement, an effort should be made to satisfy the more pragmatic demands of the changing popular will in Taiwan.
For one thing, the US should try to serve as a mediator by trying to persuade Beijing to demonstrate more flexibility on pragmatic issues such as cross-strait links and dialogue with Taiwan.
The US, on top of de-emphasizing the ambiguous Three Communiques and emphasizing instead the more pragmatic Taiwan Relations Act, should seek to assist Taiwan in entering international organizations -- at the very least, non-political organizations such as the WHO.
This is because both Washington and Beijing need to come to grips with the fact that in this increasingly globalized world, where people give high priority to fundamental values such as human rights, democracy and freedom, the people of Taiwan are no longer happy with undignified isolation and demeaning treatment from the international community -- particularly from China. It is isolation and poor treatment that have stimulated the growth of Taiwanese national pride and Taiwanese identity.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
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