Yesterday was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, which has been a pillar of the US' Taiwan policy along with the Three Communiques. Coincidentally, the US-Taiwan relationship is currently at an all-important crossroads. This is spurring discussion and providing opportunities for pragmatic adjustments to the relationship.
One factor that might help to create change is a series of personnel changes that have recently or might soon take place. Not only are American Institute in Taiwan Chairwoman Therese Shaheen and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugene Chien (簡又新) stepping down, but the two-year term of institute Director Douglas Paal is about to end as well. With at least two prior attempts at resignation by Chen Chien-jen (程建人), Taiwan's top representative to the US , a new game is about to be afoot, with a very different cast of front-line players.
In making personnel decisions, both the American and Taiwanese governments should give top priority to maintaining instantaneous, direct and unhindered channels of communication. In particular, considering the divisions that exist between the pan-blue and pan-green camps, it is imperative for the US that its information about and analyses of the situation in Taiwan come from both camps, so that the US can maintain a balanced perspective.
This need is plainly evident in the confusion and miscommunication that have occurred over a series of issues in recent years -- such as the defensive referendum, the rewriting of the nation's Constitution and the controversy surrounding the presidential election. In particular, with respect to the election, opportunities were left open for wild speculation that the US intended to intervene and pressure the government of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Such rumors inflamed radical supporters of the pan-blue camp to the point that they nearly got out of control, as evidenced by the violent confrontation in front of the Central Election Commission on March 26.
Even more important is the issue of substantive adjustments to the US' Taiwan policy now that the presidential election is over. To the dismay of Beijing, Chen's re-election unequivocally indicates the mainstream emergence of Taiwanese consciousness and a Taiwan-centered national identity. Having received more than 1 million more votes in this year's election than he did in 2000, Chen is no longer a minority president, but rather a president carrying out the mandate of the majority, who embraced policy ideas such as holding a defensive referendum on the cross-strait relationship and rewriting the Constitution.
Under the circumstances, perhaps amendments to the act and the abandonment of the Three Communiques are not practicable, but at least in terms of substantive policy implementation and enforcement, an effort should be made to satisfy the more pragmatic demands of the changing popular will in Taiwan.
For one thing, the US should try to serve as a mediator by trying to persuade Beijing to demonstrate more flexibility on pragmatic issues such as cross-strait links and dialogue with Taiwan.
The US, on top of de-emphasizing the ambiguous Three Communiques and emphasizing instead the more pragmatic Taiwan Relations Act, should seek to assist Taiwan in entering international organizations -- at the very least, non-political organizations such as the WHO.
This is because both Washington and Beijing need to come to grips with the fact that in this increasingly globalized world, where people give high priority to fundamental values such as human rights, democracy and freedom, the people of Taiwan are no longer happy with undignified isolation and demeaning treatment from the international community -- particularly from China. It is isolation and poor treatment that have stimulated the growth of Taiwanese national pride and Taiwanese identity.
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
I have heard people equate the government’s stance on resisting forced unification with China or the conditional reinstatement of the military court system with the rise of the Nazis before World War II. The comparison is absurd. There is no meaningful parallel between the government and Nazi Germany, nor does such a mindset exist within the general public in Taiwan. It is important to remember that the German public bore some responsibility for the horrors of the Holocaust. Post-World War II Germany’s transitional justice efforts were rooted in a national reckoning and introspection. Many Jews were sent to concentration camps not
RSS