In his first interviews with the international media since the election, President Chen Shui-bian (
For years, China has portrayed its relations with Taiwan as a "domestic affair" and opposed outside interference, especially from Washington. Nevertheless, in the past couple of months Beijing attempted a new strategy of putting pressure on Taipei by means of the US' influence, largely due to Chen's push to hold a referendum.
The Chinese leaders learned some valuable lessons from their saber-rattling and verbal intimidation ahead of the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. The more Beijing resorted to missile threats and diplomatic pressure, the more likely it was to ensure a result opposite to the one it wanted. Therefore, the only way of reducing the possibility of a Chen victory was to team up with Washington in denouncing the referendum.
Beijing's about-face was highlighted by US President George Bush's meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (
exchanges on how to deal with Taiwan.
Now, with a new mandate, Chen has pledged to fulfill his campaign promises by activating the peace framework and restarting cross-strait dialogue. The peace framework, as described by Chen, is aimed at replacing both sides' current political inflexibility. Chen has suggested that if Beijing puts aside its "one China" principle and he in turn would put aside his formula of "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing and Taipei could reopen bilateral talks based on peace and stability.
What's good about such a peace framework in terms of international audience? Chen argued that it would make future cross-strait interaction a lot more predictable and manageable. The international community could monitor or even facilitate cross-strait dialogue. This framework by its very nature echoes international anticipation of a constructive Taiwan-China relationship promoting peace.
What role should the US play in the new cross-strait situation? Peace and stability not only promote a secure and prosperous Asia-Pacific region, but also enable China to continue its reforms, which coincides with US interests. For its part, the US should uphold its commitment to the security of Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, by strengthening the safety of the nation as a whole and by providing firm political support.
The US stated quite clearly in its "six assurances" of 1982 that it would not be a mediator between Taiwan and China, and this policy has not changed. However, the role of the mediator could be indirect. Washington should be more positive and constructive in securing stability and initiating the resumption of cross-strait dialogue.
Despite emphasizing the significance of respecting the free will of the Taiwanese people, the US should persuade Beijing to pragmatically consider Chen's offer of building a peace framework.
Under such a framework, the US would play the role of promoting dialogue between the two sides of the Strait in a balanced manner. Washington should utilize every possible and private channel to encourage Beijing's leaders to sit down at the negotiating table.
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